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1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
The East African Commu1nity (EAC) was re-established on 30 November 
1999 by the Republics of Kenya and Uganda and the United Republic of 
Tanzania1  signing the Treaty for the Establishment of the East African 
Community (the Treaty). The Treaty came into force on 7 July 2000.2 The 
Republics of Burundi and Rwanda acceded to the Treaty on 18 June 2007 
and became full members of the EAC with effect from 1 July 2007.3  The EAC 
was formed with the major aim of widening and deepening co-operation 
among the Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields4  
that would lead to equitable economic development in the region.5 The Treaty 
envisages the formation of a political federation as the ultimate goal of the 
EAC, after having passed through the stages of a Customs Union, a 
Common Market and a Monetary Union.6  
 
The re-establishment of the EAC was realised after a painful experience for 
the region resulting from the collapse of the former EAC7 which existed for 
ten years, from 1967 to 1977, but which barely functioned during the last five 
years of its existence.  It was preceded by the East African Common Services 
Organisation (EASCO) which was itself superseded by the East Africa High 
Commission (EAHC). An insight into the functioning of these predecessor 
institutions is crucial in order to understand the institutional framework 
underpinning the existing EAC, since its achievements  will, to a great extent, 
depend on how the institutional framework is organised to carry out the 
mandate under the Treaty in a more efficient and effective manner.   
 
                                                 
1 See “Welcome to EAC” < http://www.eac.int/index.php/about-eac.html > accessed on 10 September 
2008. 
2 See “RTAs notified to the WTO and in force”< http://docsonline.wto.org-WT/COM TD/25/Add.1 > 
accessed on 10 September 2008. 
3See “Welcome to EAC” op. cit.  
4Article 5 (1) of the Treaty.  
5 Article5 (3) (b) of the Treaty. 
6Article 5 (2) of the Treaty.  
7See “History about EAC” < http://www.eac.int/index.php/about-eac/eac-history.html?showall=1> 
accessed on 10 September 2008. 
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1.2  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The research traces the history of economic integration in the region by 
taking a look at the predecessor institutions to the re-established EAC that is, 
EAHC, EASCO and the former EAC. The reasons that led to the collapse of 
the former EAC and their impact on the formation of the existing institutions 
are analysed.  
 
 A legal analysis of the institutional framework of the EAC is undertaken   to 
see whether it supports the realisation of the EAC’s objectives. The study 
examines whether the institutional framework in place is effective and robust 
enough to sustain the EAC in the event of problems, such as those that led to 
the demise of the former institutions. A specific focus is placed on key 
institutions, such as, the Summit, the Council of Ministers (the Council), the 
Co-ordination Committee (the Committee),  the East African Court of Justice 
(EACJ), the East African Legislative Assembly (EALA), and the Secretariat.  
 
Recommendations for improvement of the institutional framework are made 
to ensure that the EAC lives to fulfil its mandate and the aspirations of the 
people of East Africa.  
 
1.3  PROBLEM   STATEMENT 
The regional integration process in the East African region has undergone 
different phases which resulted in the establishment and demise of various 
institutions before and after independence. The issue under examination is 
whether the EAC in its current format can sustain itself, and effectively 
support the realisation of its objectives.  
1.4  RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
The research examines the assumption that the current institutional 
framework of the   EAC is not effective enough to achieve its objectives.  
  
1.5  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
The importance of regional economic blocs in the socio-economic and 
political development of the Partner States can not be overemphasised. 
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Given the size of the individual economies of the states, it is imperative that 
these countries put their resources together to harness the advantages of 
economies of scale. Moreover, an integrated global economy is inevitable 
given the advent of globalisation. The EAC, is therefore, an important vehicle 
in shaping the nature, and realising the benefits, of the integrated economy of 
the member states. However, this can only be done with an effective 
institutional framework which is robust enough to withstand the challenges of 
integration, and move the region forward.  
1.6  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The research examines the Treaty, together with the relevant   Protocols, 
Community Acts, and Policy Decisions, with particular emphasis on key 
institutions. Reference is made to cases decided by the EACJ on matters 
pertaining to the functioning of the EAC.  Examples of institutions are drawn 
from the best available functioning institutional framework models suitable to 
the region. 
1.7  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Venter argues that regional economic integration achieves additional gains 
from the free flow of goods and services between the countries in a specific 
geographical area or region8. However, successful regional economic 
integration is premised on a number of preconditions, such as, the existence 
of domestic peace and security in the individual countries, political and civic 
commitment to create mutual trust among countries, need for a minimum 
threshold of macro-economic stability, and good financial management and 
sufficient broad national reforms to open markets.9 
 
The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)10 states that 
while the fundamental role of institutions in providing the right framework for 
regional integration has been widely acknowledged, the reality in Africa raises 
                                                 
8 Venter, D, et al (2006) “Economic integration” as cited in Venter, D, et al (2007) Regional   
Integration -Economic Partnership Agreements for Eastern and Southern Africa pg 7. 
9 Kritzinger-Van, L. N (2005) “Regional integration: concepts, advantages, disadvantages and 
lessons of experience” as cited in Venter, D, et al, op. cit. pg 11. 
10 UNECA II (2006) Assessing Regional Integration in Africa: Rationalising Regional Economic 
Communities < http://www.uneca.org/eca-programme/nrid/docs/pppOutcomeJuly2008.pdf > pg 21 
accessed on 12 September 2008. 
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questions as to whether institutions have played their expected role. 
Integration in general, and the contribution of regional economic communities 
as part of the institutional framework in particular, have been hampered. 
Africa needs to build and strengthen its institutions to sustain development. 
This includes the institutions related to regional integration.11 
 
Streatfeild observes that the failure of the first EAC confirmed the importance 
of maintaining an equitable distribution of economic benefits, and avoiding 
welfare losses that arise from interrupted trade flows. Economic and political 
co-operation need to be promoted through a regional policy framework with 
common macro-economic policies, as well as basic regional infrastructure.12 
 
Mvungi points out that the basic institutions of the EAC should be tailored to 
reflect the supra-national character of the organisation, and the need to 
respond flexibly to the objectives of the EAC without trading off effectiveness 
against low cost.13 Nangale contends that the estranged relationship between 
different organs of the EAC challenges the integration promotional role of 
these organs.14 Ojienda further contends that these organs of the Community 
must earn and command the respect and confidence of not just the states, 
but also the people, of East Africa, as their decisions have a direct impact on 
individuals and corporations in the region.15   
1.8  CONCLUSION 
The topic under examination will be discussed in five chapters. This chapter 
is an introduction to the paper comprising of the background and objectives. It 
also sets out the context of the research in terms of identifying the problem 
and outlining the methodology. The chapter ends with a review of some of the 
literature that has been used in this paper. 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Streatfeild, J.E.J (2003) “An examination of regional trade agreements: a case study of the EC and 
the East African Community” (Tralac Working Paper no. 11/2003) < 
www.tralac.co.za/scripts/content/php?id=2240 > pg 2 accessed on 17 September 2008. 
13 Mvungi, S.E.A (2002) The Draft Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community: A 
Critical Review pg 91. 
14 Nangale, G (2006) The Politics of Partnership: A Reflection of Living Life in a Legislative Assembly 
and other Organisations pg 69. 
15Ojienda, T.O “Understanding the East African Court of Justice” (2003) 4 The East African Lawyer  
pg 25. 
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Chapter 2 gives insight into understanding the concept of regional economic 
integration. This includes an in-depth discussion of the various facets of 
regional economic integration covering types and configuration of regional 
integration agreements and reasons pushing countries to participate in 
regional integration. The chapter also looks at the importance of regional 
integration to Africa. 
 
The historical background to the regional economic integration process in the 
East African region, both before and after independence, is examined in 
Chapter 3.The chapter traces some of the initiatives and efforts that have 
shaped and informed that process, whereas Chapter 4 discusses the new 
EAC and its objectives. This chapter establishes the centrality of institutional 
arrangement as key to the functioning of the EAC. Analysis is focused on 
organs, structure, functions, decision-making processes, and the inter-
relationship between organs with a view to evaluating their effectiveness in 
realisation of the EAC’s stated objectives. In chapter 5 conclusions will be 
drawn and recommendations proposed. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONCEPT OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
2.1  CONCEPTUALISATION 
The term ‘regional economic integration’16 is sometimes used 
interchangeably with other terms, such as, ‘regional integration arrangement’, 
‘regional integration agreement’,  ‘regional trading agreement’, ‘regional 
trading arrangement’, ‘regional trading blocs’, ‘regional trade integration’, 
‘economic integration agreements’, etc. These terms will be referred to 
interchangeably in this paper. 
 
Asante contends that regional economic integration is a process where two or 
more countries in a particular area voluntarily join together to pursue common 
policies and objectives in matters of general economic development, or in a 
particular economic field of common interest, to the mutual advantage of the 
participating states,17 under the auspices of the regional organisation. A 
regional organisation, according to Bennett, is a segment of the world bound 
together by a common set of objectives based on geographical, social, 
cultural, economic or political ties, and possessing a formal structure provided 
for in formal intergovernmental agreements. A regional organisation is 
intended to appeal only to a specified category of states, and is less than 
global in nature.18 Blaisdell observes that the test of international organisation 
is whether or not its activities are transnational.19 It is further observed that 
organisations are a characteristic feature of today’s societal world.20  
 
Venter defines economic integration as a grouping of countries in trade blocs 
by agreement or treaty, usually on a regional basis. Such trade blocs secure 
benefits for the participating member states through the tariff-free or tariff-
                                                 
16 See Regional trading blocs < http:www.oecd.org > accessed on 11 September 2008. 
17 Asante, S. K. B (1997) “Regionalisation and Africa’s Development: Expectations, Reality and 
Challenges” as cited in Akokpari, J, et al (eds) The African Union and its Institutions pg 87. 
18 Bennett, A.L (1988)  International Organization: Principles and Issues (4ed) pg 350. 
19 Blaisdell, D. C (1966) International Organisations, pg 5. 
20 Blaisdell, D. C, op. cit. pg 3. 
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reduced cross-border movement of goods, services, capital and labour 
between them.21   
.  
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) states that a 
regional integration arrangement is a preferential (usually reciprocal) 
agreement among countries that reduces barriers to economic and non-
economic transactions.22 Such an arrangement can take several forms, 
differing in the way discrimination is applied to non-members and in the depth 
and breadth of integration.23 Preferential trade areas (PTAs)24 and free trade 
areas (FTAs)25 allow members to set commercial policies and offer them 
preferential tariff reductions. Customs unions (CUs) set commercial policies 
uniformly.26 Common markets and economic unions synchronise product 
standards and harmonise tax and investment codes. Some arrangements are 
restricted to trade in goods, others extend to factors of production and trade 
in services.27  
 
All formal regional integration arrangements reduce barriers, such as, tariffs 
to trade, among member countries. It is predicted that free trade will improve 
welfare by enabling citizens to procure goods and services from the cheapest 
sources, leading to re-allocation of resources based on comparative 
                                                 
21Venter, D, et al (2007) Regional Integration-Economic Partnerships Agreements for Eastern and 
Southern Africa pg 8. 
22 UNECA I (2004)  Assessing Regional Integration in Africa,  UNECA Policy Research Report pg 9 < 
www.uneca.org> accessed on 17 September 2008 
23 See also Hoekman, B.M, et al (2001) The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The 
WTO and Beyond pg. 347 where it is observed that the specifics of each regional integration 
agreement vary greatly from case to case, but they all have one thing in common- the reduction in 
trade barriers between members and consequent discrimination against trade with other countries. 
24 See also De Burca, G, et al (eds) The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues pg 187 
where it is recounted that by liberalising trade among members preferentially, PTAs create new trade 
between members and divert trade from low-cost, non-member suppliers to high cost, member 
suppliers. Since this change is trade diversion, it is commonly viewed as imposing a welfare cost on 
the PTAs and on the world as a whole.   
25Ibid. The authors contend that in FTAs as opposed to CUs, goods destined for a high tariff member 
may enter through a low tariff member. To avoid trade deflection, when a low tariff country imports a 
product in almost finished form, adds a small amount of value to it, and then exports it to the high 
tariff country duty-free, as FTAs usually include rules of origin according to which products receive 
duty-free status only if a pre-specified proportion of value added in the product originates in the 
member countries.   
26 See also Lanjouw, G.J (1995) International Trade Institutions pg 56 where it is provided that CUs 
have the additional feature of a common trade policy vis-à-vis third countries, particularly in the form 
of tariff, that is, the tariffs on imports from outside the union. 
 27UNECA I, op. cit. pg 8. 
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advantage.28 It is thus tempting to conclude that regional integration 
arrangements will generate welfare gains.29 But because they involve 
preferential reductions of trade barriers, regional integration arrangements 
are both trade creating and trade diverting. Trade creation30 increases 
welfare. But trade diversion31 reduces it. Regional integration arrangements 
generate welfare gains only when trade creation dominates trade diversion—
an outcome that can not be determined in advance.32  It is stated that trade 
diversion hurts those outside  the agreement; therefore Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs) that are generally more trade creating are usually 
considered beneficial, and those that are generally more trade diverting are 
considered harmful. 33  Viner, though, offers a practical caveat on customs 
union and preferential arrangements.34 
 
Venables argues that RTAs, if formed among low income countries, are likely 
to harm the lowest income member due to trade diversion. Unless there is at 
least one high income member, convergence to high income level is not 
possible.35 Earlier findings by Bhagwati and Panagariya demonstrate the 
growing significance of trade diversion from non-members and least-cost 
                                                 
28 See also Lanjouw, G.J, op.cit. pg 24 where the author explains the paradox of free trade being 
touted as so beneficial but at the same time facing much resistance in practice. He further explains 
that it is because the benefits and costs are shared in different ways between the different groups in 
society, and these groups try to defend their interests by influencing trade policy decisions. An 
industry in danger of losing its protection, such as in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
negotiations, has a definite interest in preserving it.   
29 UNECA I, op. cit.pg 11. 
30This is the displacement of higher cost domestic production by lower cost production from partner 
countries due to lower barriers within regional integration arrangements.  
31It is the displacement of lower cost production from non-members by higher cost production from 
partner countries due to lower barriers. 
32UNECA I, op. cit. pg 11. 
33Panagariya, A (2008) “The regionalism debate: an overview” as cited in Streatfeild, J.E.J, op. cit. pg 
4.   
34 Viner, J (1950) “Customs Union Issue” as cited in Mathis, J.H, Regional Trade Agreements in the 
GATT/WTO: Article XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement pg 2 where he states “Customs union, 
if it is complete, involves across the board removal of duties between the members of the union; 
since the removal is non-selective by its very nature, the beneficial preferences are established along 
with the injurious ones, the trade creating ones along with the trade diverting ones. Preferential 
arrangements, on the other hand, can be, and usually are, selective, and it is possible, and in 
practice probable, that the preferences selected will be predominantly of the trade diverting or 
injurious ones”. 
35 Venables, A (1999) “Regional integration agreements: a force for convergence or divergence” as 
cited in Memis, E, et al “Assessing RTAs in the context of flying gees framework” pg 6 UNU-CRIS 
Occasional Papers No. 0-2006/18)< http;//www.cris.unu.edu/UNU-CRIS-Working-Papers.19.0.html > 
accessed on 28 October 2008.     
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suppliers, and which is likely to reduce welfare not only to outsiders but also 
to participating countries.36 Elevated trade and investment diversion is 
conceived as marginalising the ‘weakest’ countries.37 Hoekman38 points out 
that a study conducted in 1996 on the effects of announcement of the Single 
Market in the European Union (EU) in the late 1980s concluded that it had a 
significant negative impact on inward foreign direct investment (FDI) flows39 
into the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries. FDI only recovered 
after EFTA members applied for EU membership or had joined the European 
Economic Area (EEA).40 
 
 Regional integration arrangements between low and high income countries 
can generate significant economic gains from increased market access, for 
much the same reasons as the wider process of globalisation.41 But as in this 
wider process, agreements between countries of different weight may result 
in unbalanced outcomes, such as, a more limited space for national 
development policies in lower income countries, or difficulties of economic 
adjustment that lead to job losses without resources to compensate those 
adversely affected.42 Braude43 points out that prior to the EAC customs 
union’s common external tariff (CET), Uganda’s maximum external tariffs 
were only 15% while Kenya’s and Tanzania’s pre-CET tariffs stood at up to 
                                                 
36 Bhagwati, J, et al (1996) “Preferential trading areas and multilateralism: strangers, friends and 
foes” as cited in Memis, E, et al, op. cit. pg 6. 
37 Crawford, J.A, et al (2005) “The changing landscape of regional trade agreements” as cited in 
Memis, E, et al, op. cit. pg 6. 
38 Hoekman, B.M, et al, op. cit. pg 352. 
39 See also Siddiqi, M “Global crunch presents stiff challenges to FDI despite new incentives” in “The 
Middle East”, dated March 2009 pg 35 where FDI is described as the acquisition abroad (i.e. outside 
the home country) of physical assets, such as plant/equipment, real estate, or of a sizeable equity 
stake (usually exceeding 10% of shareholding). FDI involves both a long-term relationship and either 
full or partial managerial control of a productive asset in one economy by a strategic direct investor or 
a parent enterprise-a multinational or transnational corporation based in another country. FDI inflows 
comprise equity capital, reinvested earnings (i.e. profits not distributed as dividends by affiliates, or 
earnings not remitted to the direct investor) and intra-company loans. The latter includes soft loans 
provided by the parent company, which are usually rolled over, thus forming a part of the affiliate’s 
capital base. Another form of inward investment is long-term credit. At one of the scale, FDI may 
simply consist of only lincensing, management or subcontracting arrangements involving no equity 
participation.  
40Hoekman, B.M, et al, op. cit. pg 352. 
41 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation (WCSDG) (2004): A Fair 
Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All pg 73. 
42 Ibid. It further states that in the process of European integration significant resource transfers from 
richer to poorer regions have helped to reduce inequalities  and facilitate adjustment, but such 
mechanisms face considerable political hurdles 
43 Braude, W (2008) Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community pg 6. 
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40%.44 The CET top band is set at 25%. As a result, consumers and 
business sector in Uganda will face higher costs on non-EAC imports but the 
Ugandan government would benefit from higher tax revenue. The opposite 
applies in Kenya and Tanzania but the revenue loss may not be significant 
provided it is offset by increase in trade, efficiency, transparency and 
accountability.45  
 
 However, there are many studies arguing that economic integration provides 
several possibilities for developing countries, such as, higher economies of 
scale with product differentiation. Also, higher division of labour, hence higher 
productive efficiency, is mentioned as another benefit of RTAs. Such 
discussions basically indicate a recognition of possible impacts of RTAs on 
productivity and growth.46  
 
Kritzinger-Van Niekerk47 argues that regional integration arrangements can 
be defined along three dimensions: the geographic scope, illustrating the 
number of countries involved in an arrangement (variable geometry), where 
membership of a regional economic arrangement is a political choice of any 
one country whether based on social, political, geographic and /or economic 
considerations; the substantive coverage or width, that is, the sector or 
activity coverage,  such as, trade, labour mobility, macro-policies, sector 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
See also Musoke, M, et al “Pressure mounts on Tanzania to chose” (2006) 2 Procurement News pg 
22 where it is stated that the EAC-CET was set at 0% for raw materials; 10% for intermediate goods 
and 25% for finished items. 
See also Stahl, H.M (2005) Tariff liberalisation impacts of the East African Customs Union in 
perspective” (Tralac Working Paper No. 4/2005) pg 5 where it is noted that the East African Customs 
Union Protocol was signed on 2 March 2004, ratified end of December 2004 and came into force on 
1 January 2005. thus only 5 years after the new EAC was established, Custom Union Protocol took 
effect. EAC disposed of the intermediate of first establishing a FTA < www.givengain.com/cgi-
bingiga.cgi?cmd=cause-dir-news-items&cause-id=16948news-id=5188285ca-id=1051 >accessed on 
19 September 2009. See also Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union, 
2004 < http://www.eac.int/en/downloads/cat-view/110-eac-customs-union.html > accessed on 28 
April 2009. See also the Official Report of the Proceedings of the 16th Sitting of the Second EALA 
(2007) pg 2 for deliberations on the East African Trade Negotiations Bill, 2007 which is designed to 
complement the Protocol on Customs in trade relations co-ordination < 
http://www.eac.int/en/downloads/cat-view50-east-african-legislative-assembly/54-hansard-report/61-
hansard-reports-2007/84-december.html> accessed on 28 April 2009. 
46Memis, E, et al, op. cit. pg 6. 
47Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L. K. (2005) “Regional integration: concepts, advantages, disadvantages 
and lessons of experience” pg 4 < http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002411/index.php > 
accessed on 10 October 2008. 
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policies, etc; and the depth of integration to measure the degree of 
sovereignty the country is ready to surrender, that is, from simple co-
ordination or co-operation to deep integration. 
 
It is submitted that integration implies a higher degree of lock-in and loss of 
sovereignty and also tends to apply to a broader scope, although it could as 
well be limited to a specific market. It may imply more united markets for 
goods (free trade areas and customs union), free movement of goods, 
services, capital and labour (common markets) and a common currency such 
as in the EU.48 The deepest form of integration is a federated union, such as, 
the United States, which includes political as well as economic integration, 
including infrastructure-related services (telecom, air transport).49  Typically, a 
high degree of economic interactions – trade, investment, etc – could make 
integration more effective as opposed to simple harmonisation/co-ordination, 
as the opportunity cost of exit rises. Also the scope of integration and the 
concomitant complexity call for countries to relinquish sovereignty to a 
supranational agency, the purest form being a federal government.50 
 
 It can, therefore, be deduced that Preferential Trade Areas (PTAs), Free 
Trade Areas (FTAs) and Customs Unions (CUs) belong to the shallow 
integration stage,51 whereas deeper integration involves a common market 
which covers provisions on movement of factors of production besides goods 
and services. And lastly, an economic union which includes national fiscal 
and monetary policies,52 including, potentially, tax policy and a common 
                                                 
48Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L. K, op. cit. pg 7. 
49 See also Hoekman, B.M, op. cit. pg 347 where it is observed that at their deepest, regional 
integration agreements deal with issues of economic regulation and political co-operation, and 
represent a step towards nation building. 
50 Ibid. 
51Das, P (2001) “Regional trading agreements and the global economy: Asia-Pacific perspective” as 
cited in   Memis, E, et al, op. cit. pg 4. 
See also Southern Africa Global Competitiveness Hub (SAGCH) “Tough questions face COMESA as 
it prepares for the customs union” (2008) 12 Inside Southern African Trade pg 2 where it is 
suggested that because economies in the COMESA region are small and fragile and largely unable 
to trade among themselves, a customs union that ultimately succeeds is one that that adopts a 
development approach to regional integration, starting by building trade capacities of partner states, 
and gradually implementing liberalisation programmes consistent with the size of the economies. 
52 See also Meadle, E, “Monetary integration: prospects for a changing world economy” (2009) XXX 
Harvard International Review pg 47 where the authors observe that a full fledged monetary union 
between two or more countries is the most ambitious, involving the creation of a new multinational 
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currency.53 As it has been indicated, regional arrangements take many 
different forms.54 Of the over 250 economic integration arrangements that 
have been notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO),55 the large 
majority are free trade areas. But there are many efforts at deeper regional 
integration, very often as a political project as much as an economic one.56 
 
Under current World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules, there are mainly two 
categories of principles related to RTAs. RTAs involving trade in goods are 
largely governed by Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT), whereas trade in services is governed by Article V of the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)   and the Enabling 
Clause.57 RTAs are recognised as exceptions to the WTO system which is 
                                                                                                                                                       
currency, its substitution for members’ national currencies, the establishment of a new multinational 
central bank, and the legal transfer of responsibility for monetary policy to the new supranational 
institution. This type of union requires not only great co-operation and co-ordination, but also 
necessitates the participatory countries to surrender individual sovereignty with respect to monetary 
matters. 
53Memis, E, et al, op.cit .pg 4. 
54WCSDG, op. cit., pg 71. 
55 WTO (2003): World Trade Report (Geneva, WTO, 2003) as cited in WCSDG, pg 71. 
56 WCSDG, pg 71. 
57 Article XXIV of the General Agreement provide the basic rules and definitions on preferential 
arrangements covered trade in goods. For instance, a customs union (CU) or a free trade area 
agreement has to meet the condition, phrased as “substantially all the trade.” This requires that 
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce must be eliminated on “substantially all the 
trade” between the constituent territories of a CU or a free trade area in products originating in such 
territories. Besides the condition, “substantially all the trade,” there is also a “stand still” condition: the 
duties and other regulations of commerce should not on the whole be higher or more restrictive than 
the general incidence of the duties and regulations of such commerce applicable in these countries 
prior to the formation of a CU or free trade area. And a reasonable length of time” condition: any CU 
or free trade area should be formed within “a reasonable length of time.” This ambiguous term has 
lately been clarified to mean exceeding ten years only in exceptional circumstances. All RTAs and 
interim agreements must be notified to the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) and be examined by 
the Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (CRTA) for their conformity to these criteria. In 
addition to these criteria, clarifications added on like all parties should liberalize their trade in 
products on a reciprocal basis. Article XXIV only covers RTAs “between the territories of contracting 
parties.” In other words, any RTA involving a non-contracting party cannot be understood as an RTA 
in the terms of Article XXIV and, consequently, cannot be justified as an exception to MFN 
obligations. In order for RTAs involving non-members to be approved, the procedure is expected to 
be in accordance with Article XXIV:10. 
The Enabling Clause legalized derogations from MFN obligations in favor of developing countries. 
The Enabling Clause covers regional or global arrangements entered into “amongst less-developed 
contracting parties” for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and non-tariff measures “on 
products;”. Trade arrangements among developing countries are designed not to raise barriers to or 
create undue difficulties for trade with any other contracting parties. Trade arrangements among 
developing countries shall not constitute an impediment to the reduction or elimination of tariffs and 
other restrictions to trade on an MFN basis; 
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established under the fundamental principle of non-discrimination.58 RTAs 
were provided for since the inception of GATT to allow likeminded members 
willing to liberalise trade faster and deeper not to be held back by slow 
progress at the multinational level.59 Considering that the Most Favoured 
Nation (MFN) liberalisation is proving increasingly hard to attain, and that 
certain trade policy areas that have become of crucial importance to several 
members are excluded from the multilateral agenda,60 the appeal of RTAs 
becomes inescapable; these allow members to single out trade liberalisation 
with specific markets; they involve less burdensome negotiations than those 
at the WTO, especially if among like minded parties;61 and they allow the 
parties to such agreements to trade according to custom built regulatory 
aspects and trade policy disciplines.62  
                                                                                                                                                       
Trade arrangements among developing countries are to be reported to the Committee on Trade and 
Development (CTD). {Adopted from Legal Frameworks for RTAs under WTO Rules as described by 
Memis, E, et al (2006) pg 14}. 
58 Memis, E, et al, op. cit. pg 13. 
See also Farrell, M (1999) EU and WTO Regulatory Frameworks: Complementary or Competition? 
as cited in De Burca, G, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 153 where it is noted that non-discrimination is, 
alongside reciprocity, market access and fair competition, an essential ingredient of the WTO system. 
59 See also Hoekman, B.M, et al, op. cit pg 353 where it is observed that a political decision was 
made by GATT contracting parties in the late 1950s not to scrutinize the formation of the European 
Economic Community (EEC). The reason was that it was made clear by the EEC Member States that 
a finding that the Treaty of Rome was inconsistent with Article XXIV would result in their withdrawal 
from GATT. At the end of the day GATT blinked. Given that EEC most likely did not meet all the 
requirements of Article XXIV, this created a precedent that was often followed subsequently. As a 
result many regional integration agreements notified to GATT, and later WTO, embody many holes 
and loopholes. 
See also De Burca, G, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 180 where it is argued that the application of Article 
XXIV was essentially a political issue, to be determined by the Committee on RTAs which is a 
subordinate body of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council.  
60 These include government procurement, competition policy, investment and trade facilitation. 
61 See also Pahariya, N.C “Trans-regional trade agreements in South Asia” (2008) 4 Trade Insight pg 
24 where the author observes that the various roadblocks that the WTO has faced in its efforts to 
liberalise trade and investment through multilateral negotiations have provided further much impetus 
to regionalism. Much of it is a very recent phenomenon. It has been estimated that 60 percent of 
global trade is taking place through regional/preferential trade agreements (RTAs/PTAs). Some of 
these RTAs/PTAs are on the “hub-and-spoke” pattern as the North American Free Trade Area 
(NAFTA), while others are manifesting a “spaghetti bowl” or, to use a more recent term, “noodle 
bowl”, phenomenon, that is, a country is part of a number of overlapping RTAs/PTAs. 
62 World Trade Organization (2007) “RTAs and WTO: A Troubled Relationship” pg 26 < 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/bookshop_e/discussion_papers12b_e.pdf > accessed on 28 
February 2009.  
See also Bhagwati, J, et al (1995) The Dangerous Drift to Preferential Trade Agreements as cited in 
Palmeter, D The WTO as a Legal System pg 140 where it is observed that: “Another reason for the 
move towards preferential arrangements is the “GATT-frustration factor”. … When the US began to 
embrace discriminatory arrangements, the multilateral system seemed sclerotic. Since multilateralism 
was hostage to the lowest common denominator, the argument went, countries interested in freer 
trade should move ahead bilaterally, letting the laggards catch up if they could”. 
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However, Ruggiero, former WTO Director General, insists that the MFN 
implications of the regional arrangements must be checked63 as the 
traditional link between trade liberalisation and non-discrimination, is 
challenged by the increasingly complex network of regional trade agreements 
generally and those of the European Union in particular.64  Schott65 opines 
that GATT/WTO permits discrimination but only in return for full liberalization. 
The core idea behind Article XXIV is that the trade creating effects of a 
regional economic co-operation organisation must be greater than its trade 
diverting effects.66  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
See also Salacuse, J.W, et al “Do BITs really work?: an evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties 
and their grand bargain (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal where, among other things, it is 
argued that the willingness by many nations to conclude BITs other than joining multilateral 
agreements stems partly from the technical explanation that a bilateral treaty accommodates the 
interests of only two parties and is, therefore, far less complicated to negotiate than a multilateral 
global treaty, which must accommodate the interests of many countries.      
63 See Ruggiero, R (1997) “Regional initiatives, global impact: co-operation and multilateral systems” 
as cited in Mathis, J.H, op. cit. pg 132 where he observes: “First, we must ensure that the foundation 
of the trading system remains non-discrimination as embodied in the two fundamental principles of 
National Treatment and Most Favoured Nation. Regional agreements which are preferential by 
nature represent an exception to the Most Favoured Nation treatment”. 
64 See De Burca, G, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 183. 
See also Sutherland, P, et al (2004) The future of the WTO: addressing institutional challenges in the 
new millennium pg 23 where it is observed: “…five decades after the founding of the GATT, MFN is 
no longer a rule; it is almost the exception. Certainly much trade between the major economies is still 
conducted on an MFN basis. However, what has been termed as “spaghetti bowl” of customs unions, 
common markets, regional and bilateral free trade areas, preferences and an endless assortment of 
miscellaneous trade deals has almost reached the point where MFN treatment is exceptional 
treatment. Certainly the term might now be better defined as LFN, Least-Favoured-Nation treatment” 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/10anniv-e/future-wto-e.pdf  > accessed on 6 May 2009. (This 
was a report by the Consultative Board to the former WTO DG Supachai Panitchpakdi, led by a 
former GATT DG Peter Sutherland). 
See also “Supachai’s Consultative Board: non-discrimination in trouble”  < 
http://www.globefish.org/?id=2338 > accessed on 6 May 2009. 
See also Khumalo, N “Looking beyond the Doha Round: reforming the WTO negotiating process” 
(2009) 4 SAIIA Policy Briefing pg 1 where the author says: “The proliferation of regional and bilateral 
trade agreements over the last few years is seen as a strong indicator that many key WTO members 
have lost patience with the institution. This has led to continued erosion of the key principle of non-
discrimination, which is supposed to be the cornerstone of the rules-based multilateral framework”. 
See also the case of Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, Appellate Body 
Report WT/DS34/AB/R, 22 October1999 where the Appellate Body (AB) commented that “we make 
no finding on the issue of whether quantitative restrictions found to be inconsistent with Article XI and 
Article XIII of the GATT I994 will ever be justified by Article XXIV” as cited in De Burca, G, et al (eds), 
op. cit. pg 183. 
65Schott, J.J (ed) (1996) The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead pg 45. He further argues that 
the price of violating MFN would be paid only if countries were willing to go “all the way”. GATT 
requires, therefore, that such agreements cover “substantially all trade”. 
66 Jackson, J.H (1996) “Foreword, perspectives on regionalism in trade relations” as cited in De 
Burca, G, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 137.   
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Recently changes have been witnessed both in the scope and the content of 
RTAs. Many of the new waves of RTAs involve provisions beyond tariff 
liberalisation, and include more intrusive obligations, especially as regards 
intellectual property rights, services, and investment.67 More and more 
countries have recognised the fact that not only the removal of trade barriers, 
but also the elimination of non-tariff limitations, are required for effective 
economic integration.68 For instance, Clapham69 observes that an issue-
related widening is under way in the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN),70 covering investment, cross border environmental protection, 
cross border crime control, meteorological research, natural disaster 
prevention and emergency relief. He further observes that the Asean 
Regional Forum (ARF) which provides the region with an institution for 
multilateral dialogue on security and for developing the concepts of 
                                                 
67See also Hilpold, P (1999) “Die EU im GATT/WTO-System” as cited in  De Burca, G, et al (eds), op. 
cit. pg 132 where it is observed that regional economic co-operation areas often make it possible for 
their members to pursue political goals of a non-economic nature, for example, environmental 
protection, human rights, democratisation and development.  
See also Baert, F, et al (2008) “Deepening the social dimension of regional integration: an overview 
of the recent trends and future challenges in light of the recommendations of the report of the World 
Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation” (UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2008/3) pg 8 
where it is observed that bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and investment clauses in regional trade 
agreements have proliferated < http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/w-2008-3.pdf  > 
accessed on 10 October 2008.  
See also Greven, T (2005)”Social standards in bilateral and regional trade agreements: investments, 
enforcement, and policy options for trade unions” as cited in Baert, F, et al, op. cit. pg 7 where it is 
contended that, while the trade-labour linkage has been side-stepped at the multilateral level, labour 
standards are now increasingly incorporated in RTAs and bilateral FTAs, led by the US and the EU. 
See also Salacuse, J.W. et al, op. cit., for a detailed discussion on the history and the three main 
goals of the BITs movement (that is, investment protection, investment and market liberalisation and 
investment promotion) and Guzman, A.T (1997) “Explaining the popularity of BITs: why LDCs sign 
treaties that hurt them” for an insight on the paradoxical behaviour of developing countries on BITs < 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-12.html > accessed on 10 November 2008.    
See also Obadina, T (2009) “Free trade, not ‘positive’ discrimination”, in “Africa Today”, dated March 
2009 pg 29 where it is reported that Oxfam International, in its report titled Signing Away the Future: 
How Trade and Investment Agreements between Rich and Poor Countries Undermine Development, 
has accused rich countries of using bilateral and regional free trade agreements and investment 
treaties to compel poor countries to liberalise their economies to benefit rich-country exporters, but at 
the expense of poor farmers and workers. According to Oxfam, what developing countries need is 
special and differential treatment to enable them move up the development ladder.  
68Memis, E, et al, op. cit. pg 3. 
69 Clapham, C, et al (eds) (2001) Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Comparative International 
Perspectives pg 167. 
70See Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 167 where it is stated that ASEAN was created in 1967. The 
founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Other 
countries which joined later are Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam.  
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confidence building, preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in the region 
was introduced in 1994.71 
 
In a similar vein, the current Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
negotiations between the EU and African, Caribbean,72 and Pacific (ACP) 
countries involve a wide range of trade and trade related issues. The EPA 
negotiations cover trade issues in six clusters namely: development issues; 
market access; agriculture; fisheries; trade in services and trade related 
services as well as institutional framework for co-operation and the process 
for dispute settlement.73 However, despite the seemingly wide coverage of 
issues under EPA negotiations, a common perception is that there is no 
coherence between the EPA agenda and the regional integration in Africa.74 
 
 On 14 November 2007, in Brussels, Belgium, the representatives from EAC 
and EU, upon resolving that the EAC-EPA would indeed be negotiated 
separately, agreed that the framework Interim Economic Partnership 
                                                 
71 Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 167. 
72 See Davies, R “Bridging the divide: the SADC EPA” (2008) 7 No.4 Trade Negotiations Insight pg 1 
where it is noted that, as of the first quarter of 2008, the Caribbean was the only region to have 
signed a full EPA. A considerable number of ACP countries, including South Africa, had however, 
signed neither. Some of these have now to trade with the EU under the “Everything But Arms” (EBA) 
arrangement applicable to the Least Developing Countries (LDCs), some under specific 
arrangements, such as, South Africa’s Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement, while yet 
others will be obliged to trade under the less favourable terms provided for in the EU’s General 
System of Preferences. He further notes that it is easy to suggest that seldom before in the history of 
the EU-ACP relations has a measure held out as a mechanism to enhance access to the EU market 
and strengthen development co-operation between the EU and the ACP, become so controversial 
and so divisive. 
73 See “Protecting health in the proposed Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between East and 
Southern Africa (ESA) countries and the European Union” < 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002684/index.php > accessed on 25 October 2008.   
See also Munyuki, E “ESA-EC discuss EPAs” (2006) 9 SEATINI Bulletin. 
74 See Overseas Development Institute (ODI)/European Centre for Development Policy Management 
(ECDPM) “Interim EPAs in Africa: what’s in them? And what is next?” (2008) 7 Trade Negotiations 
Insight pg 2. It is further observed that one particular concern has been that countries in the same 
economic region might liberalise different baskets of products and so create new barriers to intra-
regional trade in order to avoid trade deflection. Only in the case of the EAC have all members joined 
the EPA and accepted identical liberalisation schedules. If these are implemented fully and in a 
timely way economic integration will have been reinforced. 
See also SAGCH, op. cit. pg 2 where it is reported that in December 2007 four Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) members- Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda-signed an 
IEPA with the EU as the “EAC”. Swaziland signed an IEPA as part of the “SADC EPA configuration”. 
Five other COMESA countries- Mauritius, Madagascar, Comoros, Seychelles and Zimbabwe- signed 
as part of the “ESA grouping”. Djibouti, Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi and Sudan have not 
signed, and Zambia signed without submitting a market access offer. 
See also “Interview with Peter Mandelson: EPAs: there is no Plan B” (2007) 6 Trade Negotiations 
Insight.  
 
 
 
 
17 
Agreement (IEPA) would cover trade in goods and market access, 
development co-operation and fisheries.75 However, Article 37 (rendezvous 
clause) of the IEPA76 provides a long list of areas77 that would be covered in 
the comprehensive EPA text scheduled to be signed by 31 July 2009. It 
remains to be seen whether the EU’s promise that countries signing the 
EPAs would benefit from EU financial and technical assistance would be 
fulfilled amid worries that signing such agreements brings with it, on the ACP 
governments and economies, large implementation and adjustment costs.78 
                                                 
75 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 313. 
See also Bartels, L “The legal status of the initialed EPAs” (2008) 7 Trade Negotiations Insight pg 4. 
76 Agreement Establishing a Framework for an Economic Partnership Agreement between the East 
African Community Partner States and the European Community and its Member States initialled on 
27 November 2007 in Kampala, Uganda < www.seatini.org/puplications/epas/index.html > accessed 
on 25 October 2008. 
77 These include customs and trade facilitation; outstanding trade and market access issues including 
rules of origin; technical barriers to trade and sanitary and phytosanitary measures; trade in services; 
trade related issues, such as, competition policy, investment and private sector development, trade, 
environment and sustainable development, intellectual property rights, transparency in public 
procurement; agriculture; an elaborated dispute settlement mechanism and institutional 
arrangements; and economic and development co-operation. 
78 See “Economic Partnership Agreements: tackling the myth”, the Standard, Kenya, dated 23 August 
2007 as cited in “Aid for trade and financial assistance to implement the EPAs”, Analytical Note 
(SC/AN/TDP/EPA/6), pg 3 < http://www.sarpn-
org.za/documents/d0002666/EPA_Factsheet6_SouthCentre-May 2007.pdf > accessed on 10 
October 2008. 
See also Report on Economic Partnerships by the Committee on International Trade of the European 
Parliament (Final A6-0084/2007) dated 27 March 2007 pg 13 where it is observed that it is clear that 
additional resources will be needed to cope with the effects of changes ushered in by EPAs. Scaling 
up of trade facilitation, technical assistance and support to help ACP producers meet EU standards 
must be sufficiently extensive to offset losses from tariff revenues and help ACP countries take 
advantage of market access. In the first instance this requires greater efforts to ensure that funds 
already promised are spent in a timely and effective manner. Improvements to the European 
Development Fund (EDF) procedures should be prioritised with requests for additional money. The 
EU must work to ensure that more support is given to projects which will boost ACP competitiveness 
and growth without reducing spending on health and education. Suspected re-labelling of existing 
money as “Aid for Trade” and failure of Member States to clarify how bilateral support, which is where 
funds additional to EDF must come from, will be co-ordinated with EPA-support has exacerbated 
ACP suspicion that there wont be as much money as available in practice as they appear on paper < 
http://www.sarpn-org.za/documents/d0002579/EPA_EU_report_March2007.pdf > accessed on 10 
October 2008. 
See also Van Hoestenberghe, K, et al (2006) “Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU 
and groups of ACP countries: will they promote development?” UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers O-
2006/27, pg 1 where it is observed that EPAs will only marginally increase access of ACP countries 
into EU markets and empirical studies on the static effects of trade liberalisation show a small 
negative effect on economic development for ACP countries. However, it is further observed that 
EPAs can trigger changes that do contribute to development: better regional institutions, reform of 
agricultural subsidies in the EU, an increased role of the private sector in the economic development 
through foreign direct investment and outsourcing, and a new perspective in the field of migration. 
The process should not stop at signing regional free trade agreements, but that it should be enlarged 
into new approaches of economic integration and development of groups of ACP countries < 
www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20061117101114.O-2006-27.pdf > accessed on 2 
November 2008.     
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2.2  TYPES AND CONFIGURATION OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
2.2.1  Types of regional integration  
2.2.1.1Integration by markets 
There are two main types of regional integration. The first, integration by 
markets, focuses on the idea that economies can integrate among 
themselves through the use of the marketplace, i.e. allowing the private 
sector to be the vanguard of trade integration. This can also be described as 
regional integration via de facto agreements. More concretely, this means 
that the economies in a region trade intensively among themselves without 
explicit formal preferential trade agreements.79 To facilitate intra-regional 
trade without the help of legal regional trade agreements, some of the 
economies may pursue policies of unilateral domestic deregulation and trade 
liberalisations, while others may improve their infrastructure (such as ports 
and highways), streamline their customs procedures, or pursue policies that 
may facilitate inward foreign direct investment. In other words, even 
integration via the markets can entail the use of some business friendly 
policies by individual economies, even though no legal regional trade treaties 
are signed by governments.80 
 
The increased reliance in the recent past on market led, rather than institution 
led, processes of regional integration is partly explained by progress in 
economic liberalisation and the widespread adoption of market oriented 
policy framework schemes.81 The market and corporations driven process in 
East Asia, for instance, has been encouraged by the development of both 
regional and global cross border production networks. Intra-industry trade in 
parts and components and foreign direct investment – conducted by 
corporations and encouraged by significant liberalisation – have been, and 
continue to be, the key driving forces of the established production sharing 
                                                 
79 Aminian, N, et al (2008) “Integration of markets vs. integration by agreements” pg 2 < http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent Server/WDS/IB/2008/03/04/000158349_2 > 
accessed on 30 October 2008. 
80 Ibid. 
81 McKay, J, et al (eds) (2005) “Regional economic integration in a global framework” pg 10 < 
http://www.bportugal.pt/euro/emudocs/bce/regionaleconomicintegrationglobalframework2005_e.pdf > 
accessed on 9 October 2008. 
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scheme, of the evolution of these cross border networks, and of the fostering 
of regional co-operation and integration.82  
 
Before 1997 most Asian economists considered East Asian economic co-
operation (through trade and investment) as an example of a successful de 
facto regionalism, i.e., explained by the play of pure economic forces. 
However, the financial crisis of 1997-98 demonstrated the weaknesses of 
informal regional co-operation and gave East Asians a strong impetus to 
search for a regional mechanism that could forestall future crises. This search 
is now gathering momentum and opening the door to possibly significant de 
jure integration in East Asia.83  
 
2.2.1.2 INTEGRATION BY AGREEMENTS 
The second form of integration is integration by agreements, which focuses 
on trade integration via the use of formal or de jure trade treaties. This 
channel of integration emphasises the primacy of legal instruments to further 
economic integration among countries.84  
 
There is no doubt that the two forms of integration are very much related and, 
indeed, ultimately they are complementary. Integration of neighbouring 
markets without formal regional trade agreements can create uncertainty 
among businesses since the institutional foundations may not be sufficiently 
clear and transparent. 85 The EU model of integration corresponds more to 
the policy driven model of regional integration, where institutions and 
governments have ended up guiding the process, as the number of regional 
institutions and regional agreements shows.86  
 
However, integration by agreements can be vacuous if the underlying 
economic factors are not favourable for integration. For example, it can easily 
be seen that the East Asian economies are much more integrated among 
                                                 
82McKay, J, et al, op. cit. pg 12.  
83 Aminian, N, et al, op cit. pg 10. 
84 Aminian, N, et al, op. cit. pg 3 
85 Ibid. 
86 McKay, J, et al, op .cit. pg 12. 
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themselves than the Latin American economies. In 2005, 50.5% of East 
Asian exports went to other East Asian economies.87 The comparable figure 
for Latin America (including those countries in the Andean Community of 
Nations (CAN)88 and Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)89 plus 
Chile and Mexico) was only 13.2%. Trade integration in East Asia was 
already high before the 1997-98 Asian financial crises. In 1995, 48.7% of 
East Asian exports were intra-regional compared with 17.2% in Latin 
America.90 One could assume that taking into account Northeast Asian 
countries, especially China, Japan and Korea, could change results and 
produce very high levels of integration compared to Latin American countries. 
Trade integration among ASEAN countries (25.2% in 2005) was higher than 
the trade integration among Andean Community (8.2% in 2005) or 
MERCOSUR countries (12.9% in 2005). Thus, one can surmise that de facto 
trade agreements or integration via the markets were effective in helping East 
Asia integrate, while de jure trade agreements do not seem to have led to 
more intra-regional trade integration in Latin America.91 Similarly intra-
regional grew faster in Asia than in the EC and North America in the 1980s, 
even though regional integration agreements are much less important in that 
part of the world.92 
 
2.2.2 The configuration of regional integration 
The configuration of RTAs is also becoming increasingly less regional, since 
many countries appear to be looking for preferential partners beyond their 
regional borders. The trend toward cross-regional RTAs raises some 
interesting questions and makes one ponder to what extent the premise of 
RTA formation among “natural” trading partners still applies. RTAs have 
traditionally occurred among geographically contiguous countries with already 
well-established trading patterns; prime examples include the North American 
                                                 
87 Aminian, N, et al, op. cit. pg 10. 
88 See Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 144 where it is observed that the Andean Community was 
established through the Cartagena Agreement, as codified in 1997, consisting of Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.  
89See Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 139 where it is stated that MERCOSUR, signed under the 
1991 Treaty of Asuncion,  comprises of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
90Aminian, N, et al, op. cit.10. 
91Aminian, N, et al, op. cit. pg 10.  
92 Lanjouw, G.J, op. cit. pg 74. 
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Free Trade Area (NAFTA) countries; the European Community (EC); 
Association of  Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); groupings in sub-Saharan 
Africa, such as, UEMOA; Southern African Development Community (SADC); 
EAC; and Southern African Customs Union (SACU); and in the Western 
Hemisphere, notably Caribbean Community (CARICOM); Central American 
Common Market (CACM); and MERCOSUR. This premise is further 
strengthened by the ongoing efforts by most of these regional groups to 
intensify intra-regional integration. 93 
 
The advent of cross-regional RTAs could thus be seen as a drive to look 
further afield once regional prospects have been exhausted. While this may 
be true, the sharp increase in the number of cross-regional RTAs may also 
indicate a shift in emphasis from regional priorities to RTAs with extra-
regional partners.94 Substantiating this argument, it is notable that the 
strengthening of regional integration schemes overall has been very modest, 
and in several cases even weakened by the go-alone policy by some of the 
parties to these agreements. This is especially the case with regional 
integration schemes among developing countries since they are often less 
comprehensive in terms of trade liberalisation and coverage of trade related 
areas than those found in cross-regional and particularly North-South FTAs; 
the latter include, in most cases, policy areas, such as, services, investments, 
government procurement, and competition, among others.95 
 
 Perhaps with the exception of Europe where the process of integration is 
firmly rooted in the EU, all other regions manifest growing asymmetries 
between regional integration processes and the scope and depth of the 
cross-regional  RTAs to which individual countries are parties. In this sense, 
and perhaps as a further facet of globalisation, RTAs are being employed as 
tools to overcome regional constraints and open new trade opportunities in 
the global market space; and in this process they are changing long 
                                                 
93Fiorentino, R.V, et al (2006) “The changing landscape of regional trade agreements: 2006 update” 
pg 9 < http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookp-e/discussion-paper12a-e.pdf > accessed on 12 
September 2008.   
94Ibid.  
95Ibid.  
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established geographical trade patterns.96 It has to be noted that almost all 
WTO members are now engaged in at least one regional agreement, with the 
exception of Mongolia. The new wave of regionalism can involve diverse 
countries located in different time zones, as opposed to traditional RTAs 
which are usually concluded among bordering countries with comparable 
levels of development.97 
 
Among all world regions, African RTAs come closest to the traditional 
concept of regional integration based on the geographical proximity of the 
RTA partners, and political co-operation through economic integration.98 The 
ambitious goals of most African RTAs (CUs, common markets and economic 
and monetary unions); their low level of intra-regional trade; poor 
implementation of several agreements; and their overlapping membership,99 
all tend to confirm the dominant role played by regional politics in the design 
of the region's RTAs.100 Turning to extra-regional preferential trade relations: 
these have been based, until recently, on non-reciprocal preferences under 
schemes, such as, the GSP, the African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA), 
and the EU-ACP programmes, as explained above. Most countries of the 
continent benefit from such preferential schemes,101 the exception being 
countries in North Africa and in Southern Africa that have foregone unilateral 
                                                 
96Ibid. 
97Memis, E, et al, op.cit. pg 3.  
98 Fiorentino, R.V, et al, op.cit. pg 23. 
99 See also Musoke, M, et al, op. cit. pg 21 where it is contended that the issue of overlapping 
memberships in different regional organisations can no longer be left in the pending tray at the Trade 
Ministries. Businesses suffer the costs through punitive duties at border posts when their respective 
governments are not signatories to the relevant tax concessions. Moreover, in respect of CUs, under 
the WTO rules, a country can not sign up to more than one CU. 
See also Qualmann, R, et al “Overlapping membership in COMESA, EAC, SACU, SADC: trade 
policy options for the region and for EPA negotiations” < http://tanzania.fes-international.de/info-
service/docs/overlapping-membership-in comes-eac-sacu-sadc.pdf > accessed on 10 September 
2008.   
100Fiorentino, R.V, et al, op.cit. pg 23.  
101 However for a different view see Moyo, D (2009) Dead Aid pg 118 where the author asserts that 
AGOA and EBA cannot claim to have made an overwhelming impact on Africa’s share of global trade 
as only a handful of African countries have benefited, mostly the oil-rich and larger economies. It is 
observed that in 2003 AGOA exports were more than USD 14 billion. Nigeria, South Africa, Gabon 
and Lesotho account for more than 90% of AGOA duty-free benefits, and of the total USD 14 billion 
export value, petroleum products account for 80%, with textiles and clothes accounting for USD 1.2 
billion. 
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preference for reciprocal RTAs with partners in Europe, and more recently in 
the Western Hemisphere, Asia-Pacific and the Middle East.102 
 
2.3 REASONS FOR PARTICIPATING IN REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION 
2.3.1  Political reasons 
It is often asserted that most of the arguments that are advanced for a 
country’s membership of a regional economic agreement are political. The 
structure of any nation’s international trading system should be designed to 
protect it from both the internal political system of lobbyists as well as from 
other nations.103  In this regard governments carefully consider the political 
consequences of their policies and as a result most RTAs are predominantly 
politically motivated.104 Streatfeild argues that the EAC was created largely to 
attain a certain political objective, based, to some degree, on the foundations 
of economic theory.105  
 
However, there are many reasons, in addition to political ones, that underpin 
the membership by a country of a regional economic integration. On the 
political front, the first issue is security. There may be perceived benefits from 
using a regional agreement as a basis for increasing security against non-
members, and there are some examples where this has occurred. A regional 
agreement may also enhance a country’s security in its relationship with other 
members, an important argument in the early days of European 
integration.106 These security arguments are driven by a variety of 
mechanisms: interlocking economies can make conflict more expensive; 
regular political contact can build trust and facilitate other forms of cross 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
103 Krugman, P (1999) “Regionalism versus multilateralism: analytical notes” as cited in Steatfeild, 
J.E.J, op. cit. pg 3. 
See also Hoekman, B.M, op. cit. pg 349 where it is contended that regional integration agreements 
are often driven by foreign policy and national security considerations. Indeed, these often 
predominate, any economic costs being regarded as the price to achieve the non-economic 
objectives. 
104 Denmeret, P (1997) “The reciprocal influence of multilateral and regional trade rules: a framework 
of analysis” as cited in Steatfeild, J.E.J, op. cit. pg 3. 
105 Streatfeild, J.E.J, op. cit. pg 3. 
106World Bank (WB) (2000): Trade Blocs <   http://oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/1923431.pdf  > pg 6 
accessed on 10 October 2008.  
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border co-operation. But a regional agreement can also create internal 
tensions, particularly if driven by economic rather than security considerations 
and if the economics appear to bring about an unfair distribution of 
benefits.107 This happens especially when RTAs result in more divergence 
than convergence by accelerating the trend of concentration of industry in 
one or a few countries. 108 The design of regional agreements affects the way 
gains are distributed across members and may divert trade from non-
members, thus reducing the welfare of third parties, and leading to internal 
and external tensions.109 
 
Becoming a member of RTA may increase intra-regional trade and 
investment and also link countries in a web of positive interactions and 
interdependency. This is likely to build trust, raise the opportunity cost of war, 
and hence reduce the risk of conflicts between countries.110 By developing a 
culture of co-operation and mechanisms to address issues of common 
interest, RTAs may actually improve intra-regional security and 
development.111   
 
 A good example of such a response was the formation of Southern African 
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in 1980 to provide a united 
front112 on the part of the small countries of the region against the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. Part of the strategy was to reduce economic 
dependence on South Africa both as a trading partner and as a conduit for 
the SADCC trade with the outside world. The objective was actually to reduce 
trade with the hegemon.113  Therefore, SADCC was a response to security 
and ideological imperatives in the region. In 1992, through the Windhoek 
Declaration, it was restructured into the Southern African Development 
                                                 
107Trade Blocs, op. cit. pg 6. 
108 Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L. N, op. cit. pg 3. 
109 WTO (2003): World Trade Report pg 50. 
110Polachek, S.W (1992) “Conflict and trade: an economics approach to political integration as cited 
in Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L. N, op. cit. pg  3.  
111 Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L. N, op.cit. pg 3.   
112 The Frontline States consisted of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
and later on, Namibia, when it attained its independence. 
113Foroutan, F (1993) “Regional integration in Sub-Saharan Africa: past experiences and future 
prospects as cited in Trade Blocs, op. cit. pg 16. 
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Community (SADC) to reflect the changing economic and geo-strategic 
reality in the region.114 In this regard regional integration arrangements can 
help prevent and resolve conflict by strengthening economic links among 
countries, especially African countries, and by including and enforcing rules 
on conflict resolution. On a continent where political instability and conflict 
remain major problems, the potential importance of this role cannot be 
overstated,115 as it has become obvious even to economists that absolutely 
nothing destroys economies as fast and as effectively as warfare or really 
bad governments.116   
 
 Therefore, forging bilateral and regional trade ties is often linked to 
geopolitical and security considerations. Trade policy is a key instrument of 
foreign policy for the EU and the United States, which use PTAs to secure 
regional stability by promoting the development of participating countries. 
South-South agreements also tend to reflect a political desire to participate in 
a regional initiative, such as, ASEAN and MERCOSUR in Latin America 117 
and in East Africa, one of the key objectives of EAC is the promotion of 
peace, security and stability within, and good neighbourliness among, the 
Partner States.118  
 
The second sort of political factor for participation is co-ordination and 
bargaining power—the hope that from unity comes strength. The likelihood of 
this occurring depends on who the member countries are. The EU has 
probably been able to secure more in some international negotiations than its 
member states acting independently could have.119 Regional agreements 
                                                 
114 Dewald van Niekerk, (2001) “Globalisation and regionalism in the international system” as cited by 
Akokpari, J, et al (eds) The African Union and its Institutions pg 89. 
115UNECA I, op. cit. pg 22. 
116Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit.pg 63. 
117 Carstens, A (2005) “Making regional integration work”, a speech delivered by Deputy Managing 
Director, International Monetary Fund at 20th Annual General Meeting and Conference of the 
Pakistan Society of Development Economists, Islamabad, Pakistan, 20th January 2005 < 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/011205.html > accessed on 9 October 2008. See also 
Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 167 where it is observed that the formation of ASEAN should be 
seen in the context of the politico-security situation during the formation period, because it becomes 
clear that ASEAN was seen as a means of maintaining peace and stability by providing a forum for 
the discussion and resolution of regional issues relating to security. 
118 Article 5.3(f) of the Treaty. 
119Trade Blocs, op. cit. pg 7.  
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between small developing countries cannot aspire to the EU’s economic 
weight or political power, but can nevertheless enter negotiations more 
effectively than separate countries might be able to. They are more likely to 
“be noticed,” and hence more likely to be able to make deals. Of course, 
these benefits depend on members being able to formulate a common 
position on relevant issues, a goal that has often proved elusive.120 The 
underlying inequalities in economic power translate into bargaining strength 
in negotiations that poor countries are often unable to resist.121 This has led 
to growing differentiations in the ranks of developing countries, with the Least 
Developing Countries (LDCs)122 generally finding themselves in the weakest 
bargaining position.123  There is some evidence that one motivation for the 
formation of the original European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 was 
the desire to increase bargaining power relative to the United States.124  
  
Co-ordination within RTAs may be easier than through multilateral 
agreements, since negotiation rules accustom countries to a give-and-take 
approach, which makes trade offs between different policy areas possible. 
Since RTAs may enable countries to co-ordinate their positions, they will 
participate in multilateral negotiations e.g. World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
with at least more visibility, and possibly stronger bargaining power.125 The 
collective bargaining power argument is especially relevant for the poor and 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 77. 
122See UNCTAD: The Least Developed Countries 2000 Report as cited in Converting LDC Export 
Opportunities into Business: A Strategic Response pg xvi where it is stated that LDCs are officially 
designated as such on review by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. The criteria used 
as the basis for the designation include: low income (that is, a per capita gross domestic product -
GDP- of under US$ 800 for countries joining the list in 2000); low levels of human development (a 
combined health, nutrition and education index); and economic vulnerability (a composite index 
based on indicators of instability, inadequate diversification and the handicap of small size). LDCs 
are home to 10.4% of the world’s population.   
123WCSDG, op. cit. pg 77. 
See also Converting LDC Export Opportunities into Business:  A Strategic Response pg 2 where it is 
observed that declining availability of financial resources, domestic and external, including official 
development assistance (ODA), a heavy and unsustainable debt burden, falling and volatile 
commodity prices, complex trade barriers, lack of economic and export diversification and market 
access for key products which LDCs benefit from, as well as supply-side constraints, have seriously 
affected the growth and development prospects of LDCs. It is the contention of this paper that, 
saddled with these vulnerabilities, the bargaining power of LDCs is perpetually diminished.  
124Whalley, J (1996) “Why do countries seek regional trade agreements” as cited in Trade Blocs, op. 
cit.pg 18. 
125 Kritziner-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit pg 3. 
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fractioned countries within a sub-region. It may help countries to develop 
common positions and to bargain as a group, which in turn, would contribute 
to increased visibility, credibility and even better negotiation outcomes.126 
Regional agreements can serve as a policy co-ordination mechanism to help 
prevent individual countries to opt for national strategies that fall short of 
optimal regional or global outcomes.127 For instance, countries of transit trade 
are often tempted to use trade restricting policies, such as, seeking to set 
revenue maximizing fees on transit, imposing compulsory transit routes and 
check points, or the use of mandatory securitized convoys.128 The small size 
of many African countries makes co-operation in international negotiations an 
attractive option achievable through regional integration arrangements. 
Cooperation can increase countries’ bargaining power and visibility.129 
   
The third issue is a lock-in to domestic reforms, and relates to the effect of 
the regional agreement on domestic politics. Attempts at reform are often 
undermined by expectations of reversal. A regional agreement can provide a 
commitment mechanism for trade and other policy reform measures. It can 
be a way of raising the cost, and thereby reducing the likelihood, of policy 
reversal. This argument can apply to political as well as economic reform, 
and there are examples where regional integration agreements have 
reinforced democracy in member states.130  
 
The most spectacular examples of commitment mechanisms have probably 
been the North-South co-operation agreements, such as, Mexico gaining 
credibility through NAFTA, Eastern Europe through accession agreements 
with the EU.131 Under the EU rules, membership requires that  the candidate 
country should have achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing 
                                                 
126 Ibid.  
127Maur, J.C (2008) “Regionalism and trade facilitation: a primer” pg 11 < http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent.Server/WDS/IB/2008/01/03/000158349_2 > 
accessed on 30 October 2008.  
128 Ibid. 
129UNECA I, op. cit pg 21.  
130 Trade Blocs, op. cit pg 7. See also Hoekman, B.M, op. cit. pg 349 where it is observed that some 
governments saw regional integration agreements as a mechanism to lock in policy reforms, both 
economic and non-economic, for instance, democracy, and to signal such commitments to domestic 
and foreign investors. 
131Trade Blocs, op. cit. pg 24.  
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democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protections of 
minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with the competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, 
economic and monetary union.132 Some South-South agreements have also 
acted as commitment mechanisms for reforms, notably MERCOSUR.133 
However, the effectiveness of regional agreements as commitment 
mechanisms depends on the interests and degree of involvement of all the 
countries concerned. Domestic political pressures and the activities of lobbies 
will also influence the form of many regional agreements—quite possibly 
preventing them from being as effective as they might otherwise have 
been.134  
 
Entering into regional trade agreements may enable a government to pursue 
policies that are welfare improving but time inconsistent in the absence of the 
RTA (e.g. adjustment of tariffs in the face of terms of trade shocks, 
confiscation of foreign investment, etc). There are two necessary conditions 
for an RTA to serve as a commitment mechanism. The first is, that the benefit 
of continued membership is greater than the immediate gains of exit and the 
value of returning to alternative policies. The other is, that the punishment 
threat is credible.135 Regional integration arrangements work best as a 
commitment mechanism for trade policy. But RTAs can also serve to lock the 
country into micro and macroeconomic reforms or democracy if (i) those 
policies or rules are stipulated within the agreement (deeper integration 
arrangements) and (ii) the underlying incentives have changed following the 
implementation of the RTA. RTAs may be an instrument for joint commitment 
to a reform agenda, but their effectiveness may be limited by the low cost of 
                                                 
132 Copenhagen European Council (1993): Presidency Conclusions on Political Guidance on 
Enlargement as cited in Peterson, J, et al, The Institutions of the European Union pg 35. 
See also Clapham, C, et al, op. cit. pg 189 where the authors state that a new member to the EU 
must satisfy the stringent formal criteria for admission, including compliance with all the EU existing 
rules and regulations, the so called communnautaire, which consist of over 80,000 pages of laws, 
rules and standards. 
133 Trade Blocs, op. cit pg 124. 
134 Ibid, pg 7. 
135 Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit. pg 3.  
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exit and difficulties in implementing rules and administering punishment. With 
respect to other macroeconomic reforms, one may argue that the degree of 
openness of RTAs may help discipline in macro policies (especially if the 
zone shares, or targets, a common exchange rate).136  
 
 For instance, it is frequently claimed that a developing country which is in the 
process of reforming its trade and other policies can benefit from a RTA with 
a large, developed country or region (e.g., the US or EU) because this binds 
its reforms in an international treaty, weakens the groups who stand to lose 
from and oppose the reforms, and raises credibility in their sustainability.137 
And even though the standard static welfare impact of such a RTA may be 
negative for the reforming country, the latter is likely to gain once the benefits 
of the enhanced credibility of the reforms are taken into account.138  In many 
African countries regional integration can help make reforms deeper and less 
reversible. Regional integration arrangements can provide a framework for 
co-ordinating policies and regulations, help ensure compliance, and provide a 
mechanism of collective restraint.139 
 
The fifth issue is that RTAs are often effected with foreign policy goals in 
mind. Analysts often point out that both Japan and China are jockeying for 
positions of political and diplomatic influence when they attempt to form 
bilateral trade deals in Asia, including their interest in ASEAN.140 Similarly, 
Brazil is often seen to be using its position in MERCUSOR to thwart the 
power of the United States in Latin America.141  
 
2.3.2  Economic reasons 
On the economic front, there are also a number of reasons for a country to 
participate in a RTA. One is trade gains. If goods from member states are 
                                                 
136Ibid. 
137 Schiff, M, et al (1997) “Regional integration as diplomacy” pg 2  < 
http://www.worldbank/html/dec/Publications/workpapers/WPS 1800series/wps 1801/wsp 1801.pdf.> 
accessed on 24 October, 2008. 
138Ibid. 
139 UNECA I, op. cit. pg 22.   
140 Aminian, N, et al, op. cit. pg 10. 
141 Salazar-Xirinachs, et al (2005) “Regional vs. multilateral priorities for developing countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean” as cited in Aminian N, et al, op. cit. pg 29. 
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sufficiently competitive, regional trade agreements will cause the demand for 
third party goods to decrease, which will drive down prices. In addition, more 
acute competition in the trade zone may induce outside firms to cut prices to 
maintain exports to the region. It will create a positive terms of trade effect for 
member countries.142  However, the move to free trade between partners who 
maintain significant tariffs vis-à-vis the rest of the world may well result in 
trade diversion and welfare loss. The risk of trade diversion could be 
mitigated if countries implement very low external tariffs (“open regionalism” 
arrangements).143   
 
Thus, DeRosa144 argues that, in trade diverting RTAs, tariff revenue losses 
can be decisive in determining the overall welfare effect of the regional 
integration arrangement on individual member countries and the trading bloc 
as a whole.145  In cases where the formation of a customs union would result 
in net economic benefits for the trading bloc, a facility for apportioning tariff 
revenues among union members might be necessary to enable the countries 
that gain from formation of the RTA to compensate the countries that lose.146  
                                                 
142 Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit. pg 2. 
143 Ibid. 
See also the United Nations Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (1994):Open 
Regionalism in Latin America and the Caribbean: Economic Integration as a Contribution to 
Changing Product Patterns with Social Equity as cited in Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 140 
where it is stated that in contrast to the regionalism of 1960s, which sheltered behind protectionist 
barriers, the new regionalism is termed as ‘open regionalism’ which is defined as “a process of 
growing economic interdependence at the regional level, prompted both by preferential integration 
agreements and by other policies in a context of liberalisation and deregulation, geared towards 
enhancing the competitiveness of the countries in the region and, in so far possible, contributing the 
building blocks for a more open and transparent international economy”. 
144 DeRosa, D.A (2007) “Regional integration arrangements: static economic theory, quantitative 
findings, and policy guidelines” pg 12 < 
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/workpapers/wps2000series/wps > 2007/wps2007.pdf 
accessed on 24 October 2008.      
145 Ibid. 
146For a tariff revenue apportioning mechanism see Bank of Namibia (2005) The Benefits of Regional 
Integration for Smaller Economies pg 21 where it is stated that 2002 Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU) has introduced a new system of managing and sharing the common revenue pool 
(CRP) which consists of all customs and excise duties collected by the five members (Botswana, 
Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland- BNLS states- and South Africa-SA) into a Consolidated Revenue Fund 
(CRF). SA is no more receiving the residual but is now entitled to its share of customs and excise 
revenue just like other members. The total CRP has now three components, which are governed by a 
different set of distribution criteria. The customs component, consisting of all customs duties actually 
collected, is distributed on the basis of each country’s percentage of total intra-SACU imports, 
excluding re-exports. The excise component consisting of all excise duties actually collected on 
goods produced in the customs area (net of the development component) is allocated on the basis of 
the each country’s share of total SACU Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The development 
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DeRosa further insists that a customs union or free trade area, that results in 
welfare losses for one or more member countries, might still be successfully 
implemented if welfare gains for other member countries are sufficiently large 
to provide a net welfare gain for the trading bloc as a whole and if a facility for 
compensatory intra-bloc payments, typically involving apportionment of tariff 
revenues among member countries, can be successfully implemented, with 
the result that member countries that gain from the regional integration 
arrangement compensate member countries that lose.147  
 
The second economic reason relates to increased returns and increased 
competition.  Countries participating in regional integration aim at enhancing 
trade in order to achieve higher levels of economic growth and material 
welfare. They often seek to secure access to large markets, such as the US 
or EU.148 Sometimes countries, especially smaller ones, may see 
participation in regional arrangements as a defensive necessity from an 
economic perspective. Governments may simply fear exclusion from markets, 
and regard participation as an insurance policy against being placed at a 
competitive advantage through discriminatory policies.149 Regional integration 
can empower people and countries to better manage global economic 
forces.150   
 
Within a tiny market there may be a trade off between economies of scale 
and competition. Market enlargement removes this trade off and makes 
possible the existence of: larger firms with greater productive efficiency for 
any industry with economies of scale;151 and increased competition that 
                                                                                                                                                       
component is funded initially from 15 percent of the total excise component, and distributed on the 
basis of each country’s GDP per capita: countries with lower income per capita do receive more < 
www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001766/BankNamibia2005.pdf > accessed on 10 October 2008.  
147 DeRosa, D.A, op. cit. pg 14. 
148 Carstens, A, op. cit.  
149 World Trade Report, op. cit. pg 50. 
See also Baldwin, R.E (1995) “A domino theory of regionalism” as cited in Hoekman, B.M, et al, op. 
cit. pg 349 where it is observed that as major trading partners created trade blocs, the pressure on 
others to follow increased as the costs of exclusion seemed to grow- the so called ‘domino 
regionalism’. 
150WCSDG, op. cit. pg 71.  
151 See also Lanjouw, G.J, op. cit. pg 58 where it is observed that the dynamic effects of regional 
integration include effects such as economies of scale, that is, the possibility of producing on a larger 
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induces firms to cut prices, expand sales and reduce internal inefficiencies.152 
Given the high level of fragmentation in the developing countries, especially 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), it is expected that market enlargement would 
allow firms in some sectors to more fully exploit economies of scale.153 
Clapham154 observes that ASEAN countries are advocates of open 
regionalism simply because the region is too small for inward-looking 
regionalism.155 
 
 Competition may lead to the rationalisation of production and the removal of 
inefficient duplication of plants. However, pro competitive effects will be larger 
if low external tariff allows for a significant degree of import competition from 
firms outside the zone.156 Otherwise, the more developed countries within the 
regional integration scheme would most probably dominate the market 
because they may have a head start. On the other hand, current technology 
may be obsolete in these countries compared to current and future needs of 
the regional market. Firms may then decide to re-deploy new technology and 
re-locate in other areas depending on factor costs.157 In this case, countries 
with the most cost effective infrastructure and human resources would be the 
beneficiaries.158 Regional integration arrangements can help African 
countries overcome constraints arising from small domestic markets—
allowing them to reap the benefits of economies of scale, stronger 
competition, and more domestic and foreign investment. Such benefits can 
                                                                                                                                                       
scale at lower average cost, permitted by the larger market in the region as well as the favourable 
effects of increased competition within the region. 
See also “e-EAC newsletter”, Update Issue No. 24 dated 24 February 2009 “Summit Chair convenes 
historic meeting to usher new look EAC” pg 2 where President Kagame is reported to have 
mentioned some of the benefits of regional integration as larger markets, economies of scale, larger 
pools of human, financial, and physical capital.   
152 Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit. pg 2. 
153Ibid. 
154 Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 167. 
155 Ibid, where the author further states that ASEAN is the largest free trade area grouping in the 
world in terms of population, but the smallest in terms of gross national product (GDP). Therefore, it 
is leading external linkages with Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), Closer Economic 
Relations (CER) in New Zealand and Australia, the EU, NAFTA and so on.  
156Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit. pg 2. 
157 See also Hoekman, B.M, et al, op. cit. pg 349 where it is stated that increased internationalisation 
of markets put pressure on firms, and, through them, governments to seek efficiency through larger 
markets and improved access to foreign technologies and investment. This led to private sector 
lobbying for reductions in regulation-related trade costs. These may be perceived to be easier to 
address in regional integration agreements involving like-minded governments.   
158 Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit. pg 2.  
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raise productivity and diversify production and exports.159 By effectively 
increasing the size of domestic markets, integration increases the capacity to 
withstand external economic fluctuations.160 
The third reason is investment. Entering into a regional agreement may give 
a small country an advantage over other similar countries in attracting FDI. 
Raising the level of FDI or domestic investment requires making a country 
attractive vis-à-vis other countries.161  Regional trade agreements may attract 
FDI both from within and outside the regional integration arrangement as a 
result of: market enlargement particularly for large investment that might only 
be viable above a certain size; and production rationalisation (reduced 
distortion and lower marginal cost in production). But it would be necessary to 
reduce protection, especially external tariffs. 162  
Regional economic integration typically encompasses reductions in regional 
trade barriers and investment restrictions. Hence, the impacts of RTAs on 
FDI flows will ultimately reflect the impact that trade and investment 
liberalisation has on location and firm-specific advantages. Changes in 
location-specific advantages are potentially associated with liberalisation 
induced changes in relative costs among member and non-member 
countries, changes in relative economic growth rates, altered investor 
perceptions about country-specific political risk, agglomeration economies, 
and so forth.163 Some of these changes will be the direct result of 
liberalisation initiatives: e.g., tariff reductions alter the relative advantages of 
                                                 
159 UNECA I, op. cit. pg 21.  
160 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 71. It further states that better regional co-ordination of economic policies can 
also help to dampen the spillover effects of external shocks between countries. Common frameworks 
for financial regulation, rights at work, tax co-ordination and investment incentives are practical 
regional goals which can help prevent  any risk of a ‘race to the bottom’ in these areas. 
161 Carstens, A, op. cit. 
See also Akinsanya, A “International protection of foreign direct investments in the world” (1987) 36 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly pg 58 where it is observed that the feeling of insecurity 
among investors is perhaps the major deterrent to the flow of direct foreign investment in LDCs. 
Because of the need to ensure a steady flow of investment in LDCs, measures are taken to promote 
and protect FDI in LDCs. These include concluding agreements for reciprocal promotion, 
encouragement and protection of FDI. 
See also Asante, S.K.B “International law and foreign investment: a reappraisal” (1988) 37 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly pgs 588-629 for a comprehensive discussion on FDI.  
162 Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit. pg 2.  
163 Blomstrom, M, et al (1998) “Regional economic integration and foreign direct investment: the 
North America experience” pg 4 < http://www.ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/hastef/0269.html > accessed on 
9 October 2008. 
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exporting versus establishing foreign affiliates. Other changes will indirectly 
reflect the consequences of economic integration; for example, economic 
integration will affect relative and absolute growth rates which, in turn, should 
affect FDI flows.164 
Fourthly a regional agreement can also help in dealing with region specific 
issues, such as, border controls, transit, migration, or movement of labour.165 
Countries recognise that other more opaque barriers than tariffs can hinder 
trade.166 These include border controls, phyto-sanitary restrictions, weak 
transport systems, and regulatory differences. Regional economic 
agreements, therefore, increasingly cover some of these issues, which are 
more suitably addressed at the regional level.167 For instance, domestic 
transport infrastructure constraints often have regional implications, justifying, 
from an economic point of view, port or regional airport hubs.168 Landlocked 
countries depend on the quality of the infrastructure of their neighbours. 
Some RTAs have also included dispute resolution mechanisms, which, in the 
implementation phase of the arrangement, have proven to be extremely 
useful.169  
 
The fifth factor is signalling. Though entering RTAs is costly, in terms of 
investment in political capital and transaction costs, a country may want to do 
so in order to signal its policy orientation / approach, or some underlying 
conditions of the economy, such as, competitiveness of the industry and 
sustainability of the exchange rate, in order to attract investment. This may be 
especially important for countries having a credibility and consistency 
problem 170 wanting to demonstrate to potential traders and investors that 
                                                 
164Ibid. 
165 See also Hoekman, B.M, et al, op. cit. pg 349 where it is observed that some problems or issues 
may be shared by only a limited number of (often neighbouring) countries, and can, therefore, be 
better resolved on a regional basis rather than multilaterally, for instance, a desire to achieve political 
integration- the creation of a larger political entity.  
166Carstens, A. op. cit.  
167 Ibid.  
168 Caron, et al (2001) “East Africa Sub-region: enhancing transportation management to foster US 
agricultural opportunities” as cited by Maur, J.C “Regionalism and trade facilitation: a primer” pg 11.  
169 Carstens, A, op. cit.  
170Kritzinger-Van Niekerk, L.N, op. cit. pg 3  
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they are committed to opening their markets and that the commitment would 
not be easy to reverse.171 
  
Turning to large industrial countries, trade in goods per se no longer appears 
to be the dominant factor for participating in RTAs. A growing number of 
RTAs includes a provision on liberalising services (including financial), 
investment, protecting intellectual property rights, labour, and environment 
standards.172 Industrial countries are keen to include such issues to counter 
what they regard as unfair competition due to, for example, piracy or poor 
labour standards. They also desire to open up markets for their services 
sectors, where they have a competitive advantage.173   
 
With regard to Africa, the similarities and differences of her countries could 
make regional integration and co-operation beneficial. Many African countries 
share common resources, such as, rivers—and problems, such as, HIV/AIDS 
and low agricultural productivity. But they also exhibit important differences, 
particularly in their endowments.174 Though most have limited resources, 
some have well trained workers, some have rich oil deposits, some have 
water resources suitable for hydroelectric generation, and some have 
excellent academic institutions and capacity for improving research and 
development. By pooling their resources and exploiting their comparative 
advantages, integrated countries can devise common solutions and use 
resources more efficiently to achieve better outcomes.175 Among others, 
                                                 
171 World Trade Report op. cit. pg 50. 
172 Carstens, A, op. cit. 
173Ibid. 
See also Mosoti, V “Non-discrimination and its dimensions in a possible WTO Framework Agreement 
on Investment: reflecting on the scope and policy space for the development of poor economies” 
(2003) 4 The Journal of World Investment pg 1015 where it is observed that in investment, it would 
be naïve to suppose that economic or technology transfer advantages will result directly to host 
country because investment follows maximum return, essentially meaning that the investor is not 
necessarily driven by any benevolent interests in the host country but rather will try to reap maximum 
returns that can be secured with the barest of input and least possibility of technology and knowledge 
transfer. In fact, it is well known, for instance, that in knowledge intensive business sectors 
corporations will usually be reluctant to create subsidiaries abroad if they are not assured that their 
intellectual property rights will be protected and that they can operate in an environment that can 
ensure a minimal diffusion of their peculiar profit-making knowledge to the host country and its 
citizens, be they human or corporate.  
174 UNECA I, op. cit. pg 21. 
175 Ibid.    
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resource pooling (i.e., human resources or providing R&D expenditures 
jointly) and the extended diffusion of technology (i.e., higher technology spill-
over, cheaper and more appropriate technology transfers) are considered to 
be the most significant factors in triggering economic growth.176 In Africa, 
regional economic integration is also seen as an important route to peace 
and stability, and to more effective participation in the global economy. The 
aim is attract both foreign and local investors, and to develop a pool of 
regional expertise.177 Regional integration can build the capabilities needed to 
take advantage of global opportunities.178  
 
Thus as it has been summed up by Judge Bossa, states have since come 
together because of shared ideals, values and norms and in some instances 
cultural, economic and historic ties to form economic blocs that can assist 
them to lower the cost of trading and business, stimulate economic growth, 
and transform their economies, and improve on the lives of their people.179 
 
2.4  THE IMPORTANCE OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN AFRICA 
2.4.1  The building blocs 
Regional integration is an imperative in Africa for a number of compelling 
reasons. Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, is the least developed 
region in the world.180 Of the 41 countries in the world identified by the G-8 
                                                 
176 Memis, E, et al, op. cit. pg 7. 
177 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 72. 
178 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 71.It further states that investment in skills, infrastructure, research, 
technology and support for innovation often require a critical mass of efforts more readily achieved at 
regional level. More ambitious regional objectives are also possible, such as regional strategies for 
industrial transformation or a co-ordinated broader development strategy. 
179 Romano, C.P.R. “The proliferation of international judicial bodies: the pieces of the puzzle” as 
cited in Bossa, S.B (2006) “A critique of the East African Court of Justice as a human rights court” pg 
10 < http://www.icj.org/IMG/Speech_BOSSA_pdf > accessed on 3 March 2009. 
Judge Solomy Balungi Bossa was a Judge with the EACJ, and the High Court of Uganda. 
See also Hoekman, B.M, et al, pg 348 where it is contended that the US moved from active hostility 
to enthusiasm towards regionalism in the 1980s, driven in part by frustration with slowness of the 
multilateral process. Also important was the end of cold war which reduced US willingness to accept 
preferential liberalisation elsewhere in the world while not pursuing this avenue for improving access 
to major markets itself.  
180 See also Portugal-Perez, A, et al (2008) “Trade costs in Africa: barriers and opportunities for reform” 
(Policy Research Paper No. 4619) pg 4 where it is asserted that world trade and investment flows expanded 
over the last years, but in contrast the trade performance of  SSA countries has been disappointing. According 
to COMTRADE data, Africa’s share of world exports has dropped by nearly two-thirds in three decades: from 
2.9 percent in 1976 to 0.9 percent in 2006. This implies that if Africa’s share of world exports would have been 
kept at the same level than at the mid-seventies, its exports revenue should be 10 times bigger than its current 
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(the group of eight of the most industrialised countries)181 in 1996 as poor and 
needing immediate debt relief, 33 are in Sub-Saharan Africa. African 
countries generally have low per capita income, with between 40% and 60% 
of its 900 million people earning less than $2.00 a day, while inflation rates 
are high, ranging in double, sometimes thee digit figures in certain countries. 
Overall economic growth, particularly in Sub Saharan Africa, plummeted from 
a high of 5.3% in 1997 to 4.3% in 2000.182 Unemployment is highest in Africa 
compared to other regions. The continent faces chronic balance of payments 
problems, while the imbalance in economic power relations between it and 
the Western trading partners makes prospects for better terms of trade 
unlikely.183 Grobbelaar184 indicates that the continental also remains on the 
sidelines of financial globalisation.185 
 
It does not need to be emphasised that the issue of African economic 
integration is not new.186 It came up at the dawn of independence as a 
demonstration of the willingness of African leaders to stem the adverse 
effects of Africa’s balkanisation and underdevelopment.187 It was the political 
and economic reactions to these adverse effects that triggered the 
                                                                                                                                                       
value < http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/09/16/0000158349_20089161 > 
accessed on 28 October 2008. 
181 The G-8 countries are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Russia. 
182 See, Africa Recovery (2002) as cited by Akokpari, J, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 95. 
183 Akokpari, J, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 95 
184 Grobbelaar, N, et al (eds) (2008) Unlocking Africa’s Potential: The Role of Corporate South Africa 
in Strengthening Africa’s Private Sector pg 172. 
185See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (1999) Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa: Performance and Potentials as cited in Globbelaar, N, et al (eds) pg 172 where 
it is noted that over the period 1989-2004, Sub-Saharan Africa’s share in the world’s FDI flows 
averaged 1%, compared to 10% and 17% for Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the 
Pacific, respectively.  
See also Moyo, D, op.cit. pg 98 where the author states that in 2006 global flows of FDI soared to a 
record USD 1.4 trillion whereas FDI flows into developing world (globally) approached USD 400 
billion. During this period, FDI flows to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa reached a meagre USD 17 
billion. The continent as a whole continues to disappoint and has failed to capitalise on the 
phenomenon of global FDI growth.   
186 See Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 59 where it is stated that since African states are, on the 
whole, both exceptionally small and weak, and since they have shared the strong sense of 
continental solidarity expressed notably through Pan Africanism, it is unsurprising that the continent 
has fostered a plethora of regional integration schemes of one sort or another.  
187 See also Lanjouw, G.J, op. cit. pg 69 where it is stated that in Africa the history of regional 
economic integration is linked to decolonisation. Attempts were made to alleviate the associated 
problems by economic co-operation. 
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establishment of a large number of intergovernmental agencies operating in 
the field of integration, to enable African countries to speak with one voice 
and to ease the constraints linked to the limited size of national markets.188  
 
 Given the above exposition, it can be safely stated that economic integration 
is widely regarded as a policy capable of lessening Africa’s economic and 
political marginality. This is exemplified by the fact that creation of a 
continental African common market was a founding principle of the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 and the African Union (AU), 
which replaced the OAU in 2002. The integration ‘master plan’ of both 
organisations proposes the establishment of several regional projects that, 
over time, integrate to form a pan-African community.189 
 
The Lagos Pan of Action (LPA) of 1980 which was presented by the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) prescribed regional collective self-
reliance as the approach to development. Consistent with the prevailing 
African ideology, the LPA projected an introverted, state led approach to 
integration that envisaged the creation of a common African market.190  Both 
the LPA and the 1991 Abuja Treaty, which established the African Economic 
Community (AEC), aimed to create an African economic union. Regional 
Economic Communities (RECs) are seen as the essential building blocs for 
the integration and economic development of Africa. The AEC has 
designated a number of RECs as pillars of the intended African economic 
union, including both SADC and COMESA. The AEC’s ambitious goal to 
achieve such an economic union by 2028 will demand not only the 
consolidation and rationalisation of existing RECs, but also a political 
commitment by member states to share sovereignty and deepen 
integration.191 
                                                 
188 Kouassi, R.N (2007) “The itinerary of the African integration process: an overview of the historical 
landmarks” pg 1 < http://www.africa-union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/EA/Vol.1,No.2/Kouassi.pdf> 
accessed on 28 October 2008. 
189Gibb, R, (2006) “Rationalisation or redundancy? Making Eastern and Southern Africa’s regional 
trade units relevant pg 3 (Brenthurst Discussion Paper No.3/2006) < 
www.givengain.com/unique/tralac/pdf/20060423-Bernthurst-Discussion.pdf > accessed on 19 
September 2008.  
190 Akokpari, J, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 93. 
191 Gibb, R, op. cit. pg 4.  
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 The potentially pivotal role of regional integration, providing the essential 
building blocs for integration and development, is also recognised by the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD),192 which has identified RECs 
as having responsibility to mobilise and oversee the translation of NEPAD 
objectives into practical and implementable programmes.193 Similarly to the 
AEC, NEPAD considers RECs to be the most appropriate political structure, 
and at the most appropriate geographical scale, to implement policies aimed 
at transforming the social, economic and political well being of the African 
continent.194 There is, therefore, a remarkable degree of consensus that 
effective regional integration is necessary for the economic and political 
transformation of the continent.195 The conclusion to the 1993 African 
Development Bank (ADB) study on economic integration concludes that ‘so 
serious are the challenges facing southern Africa that governments cannot 
afford to ignore  the limitations which national boundaries impose on their 
prospects for economic recovery and growth’.196  
 
The success of the process of integration is essential for Africa - because 
only the virtues of integration, in economic and political terms, offer the 
assets necessary to take up the challenges of globalisation, and to obtain a 
credible capacity for negotiation in international debates.197 Fostering intra-
African trade integration promises to reduce dependence on the West by 
                                                 
192See also Mosoti, V “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (2004) 5 San Diego 
International Law Journal pg 153 where it is observed that NEPAD rests on a new kind of relationship 
between Africa and the development partners. This relationship, unlike in the past, is described as a 
“partnership” based on mutual obligations, commitments, interests and benefits. It recognises that the 
so-called development partners also benefit, in fact very profitably, by engaging with Africa. This is 
not a trivial recognition. According to a 1999 United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
(UNIDO) Report, Africa consistently yields the highest return for foreign investment compared to all 
other regions of the world; four times the return compared to developed countries, double the return 
from Asia and two-thirds more than the from Latin America.    
193‘Joint communiqué of the Chief Executive Officers of Regional Economic Communities and the 
NEPAD Secretariat’ 29-30 October 2003, Abuja, Nigeria as cited in Gibb, R, op. cit. pg 4. 
194 See also Grobbelaar, N, et al (eds), op. cit. pgs 169-200 for discussion on the role of NEPAD on 
investment climate in Africa. 
195 Gibb, R, op. cit. pg 4. 
See also Mosoti, V, op. cit. pg 154 where it is observed that the expected results from the full 
implementation of NEPAD include high and sustainable continent-wide economic growth; reduction in 
poverty and inequality; diversified productive capacities for enhanced international competitiveness 
and increased exports; and a more cohesive continent through integration.  
196 Gibb, R, op. cit. pg 4. 
197 Kouassi, R.N, op. cit. pg 2. 
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promoting regional self-reliance. Regionalism would enhance Africa’s 
bargaining power with other regional blocs in the global economy.198 
Clapham199 argues that, paradoxically, however, where African regional 
economic organizations did have any significant impact on regional 
relationships, this was much more likely to be in the field of security rather 
than that of economic development. The most important case has been the 
role of the Economic Community of Western African States Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG) in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone.200 The SADC 
intervention in Lesotho, and still more controversially, its role in orchestrating 
military support for the Kabila regime in Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), provide further striking examples.201 
 
2.4.2  Historical ties and new developments. 
It is crucial to point out that, historically, most of SSA’s trade links have been 
with the former metropolitan powers, either directly with the United Kingdom 
(UK) (in the case of Anglophone countries) and France (for Francophone 
countries), or more generally with Europe and North America.202 These links 
have been strengthened through the development of various forms of 
preferential trade arrangements (Lome-Cotonou, AGOA, EPAs and FTAs). It 
is not surprising, therefore, that currently most of SSA’s trade is with the 
historically industrialised countries.203   
 
The current structure of trade slows down the prospects of regional economic 
integration in Africa, given the fact that regional trade agreements are usually 
measured by taking into account the level of intra-regional trade. For most of 
                                                 
198 Mistry, P.S (1999) “The new regionalism: impediment or spur to future multilateralism” as cited by 
Akokpari, J, et al (eds), op. cit.pg 97. 
199 Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 62. 
200Ibid.  
201 Ibid. 
202 Kaplinsky, R, et al (2007) “The impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa” IDS Working Paper 291 
pg 41 < http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002953/China_Africa_IDS_Nov2007.pdf> accessed 
on 10 October 2008.  
203 Ibid.  
See also Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 60 where it is observed that in economic terms, a 
regional community comprising small and poor African states had very little to offer as the modern 
monetary economies of these states had been formed, certainly on a highly unequal basis, through 
their incorporation as sources of primary products and markets for manufactured goods and services, 
within a global structure of north-south trade, dominated by their colonial metropoles. 
 
 
 
 
41 
the countries, in the region the main trade partners are not the neighbouring 
countries but markets located further away, and that have a higher demand 
for the products that are being exported.204  The 2001 share of African 
imports from other African countries was approximately 9%.205 In 2002 intra-
trade in Africa was 8.1%. This pales into insignificant in comparison to the 
50.9% and 17.0% trade with Western Europe and North America 
respectively. In 2002 intra-regional trade in Western Europe and America was 
67.3% and 40% respectively.206 
 
The other reason apart from historical ties with the West for developing 
countries, especially in Africa, not being natural trading partners, stems from 
the fact that low-income countries tend to have relatively similar factors of 
supplies; therefore, the incentive to trade with each other is smaller than for 
dissimilar countries.207 In other words, developing countries tend to have a 
comparative advantage in the same sectors; therefore, they generally are not 
low cost producers of goods imported by other developing countries. By this 
reasoning, South-South trade agreements in general, and among African 
countries in particular, are likely to lead to trade diversion as opposed to trade 
creation, if any increase in imports occurs at all. From a political economy 
point of view, trade diversion in turn implies a stumbling block effect of South-
South trade agreements for multilateral trade liberalisation.208 The challenge 
for these countries is to move into higher value exports. A strategic response 
is needed to promote innovation, adaptation, and the learning processes 
associated with it.209 Key to creation of national systems of innovation is the 
upgrading of skills and technological capabilities.210   
 
                                                 
204 Fanta, E (2008) “Dynamics of regional (non-) integration in eastern Africa” W-2008/2 pg 15 < http: 
www.cris.unu.edu/workingpapers/Emmanuel.pdf > accessed on 10 October 2008. 
205International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2002) Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, IMF as quoted in 
Mayda, A. M, et al “Do South-South trade agreements increase trade? commodity-level evidence 
from COMESA” UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers 0-2006/19 pg 6 < http://www.cris.unu.edu/UNU-CRIS-
Working-Papers/Mayda.pdf > accessed on 28 October 2008.  
206World Bank (2002) Statistics of World Trade as cited in Akokpari, J, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 97.  
207Mayda, A.M, et al, op. cit. pg 6.  
208 Ibid. 
209 Amsden, A (2001) The Rise of the Rest as cited in WCSDG, op. cit. pg 59. 
210 WCSDG, op. cit. 59. 
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Nevertheless, two major developments are disturbing these historical 
patterns. First, there appears to be a naturally growing regional market in 
southern Africa reflecting regional externalities in production.211  But, 
secondly, the rapid growth in trade between SSA and China suggests a 
growing ‘magnetic pull’ from the East. This poses a major policy challenge to 
individual and groups of SSA economies, particularly relevant in the context 
of stretched policy and administrative systems – given the growing 
importance of regional ties in the global economy. It will necessarily involve a 
‘joined-up’ mix of economic and political initiatives.212 As SSA loosens its 
links with Europe and North America, it will also be necessary for countries, 
particularly those in southern Africa, to determine how much weight they wish 
to place on intra-continental regional links, and how much on forging new 
regional links with China and other Asian economies 213 in their efforts to spur 
economic growth. Under consideration should be the fact that China’s trade 
with SSA increased 50-fold between 1980 and 2005, reaching $40 billion, 
though it represented only 2.5% of Chinese foreign trade.214 China and India 
                                                 
211 Kaplinsky, R, et al (2006) “Deep and shallow integration in Asia towards a holistic account” as 
cited in Kaplinsky, R, et al, op. cit. pg 41. 
212Kaplinsky, et al, op. cit. pg 42.   
213Ibid. 
See also Gouede, N.N (2008) “Trade and investment between Japan and Africa in the context of 
follow up to the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD IV)” pg 4 
where it is reported that Japanese investment into Africa reached USD 203 million in 2004 alone and 
between 2002 and 2004, Japanese FDI in SSA amounted to USD 415 million, roughly 0.4 percent of 
Japanese total FDI during the period. And although Japanese trade with Africa in 2007 rose to USD 
26.6 billion, it still accounted for about 2 percent of the country’s global trade. Japanese investment 
on the continent has also been urged to take into account all African countries and not focus only on 
South Africa and Egypt which absorb 85 percent of Japanese investment on the continent < 
http://www.afdb.org/pbs/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB-ADMIN-PG/DOCUMENTS/AEC/1.2.3.GOUDE-
0.PDF >accessed on 10 November 2008. 
214See also Moyo, D, op. cit. pg 120 where it is observed that in 2007 Sino-African trade jumped to 
UDS 45 billion becoming the continent’s third most important trading partner, behind the US and 
France, and ahead of UK.  
See also Dowden, R, et al “Dialogue” in “Standpoint” dated March 2009 pg 27 where Dambisa Moyo, 
Zambian-born economist and author of Dead Aid is reported arguing that Africa should be fostering 
alliances with other countries, non-traditional investors that actually do have money. China has four 
trillion dollars in foreign reserves. They have seven percent arable land and 1.3 billion people to feed. 
Therefore, she further argues, Africa should not waste its time in the WTO Doha Development 
negotiations; instead it should foster relationships with countries that are interested in buying its 
produce, such as China and India. 
See also Cheng, J.Y.S, et al “China’s Africa’s policy in the post-cold war era” (2009) 39 Journal of 
Contemporary Asia pg 87 where it is observed that China’s impressive economic growth involves an 
expansion of trade and investment activities, as well as efforts to ensure a reliable supply of 
resources in support of its development. Africa, therefore, is no longer an element of the abstract 
“Third World” concept in China’s diplomacy; it has a significant political ally in international 
organisations as well as an increasingly important trade partner and supplier of energy resources. 
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together account for about 10% of both SSA exports and imports - 25% more 
than the share of these two countries in world trade. SSA imports from China 
are mostly consumer goods, and exports to China mostly oil and other 
primary products.215 
 
However, much as regional integration is on the agenda worldwide, the 
rhetoric and reality do not always coincide.216 In the EU, there are complaints 
of bureaucratisation, distance from the people, trade diversion and problems 
of unequal weight and influence between counties and social actors. In 
addition co-ordination of policy is proving difficult. Yet there has been 
enormous progress overall.217 Elsewhere, progress has been uneven. In 
Latin America, the strengthening of regional institutions has been impeded by 
resource constraints and by a series of economic and political crises.218 In 
Africa, efforts to open up and interconnect African economies require 
considerable investment, which has been hard to mobilise. The danger of 
creating another layer of bureaucracy is real.219 
2.5  CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that regional economic integration can be either 
trade creating or trade diverting, depending on its design. It has transcended 
the traditional geographical configuration and, therefore, can be concluded 
between countries which are not geographically contiguous, shaped either 
through markets or formal legal agreements. The chapter indicates that a 
variety of reasons, predominantly political and economic in nature, tend to 
influence participation of countries in regional economic arrangements. The 
inevitability of regional economic integration as a policy capable of lessening 
Africa’s economic and political marginality has been underscored. The 
chapter has introduced the main themes underlying regional economic 
                                                                                                                                                       
See also Tandon, Y “Ending aid dependence” in “African Business”, Issue No.351 dated March 2009. 
215Broadman, H (2006) “Africa’s silk road: China and India’s new frontier” as cited in Sindzingre, A 
“Trade structure as a constraint to multilateral and regional arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa: the 
WTO and the African Union” UNU-CRIS Working Papers W-2007/11 pg 8 < 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20071207142150.w-2007-11.pdf > accessed on 10 
October 2008. 
216 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 73. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Ibid. 
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integration, laying a foundation to undertake an informed review of the history 
of the integration process in East Africa in the following chapter. 
 
 
 
 
45 
CHAPTER THREE 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN 
EAST AFRICA 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The three countries of East Africa, namely, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, 
have a lot of commonalities despite their separate existence. Apart from their 
similar colonial history, these countries harbour within their boundaries people 
who share almost similar cultural and social traits, and who, in some instances 
are in fact related, for instance, the Maasai on either side of the Tanzania-
Kenya border, and the Karamoja and Teso along the Kenya-Uganda border. 
The political economies of these countries also have a lot in common, not to 
mention their geographical proximity.220   
 
 The roots of co-operation in the East African region precede the 
colonialisation of East Africa. Before East Africa was a region in social-
economic and political flux, with various people groupings, a trade route 
network, political dynamism and social mingling that had for centuries 
succeeded in establishing a common cultural identity and a non-tribal common 
language known as Kiswahili. 221 Co-operation in early colonial days was not 
based on any institutional framework but arose in accordance with the needs 
of the moment. However, the ad hoc mechanisms were periodically reviewed 
with a view to establishing a systematic framework to support what was 
already going on. From the early institutions of integration it can be discerned 
that the main thrust behind co-operation was to take advantage of the 
commonalities of the countries to build a strong economic bloc in the East 
African region. There was, however, the equally important reason during the 
colonial times of securing greater political control by the British Government 
over the territory.222  
 
Two of the three countries that form East Africa, Kenya and Uganda, became 
British protectorates in 1894 and 1895, respectively. Kenya proceeded to 
                                                 
220 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 17. 
221 Taasisi ya Ukuzaji wa Mitaala: Kiswahili kwa Sekondari as cited in Mvungi, S.E.A (ed) op. cit. pg 
66. 
222Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 17.  
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become a colony in 1920. Tanganyika had been colonised by the Germans up 
to 1918 when it became a British mandated territory. Thus at the beginning of 
the 20th century, Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika (now Tanzania)223 were 
British territories. It, therefore, appeared to make sense to the British that, 
although governed separately, the East African countries should have a 
common market,224 taking advantage of their memorable history of cultural and 
socio-economic co-operation.225 
 
3.2 PRE-INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTIONS 
3.2.1 THE GOVERNORS’ CONFERENCE 
The institutionalisation of East Africa co-operation under British colonial rule 
started with the establishment of a common railway administration for Kenya 
and Uganda in 1902. In 1905 an East African Currency Board was 
established between Kenya and Uganda. In 1911 the two countries 
established a common Postal Union and in 1917 they established a Customs 
Union. Tanganyika joined the Currency Board in 1921, then the Customs 
Union in 1923 and finally the Postal Union in 1933.226  
 
 European settlers in Kenya were very much in favour of a federation, so they 
made an appeal for amalgamation in 1905, which received considerable 
support from Sir Percy Girouard, the man who became the Governor of the 
East African Protectorate in 1909.227 The Colonial Foreign Office in London 
was, however, hesitant about the proposal. The actual problem was that an 
East African Federation as demanded by the White settlers meant the 
establishment of a self-governing White only Colony in East Africa in which 
African interests played no part at all.228 Other common institutions to appear 
during this period include the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa, the Kenya–
Uganda Railways and Harbours, the East African Meteorological Department 
                                                 
223 Tanganyika and Zanzibar joined on 26th April, 1964 to form the United Republic of Tanzania. 
224Okoth, A (2006) A History of Africa 1915-1995: African Nationalism and the De-colonization 
Process, pg 333. 
225 Shivji, I.G (ed) (2004) Constitutional and Legal System of Tanzania: A Civics Sourcebook pg 135. 
226Doimi de Delupis, I (1970) “The East African Community and Common Market” as cited in Mvungi, 
S.E.A (ed) op. cit. pg 67.  
227Rosberg, et al (1963 “An East African Federation” as cited in Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 67. 
228Ibid. 
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and the East African Posts and Telegraphs Department.229 The East African 
Governors’ Conference was established in 1926. 
 
Due to the existence of the Governors’ Conference of the three territories 
some policies adopted for one territory found acceptance with the authorities 
of the other East African territories.  For instance, when Kenya introduced 
income tax in 1937 to remedy its bad financial situation, this was extended to 
Tanganyika and Uganda in 1940. In the same year a Joint Income Tax Board 
was established to handle the collection of tax. A Secretariat of the 
Governors’ Conference finally took permanent form, and a Joint Economic 
Council was established to liaise between the Common Services and Civil 
Services of the territories.230 
3.2.2 THE EAST AFRICAN HIGH COMMISSION (EAHC) 
During the period after World War II East Africa saw a lavish proliferation of 
common services institutions. Prominent amongst these were: the East 
African Industrial Research Organisation, the East African Airways 
Corporation, the Directorate of Civil Aviation, the East African Customs and 
Excise Department, the East African Tobacco Company, the University of 
East Africa and finally, the East African Railways and Harbours.231 On the 
recommendation of a colonial White Paper (Inter-Territorial Organisation in 
East Africa) of 1945, a common supreme body, the East African High 
Commission (EAHC), was also established in 1948 232 through an East 
African (High Commission) Order-in-Council which came into force on the 1 
January 1948.233 
 
EAHC was not an international organisation, since Tanganyika, Kenya and 
Uganda were not states but territorial units under colonial and/or foreign 
                                                 
229 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed) (2003) Constitutional Development in East Africa for Year 2001 pg 120. 
230 Ingham, K (1963) “A History of East Africa” as cited by Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 69. 
231 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed) (2003), op. cit. pg 120. 
232Ibid. 
233 Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 71. 
See also Busse, M, et al “Trade effects of the East African Community” (2005) 6 The Estey Centre 
Journal of International Law and Trade Policy pg 4 where it is stated that the EAHC was established 
with the purpose of controlling the public service in the British colonies of Kenya and Uganda, and 
the British mandated territory of Tanganyika. 
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occupation and rule. The Order-in-Council that established the High 
Commission was not a treaty, but just subsidiary legislation made by the 
Crown in England under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act.234 Although the 
proposal to establish the High Commission is said to have been accepted by 
the legislatures of the three territories, this was important only for the 
consumption of the British Parliament since for the people of the territories 
the colonial legislative organs were not legitimate law making organs. Their 
members were appointees of the Governor instead of the elected 
representatives of the people, and had no actual legislative powers since as 
dependencies; Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya were under the legislative 
jurisdiction of the British Parliament.235  
 
EAHC consisted of the Governors of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, a 
central legislature, an executive, together with various advisory boards. It was 
chaired by the Governor of Kenya. While this time around legislative 
competence was given to the Commission, no judicial body was 
contemplated. The functions of the High Commission related mainly to 
administrative duties. The Order-in-Council nevertheless introduced some 
rationalisation into the system of East African co-operation.236 The 
established Legislative Assembly, presided over by a Speaker, consisted of 
seven ex-officio members who were officers of the Commission, one official 
member nominated by the Governor of each territory, 13 unofficial members, 
one member elected by the unofficial members of the Legislative Councils 
(LEGCOs) in each territory, one African and one Indian member appointed by 
the Governor of each territory, and one Arab member elected/appointed by 
the High Commission.237 
 
The Legislative Assembly had powers to make laws, that were directly 
applicable in the jurisdictions of the three territories, relating to all matters 
                                                 
234 Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 70. 
235 Ibid. 
236 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. op. cit. pg 18. 
237 The East African (High Commission) Order-in-Council, 1947 in the Report of the High 
Commission, 1949 as cited in Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 71. 
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listed in the Order-in-Council,238 but the High Commission had powers to 
veto, scrutinise and allow the legislation so made. Furthermore, the High 
Commission could, without being invited, advise on all matters listed in the 
Order-in-Council provided this was deemed to be expedient and in the 
interest of  public order, public faith and good government. The High 
Commission could also legislate upon advice of the legislatures of the three 
territories.239  
 
EAHC was successful in its implementation of its objectives and by the time 
the three East African territories approached independence, the services 
rendered by the High Commission were enormous. Despite the success,240 
the High Commission remained an instrument of colonial domination and 
exploitation, and the concentration of most of the High Commission’s 
activities in Kenya became a bone of contention in the post-independence 
period, and finally led to the collapse of the regional co-operation.241 The 
common market system within East Africa favoured the Kenyan industrial 
base which was able to export considerably more to the neighbouring 
countries than vice versa; this led to marketing difficulties for Ugandan and 
Tanzanian products, and to bitter complaints.242  
 
                                                 
238 18 items were listed in the Order in Council as areas of legislative competence of the Legislative 
Assembly. These include: appropriations providing for the expenditures of the High Commission and 
the common services, civil aviation, customs and excise excluding tariffs, income tax excluding tax 
rates and allowances, Lake Victoria fisheries, Makerere College (effective from 1st August, 1948), 
meteorological services, pensions and emoluments of service staff, posts, telegraphs and radio 
communication, railways, harbours and inland water transport (effective from 1st May, 1948), loan 
ordinance for self-contained services, statistics and census, Royal Technical College (effective from 
1949), peace, public order and good government in the territories. 
239 Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit.pg 71. 
240 See also Mukandala, R (1999) “Political co-operation” as cited in Apuuli, K.P “Fast tracking East 
African Federation: asking the difficult questions” pg 5 where it is stated that during the pre-
independence period, from 1900 to 1960, over 40 different East African institutions in research, social 
services, education/training and defence, among others were established or strengthened. Several 
commissions were also appointed to explore the possibilities of the East African Federation, including 
the Ormsby-Gore Commission in 1924, the Hilton-Young Commission in 1927, and the Joint 
Committee of both the Houses of the UK Parliament in 1931 < http://www.deniva.or.ug/files/articles-
askingthedifficultquestions.doc > accessed on 28 April 2009. 
241Ibid. 
242 Mwase, N (1979) “The East African Community: a study of regional disintegration” as cited in 
Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 121. 
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3.3 POST-INDEPENDENCE INSTITUTIONS 
3.3.1 THE EAST AFRICAN COMMON SERVICES ORGANISATION (EASCO) 
The independence of the East African countries led to the assumption of 
power by African governments. Competition arose over the management of 
economic affairs, as Tanzania and Uganda felt that they stood to lose more 
than they gained, resulting in tensions within the Commission. While all three 
countries made significant progress towards self-government, the institutional 
framework of the High Commission failed to keep pace with these changes, 
resulting in some incongruence.243  
 
In June 1961 delegations from the United Kingdom, Kenya, Uganda, 
Tanganyika and an observer from Zanzibar assembled in London to 
deliberate on the future of the High Commission. They agreed to preserve the 
activities of the High Commission under a restructured organiational 
framework taking into account the impending achievement of statehood and 
independence of the three territories.244 The High Commission was to be 
replaced by an East African Authority consisting of the Governors of Kenya 
and Uganda and the President of Tanganyika245. The new organisation was 
named the East African Common Services Organisation (EASCO).246 Later 
the Agreement was amended to include the Presidents of Kenya and Uganda 
when these two countries became independent.247  
 
While emphasis was still laid on the economic benefits of co-operation, 
political leaders assumed the functions of colonial administrators and 
bureaucrats, hence making EASCO more political than its predecessors. 248 
However, the EASCO was a great improvement on EAHC. It created five 
Ministerial Committees, working directly under the Authority, in the fields of 
communication, finance, commercial and industrial co-operation, social and 
                                                 
243 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 18. 
244 Mvungi  S.E.A (ed) (2002), op. cit. pg 72 
245 Tanganyika became independent on 9th December 1961. 
246 Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit.pg 72. 
247 Uganda became independent on 9th October 1962 and Kenya on 12th December 1963. Zanzibar 
was included in EASCO by Amendment no.2 to the EASCO Agreement, 1964. 
248 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit.pg 18. 
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research services, and labour.249 Furthermore the EASCO Agreement 
established an East African Court of Appeal to hear appeals from the High 
Courts of the three territories. EASCO could enter into an agreement with the 
United Kingdom under which the East African Court of Appeal could hear 
cases of other territories, such as Aden, St. Helena, Seychelles and 
Somaliland. This transferred the powers of the Privy Council to hear appeals 
from the three territories to the Court of Appeal of East Africa. The powers of 
the East African Legislative Assembly were increased so that it could 
legislate on the 27 matters listed in the Annex to the EASCO Agreement.250 
  
EASCO was also responsible for customs and income tax, postal services, 
railways, East African Airlines, the University, and other services including 
tsetse fly control and research. Most important was the East African Currency 
Board which issued the common currency, the East African schilling.251 
These services were known as common services. EASCO managed to 
establish itself as a very competent regional integration organisation with 
unprecedented supra-national powers. The free movement of goods, 
services, persons and capital was guaranteed, with a single currency 
ensuring a stable financial market without convertibility impediments.252 
 
It is, however, significant to note that Kenya remained at all times the seat of 
nearly all the integration institutions.253 One relevant outcome of this was 
sharply contrasting levels of economic development, Kenya exhibiting a 
conspicuous head start in nearly all the key indicators, with Tanzania trailing 
behind her two ‘cousins’. Whether within EAHC or EACSO, one member 
continued to enjoy a relatively superior level of economic development (and 
infrastructure), thus attracting more investments, with the ultimate result of 
not merely becoming a “principal beneficiary” of the integration scheme but 
the ‘dominant’ factor.254  
                                                 
249Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 72.   
250Ibid.  
251 Shivji, I.G (ed) (2004) Constitutional and Legal System of Tanzania: A Civics Sourcebook op. cit. 
pg 135. 
252 Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 73. 
253 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 120. 
254 Oloka-Onyango, op.cit.pg 122. 
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 The issue of inequitable distribution was, however, partly settled through the 
Raisman Commission, which recommended that each territory pay into a 
distributable pool a fixed percentage of the customs and excise duties, as 
well as corporate income taxes, which it collected. Since Kenya was 
economically doing better than the other two countries, it had to pay a 
proportionately larger percentage of the pool proceeds. The distributable pool 
favoured Uganda and Tanzania; therefore, this solution was not 
satisfactory.255  
 
Although the internal institutional and investment imbalances in the East 
African common market as a result of colonial policies began to bear on 
EASCO affairs, these were immediately palliated by the radical movement 
towards an East African Federation which the political leadership of the three 
territories was offering.256 The idea of a political federation, with Tanzania as 
its strongest advocate,257 did not go down well with the other two. In 1963 the 
issue nearly broke EASCO itself. As a matter of fact, the East African Navy 
had already been broken up, Uganda had withdrawn from the East African 
Tourist Travel Association and Tanzania was threatening to withdraw from 
the market.258  Ultimately the three governments failed to agree on setting up 
a Federation and gradually went their own way, splitting all the common 
services. The Common currency was probably the most serious loss as two 
of the successor currencies rapidly inflated, and eventually the Kenyan 
currency too. The currency collapsed in value when Tanzania adopted 
socialism in 1967 and nationalised all its banks. Customs posts were set up 
                                                 
255 Okoth, A, op. cit. pg 334. 
256 Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 73. 
257 See also Nyerere, J.K (1966) Freedom and Unity pg 90 where the author says that the 
balkanisation of Africa is a source of weaknesses to the continent. The forces of imperialism and 
neo-imperialism will find their own strength in this basic weakness of the continent. He advocated a 
federation of East Africa as one of the solutions to undo part of the harm that was already done by 
the balkanisation of the continent. 
258 Okoth, A, op. cit. pg 334. 
See also Nyirabu, M (2005) “Lessons from the East African Community of 1967-1977” as cited in 
Apuuli, K.P, et al, op. cit. pg 7 where it is stated that from its birth EASCO was faced with serious 
problems, predominantly trade imbalances and unequal distribution of benefits. Attempts were made 
to address the imbalance by signing the Kampala Agreement in 1964. The Agreement sought to 
decrease trade deficit and industrial imbalance. It was never implemented partly because Kenya 
refused to ratify it. 
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on roads which previously had experienced free trade, turning ordinary 
traders into smugglers.259  
 
Following the dissolution of the East African Currency Board, some Partner 
States started introducing measures aimed at individual rectification of the 
existing imbalances in the economic structure of EASCO by introducing 
certain restrictions on trade. This led to immediate reactions in the common 
services, and a commission was appointed under a United Nations expert, 
Professor Kjeld Phillip of Denmark, to study the problems facing EASCO. 
Professor Phillip submitted a far reaching Report which made proposals for 
restructuring the EASCO into an economic community.260  
 
3.3.2 The East African Community (EAC) 
On the basis of the Report by Professor Phillip, on 6 June 1967 Presidents 
Jomo Kenyatta (Kenya), Julius Nyerere (Tanzania) and Milton Obote 
(Uganda) signed the Treaty for East African Co-operation261 that established 
the East African Community (EAC), also referred to as ‘the Community’. The 
Treaty came into effect six months later on 1 December 1967.262 The 
Community was essentially a carryover into the independence era of former 
colonial arrangements263 as it ‘took over’ nearly the entire range of joint 
services belonging to the erstwhile EASCO. These in turn may be classified 
into two groups: East African Community Corporations, and General Fund 
Services. To the former belonged such services as railways, posts and 
telecommunications, airways and cargo handling services. The latter included 
a far broader category of services, ranging from research and training 
institutions to the Auditor-General’s Department.264  
 
Structurally the Treaty established the following organs: the East African 
Authority (commonly referred to as ‘the Authority’), the East African 
Legislative Assembly, the East African Ministers, the East African Community 
                                                 
259Shivji, I.G (ed), op. cit. pg 135. 
260 Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 75. 
261 For purposes of clarity it may be referred to as  ‘the former Treaty’ 
262 Okoth,  A, op. cit. pg 334. 
263 Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 59. 
264 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 124. 
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Council, and the Common Market Tribunal.265 The East African Authority was 
the highest decision-making, supervisory and controlling organ of the 
Community, consisting of the Heads of State of the three Partner States.266 
The Authority was immediately assisted by the East African Ministers who 
were appointees of the Heads of the State of the three Partner States, 
provided that, in appointing an East African Minister, the appointing authority 
was required to ensure that his appointee was a person who qualified as a 
voter according to the electoral laws of their country and was not a member 
of their country’s cabinet, at the time of appointment.267  
 
The proviso to bar East African Ministers from being members of their home 
country’s cabinet was included in order to ensure that an East African 
Minister is independent of national politics of their country. The Committee of 
Ministers, permanently resident in Arusha, Tanzania, the newly designated 
headquarters of the Community, was primarily tasked to serve as an advisory 
body to the Authority in respect of day to day management and decision 
making.268 Each appointed Minister enjoyed the status of a Cabinet Minister 
in his or her respective home government, thereby ensuring robust linkages 
between the Community in Arusha and the Governments of the Partner 
States in Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala and Nairobi. The East African Ministers 
further worked in further close consultation with two other organs- the East 
African Legislative Assembly (EALA), on the one hand, and the five 
Ministerial Councils, on the other. They sat along with their respective 
Deputies in the EALA and were entitled to also sit on the Councils.269  
 
The Treaty establishing the Community did away with the committee system 
employed by EASCO and introduced a council system instead. The five 
councils established by the Treaty were: the Common Market Council, the 
Communications Council, the Economic Consultative and Planning Council, 
the Finance Council, and the Research and Social Council. Except for the 
                                                 
265 Article 3 of the former Treaty as cited in Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 76. 
266 Articles 46, 47 and 48 of the former Treaty as cited in Mvungi, S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 76. 
267 Article 49 of the former Treaty as cited by Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 76. 
268 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 125. 
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Communications Council and the Finance Council, which had only six 
members (namely, the three East African Ministers and one other National 
Minister from each Member State), the other three Councils had 12 members 
of whom three were the East African Ministers and three National Ministers. 
The functions of each Council were set out in the Treaty, and these included 
the carrying out of the specific duties and functions stipulated in the Treaty for 
their field or area.270 The Secretariat in Arusha co-ordinated the work of the 
Councils. 
 
The legislative body, previously the Central Legislative Assembly was re-
named the East African Legislative Assembly. It was to consist of nine 
members appointed by each partner state, a Chairman, the Secretary-
General, the Counsel to the Community, and six newly created ministers, that 
is, three East African Ministers and three Deputy Ministers.271 The EALA, 
established under the Treaty, was in the same way and with similar powers 
as it had been in the EASCO Agreement. Other than the changes in the 
composition of the Assembly, the actual method of recruitment of its 
members remained by appointment rather than by election. This left the 
Community in the same situation of isolation and alienation from the 
mainstream of communal or grassroots politics as was the case with its 
predecessor, the EASCO.272  
 
The Partner States had equal representation in the Assembly, viz., one East 
African Minister, his Deputy (if any), and nine members. The tenure of the 
legislature was perpetual but the members of the Assembly served until the 
legislative period of the Government that appointed them had met after it was 
next dissolved. The Assembly was vested with powers of enacting the laws of 
the Community in the areas of Community jurisdiction. The Acts of EALA 
were effected by means of Bills passed and assented to by each member of 
the Authority. Any Act so passed and assented to became directly 
enforceable law in the domestic jurisdiction of the Partner States, but the 
                                                 
270 Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 77. 
271 Okoth, A, op. cit. pg 335. 
272 Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 77. 
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members of the Authority, jointly or severally, had powers to withhold assent. 
If withholding of assent persisted for more than nine months, the Act 
lapsed.273 
 
The Treaty provided also for a two tier dispute settlement mechanism, 
namely, the Court System and the Tribunal System, under Articles 80 and 81 
respectively. The Court System provided for an apex court, the Court of 
Appeal for East Africa, as had been established in the EASCO Agreement. 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal for East Africa was to hear appeal 
cases from the High Courts of the three Partner States as provided for by the 
laws of each Partner State. This clearly created an apex court with roots in 
the domestic legal systems of the Partner States. The impact of such a 
system was to make the work of harmonisation of the laws in East Africa 
easier, since all the Partner States adhere to the common law tradition 
especially with regard to the doctrines of precedent and stare decisis.274 
 
The Tribunal System included the East African Industrial Court, established 
by Article 84 of the Treaty, to deal with pensions and trade disputes, and the 
Common Market Tribunal, established by Article 32 of the Treaty, to deal with 
disputes arising from the Common Market established and provided for under   
Chapters II to XI of the Treaty.275  The Court of Appeal for East Africa rotated 
from one Partner State to another, hearing appeals from their respective High 
Courts.276 
 
One fundamental change introduced by the Treaty was the re-location from 
Nairobi to Dar-es-Salaam and Kampala of the headquarters of a number of 
Community Corporations.277 The Treaty decentralised the location of the 
institutions of the Community so that there was a balance of interests of 
Community affairs. Thus, in terms of Article 84 of the Treaty, the 
headquarters of the Community, the Tribunal, the Secretariat and the East 
                                                 
273Ibid. 
274 Mvungi, S.E.A, (ed) op. cit. pg 78. 
275Ibid.  
276 Okoth, A, op. cit. pg 335.  
277 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 125. 
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African Harbours were located in Tanzania, the East African Development 
Bank and the East African Posts and Telecommunications were located in 
Uganda, and the East African Railways and the East African Airways were 
located in Kenya.278  
 
Another significant change brought about by the Treaty was the distribution of 
industries and the transfer of taxes. As a measure to achieve a more even 
distribution of industries in East Africa, the Treaty recommended the transfer 
of taxes. These were import duties which the three Partner States would 
impose on each other’s industrial products. It was hoped that the growth of 
the individual national industries would be stimulated.279  
  
It has been observed that the most significant aspects of the Treaty were the 
combining of the common services inherited from EASCO, and the 
transformation of the till then informal Common Market. Thus, the informal 
Common Market acquired legal foundation under Articles 86 and 87. 
However, it has also been observed that the fact that of this formalisation was   
not necessarily reflective of the organisational effectiveness of EAC. The real 
test of the latter was the readiness of the Partner States to implement 
measures establishing the Common Market.280 
 
3.3.3 THE COLLAPSE OF THE FORMER EAC AND THE CHALLENGES OF 
REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
Despite much progress being recorded by the former EAC, it faced numerous 
challenges which in the end proved insurmountable. First, there was lack of 
political goodwill among the Partner States to deal in a spirit of unity and with 
an awareness of interdependence with the inevitable difficulties of 
international co-operation between poor countries.281 Personality problems 
was another challenge. In Uganda the government was overthrown by 
General Amin in January 1971, and the Heads of State ceased to meet, as 
                                                 
278 Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 79. 
279Okoth, A, op. cit.pg 336.  
280 Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 79. 
281 Statement by Julius Nyerere, Former President of Tanzania, speaking as Chairman of the Heads 
of State Meeting at the signing ceremony of the Mediation Agreement, May 14, 1984 in Arusha as 
cited in Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit pg 126. 
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President Nyerere of Tanzania refused to meet with General Amin.282 This 
completely crippled the Authority which consisted of the three Presidents. 
Nyerere, who at the time was the Chairman of the Authority, was unwilling to 
convene any meeting to discuss the Community’s problems.283  
 
The joint Corporations began to break up as some interests in Kenya, among 
other things, undermined common services. The result was three weak 
economies where there had previously been a relatively strong regional 
economy. The airline and railways suffered by losing their common 
maintenance and planning.284  The last blows that brought the Community to 
its final demise were delivered by the decision of the East African Airways to 
suspend the less profitable routes, namely, routes serving the weaker Partner 
States, Tanzania and Uganda, and the order by the Kenyan Government 
grounding the East African Airways and establishing in its place a national 
airline. The decision to suspend certain less profitable routes interfered with 
the interests of the weaker Partner States, whereas the grounding of the East 
African Airways and the establishment of Kenya Airways amounted to a total 
breach of the Treaty.285 
 
 The ideological differences of the economic systems among the three 
countries was another key factor that contributed to the collapse of EAC. 
While Kenya had continued with the inherited liberal and private economy, 
Uganda and Tanzania had adopted state run economic system.286 The 
difference between Kenya and Tanzania was that Kenya wanted a more open 
market than Tanzania. However, the Tanzanians feared that a completely 
common and open market would favour Kenya whose manufacturing and 
agricultural sectors were more advanced. Tanzanian industries were in their 
infancy and Tanzania wanted conditions that would protect them. As a result 
of this economic imbalance and ideological differences,287 Tanzania closed 
                                                 
282 Shivji I.G (ed), op. cit. pg 135. 
283 Okoth, A, op. cit pg 336. 
284 Shivji I.G (ed), op. cit pg 135. 
285 Mvungi S.E.A, (ed), op. cit. pg 80. 
286 Shivji I.G (ed), op. cit pg 136. 
287 See also Mair, S (2000) “Regionale integration und cooperation in Afrika sudlich der Sahara: fallstudie East 
African Co-operation” as cited in Busse, M, et al, op. cit. pg 4 where it is observed that from the beginning 
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her common border with Kenya in 1977.288  The opposing political economies 
conducted by socialist Tanzania and free market Kenya, coupled with political 
tensions between Tanzania and Uganda, led to the demise of the regional 
group and the eventual abandonment of the EAC.289  
 
Forces of economic nationalism took over. Each of the Partner States 
effectively withdrew from the common currency arrangement. This played 
havoc with inter-state remittances, leading to a further decline in intra-East 
African trade through restrictions on trade and financial services, thus 
undermining the bedrock of the Common Market system.290 There were other 
economic problems since various compensatory and corrective measures in 
the Treaty did not prove satisfactory to all concerned. Kenya became 
particularly unhappy with Uganda and Tanzania for imposing transfer taxes to 
their advantage. The provision that partners would levy import duties on 
goods from each other’s industries worked against Kenya’s interests as she 
was selling more goods to the partners. Uganda and Tanzania had no 
problem with this arrangement as they were selling less to Kenya.291 
Furthermore, lack of co-ordination of the policies of industrialisation in the 
Partner States made the situation worse, for when these countries began to 
produce the same goods, the spirit of the Common Market was 
endangered.292  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
probably the most important problem threatening the existence of the former EAC was the industrial 
dominance of Kenya in the region, leading to growing deficits for Tanzania and Uganda in their trade. The 
persistence of trade imbalances among the Partner States was, therefore, one of the main reasons for the 
collapse of former EAC. 
288 Okoth, A, op. cit pg 337. 
289 Fanta, E, op. cit. pg 11. 
290 Oloka-Onyango J (ed), op. cit pg 127. 
See also Lanjouw, G.J, op. cit. pg 73 where it is stated that difficulties were also caused by the debt 
problems of the developing countries, which on several occasions led to trade restrictions in order to 
combat the shortage of foreign exchange. The restrictions were often also applied to integration 
partners. 
291Okoth, A, op. cit. pg 337. 
292 Ibid. 
See also Lanjouw, G.J, op.cit. pg 73 where the author observes that the most fundamental problem 
concerning regional integration between developing countries is the tension which has often existed 
between an import substitution policy and the establishment of regional trade policy. Import 
substitution creates vested interests in the import-competing sector which are difficult to overcome, 
even if it is ‘only’ a question of regional free trade. 
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Other factors that precipitated the collapse of EAC were: lack of strong 
participation of the private sector and civil society in co-operation activities; 
the continued disproportionate sharing of benefits of the Community among 
Partner States due to the differences in their levels of development; and lack 
of adequate policies to address this situation.293 Lastly, there were other 
institutional shortcomings, too, which were not unrelated to the inability of the 
Authority, the supreme policy making body, to meet. At the centre of these 
institutional problems were the influential East African Ministerial Committees 
and Councils. If any meetings were ever held, decisions took inordinately long 
to be reached or matters were simply left in abeyance. As a consequence 
individual Partner States found themselves intervening directly in the day to 
day operations of what was designed to be an autonomous institution with 
distinct legal personality. The coup de grace, however, came in June 1977 
when Partner States withheld approval of the General Fund Services budget 
for the year beginning  1July 977.294   
 
The Community was thus afflicted by numerous economic, ideological and 
administrative difficulties.295 It finally collapsed in 1977. Kenya disbanded all 
the Community operations and replaced them with national services. 
Tanzania and Uganda did the same within their borders.296  
    
3.4 REVIVAL OF THE COMMUNITY 
3.4.1 THE MEDIATION AGREEMENT 
In accounting for the revival of institutionalised regional co-operation in East 
Africa, which efforts culminated in the signing of the 1999 Treaty for the 
Establishment of the East African Community, one cannot ignore the 
Mediation Agreement of 1984. Amidst intense mutual acrimony following the 
collapse of the former Community in 1977, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda 
                                                 
293 Shivji I.G (ed), op. cit pg 136. 
294 Umbritch, V.H (1988) “Multilateral Mediation: Practical Experience and Lessons” as cited by 
Mvungi S.E.A (ed), op. cit. pg 127. 
295 See Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 61 where it is observed that the collapse of EAC, as a 
result partly of structural economic problems (notably the centrality of Kenya), partly of ideological 
disputes (notably as between capitalist Kenya and socialist Tanzania), and partly of differences 
between the leadership of the three member states that were exacerbated by the overthrow of 
President Obote by General Amin in Uganda, illustrates the difficulties of regional integration.   
296 Okoth, A, op. cit pg. 339. 
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were still able to ‘agree to disagree’. They did so in the form of a Treaty, the 
Agreement for the Division of Assets and Liabilities of the Former East 
African Community (popularly referred to as the Mediation Agreement of 
1984) effected by a Swiss diplomat,  Ambassador Victor Umbricht,  after 
seven years of relentless work.297 Through this Mediation Agreement, the 
Partner States divided among themselves the assets and liabilities of the 
fallen Community, and so marked the end of co-operation among them. One 
positive element of that Mediation Agreement was a provision for possibility 
of pursuit of co-operation among these countries in future.298 The pertinent 
and innocuous provision, Article 14.02, of the Mediation Agreement stated 
that States agreed to explore and identify further areas for future co-operation 
and to work out concrete arrangements for such co-operation.299  
 
3.4.2 THE PERMANENT TRIPARTITE COMMISSION (PTC) 
This provision, popularly known as the ‘Umbricht Clause’, although without a 
timeframe, facilitated a meeting of East African Heads of State in Harare, 
Zimbabwe, at a satellite meeting within the Commonwealth Heads of 
Government and States Meeting in October 1991.300 This set the pace for a 
series of actions that culminated in the signing of the Agreement for East 
African Co-operation on 30 November 1993.301 The PTC, created as a co-
ordinating body with decision making powers, consisted of Ministers 
responsible for agreed areas of co-operation and was headed by the 
Ministers responsible for regional co-operation.302  
 
 
                                                 
297 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 131. 
298 Report of the 6th Summit of the East African Community Heads of State, AICC, Arusha, Tanzania, 
November 26th , 2004 (Ref: EAC/SHS/06/2004) pg 11. 
299 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 131. 
300 See Report of the 6th Summit of EAC Heads of State, op. cit. pg 11 where it is stated that, att that 
meeting, the Heads of State agreed on the revival of East African co-operation. This meeting was 
soon followed by a meeting of the same Heads of State in Nairobi, Kenya, in November 1991, at 
which they issued a formal communiqué to revive the co-operation and set up a Committee of 
Ministers of   Foreign Affairs to work out the details. 
301 See Report of the 6th Summit of EAC Heads of State, op. cit. 11 where it is reported that the 
Agreement established the Permanent Tripartite Commission (PTC) to steer the process of the new 
co-operation. This process moved on to the establishment of a Secretariat in Arusha, Tanzania, on 
14 March 1996. Unique to this Secretariat was the emphasis on its “small and lean nature”, leaving 
most of the activities to take place at the Partner State level. 
302 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 133. 
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3.4.3 THE NEW EAC 
Recognising the need to consolidate regional co-operation, the East African 
Heads of State, from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, at their second Summit 
in Arusha on 29 April 1997, directed the PTC to start the process of 
upgrading the Agreement303 into a Treaty.304 The Treaty for the 
Establishment of the East African Community was signed in Arusha on 30 
November 1999.305 The Treaty entered into force on 7 July 2000 following the 
conclusion of the process of its ratification and deposit of the Instruments of 
Ratification with the Secretary-General by all the three Partner States. Upon 
the entry into force of the Treaty, the East African Community came into 
being.306  The official launching marked the culmination of a process that 
started way back in 1993 and which was boosted by the business community 
which no doubt takes a more strategic view of the East African market as a 
whole.307 The Republics of Burundi and Rwanda acceded to the Treaty on 18 
June 2007308 and became full members of the EAC with effect from 1 July, 
2007.309 The accession of the two countries had been delayed by some years 
until the customs union was in place.310 Arusha, Tanzania, as per the 
Treaty,311 serves as the headquarters of the Community. The Secretary-
General (SG) is mandated to conclude agreements relating to privileges and 
immunities to be accorded by Governments of Partner States in whose 
territory the headquarters or offices of the Community will be situated.312  
                                                 
303 The Agreement Establishing the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation. 
304See “About EAC: History from Co-operation to Community” < http://www.eac.int/index.php/about-
eac/eac-history.html > accessed on 6 October 2008.  
 305After a treaty making process, which involved negotiations among the Partner States, as well as 
wide participation of the public, was successfully concluded within three years.   
306Ibid. 
307 Shivji I.G (ed), op. op. pg 136. 
308Deya, D,“Rule of Law and Independence of the Judiciary in the East African Region” (2007)1 The 
Tanzania Lawyer pg 53. 
309 See “Welcome to EAC”< http:www.eac.int/index.php/about-eac.html  > accessed on 10 
September 2008.  
310 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 4. The author states that this was done because existing members felt that 
the Customs Union Protocol should not be open to major re-negotiation by new comers. The Treaty 
has a formal procedure for accession and rules of procedure for entry have been drawn up which are 
verified by country visits and scrutiny of indicators and statistics. 
311 Article 136 of the Treaty. The provision also allows establishment of such offices of the 
Community in the Partner States and elsewhere as the Council may determine. 
312 See also Van Krieken, P.J, et al (eds) (2005) The Hague: The Legal Capital of the World pg 65 
where it is stated that as far as substance of the existing headquarters’ agreements is concerned, 
prima facie they generally cover the more or less classic privileges and immunities for international 
organizations and their staff, such as, the inviolability of the premises and of archives of the 
 
 
 
 
63 
3.5  CONCLUSION 
The chapter has traced the background to the integration process in East 
Africa which is rooted in the historical commonalities of the countries 
constituting the region. It has been shown that the integration process took a 
more advanced, mainly economic, form during the period of colonial 
domination, to serve the interests of colonial rulers. The chapter has indicated 
that a series of organisations emerged during this period to manage the 
process which was later taken over by African governments upon attaining 
independence in the early 1960s, culminating in the formation of the former 
East African Community in 1967. However the Community collapsed in 1977 
due to a number of reasons including ideological differences, personality 
problems and institutional weaknesses. And it has been shown that it took the 
region twenty years to revive the Community.   
                                                                                                                                                       
organization; immunity from jurisdiction and from execution; freedom of communication; the 
organization is exempt from direct taxation; salaries and emoluments of staff members are exempt 
from income tax; settlement of disputes through arbitration; and, no parliamentary approval of the 
agreement is required.  
See also the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and International 
Organisations or between International Organisations. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EAST AFRICAN COMMUNITY 
4.1 OBJECTIVES OF THE COMMUNITY (EAC) 
The EAC (also referred to as ‘the Community’) was established with lofty 
objectives313 of developing policies and programmes aimed at widening and 
deepening co-operation among the Partner States in political, economic, 
social and cultural fields, research and technology, defence, security, and 
legal and judicial affairs, for their mutual benefit.314  
 
The achievement of the above stated objectives were to be governed by the 
Fundamental Principles315 of mutual trust, political will, and sovereign 
equality; peaceful co-existence and good neighbourliness; peaceful 
settlement of disputes; good governance; equitable distribution of benefits; 
and co-operation for mutual benefit.316  
 
4.2  THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  
4.2.1  BACKGROUND 
The Treaty establishes various organs of the Community.317 These are the 
Summit; the Council; the Co-ordination Committee; the Sectoral Committees; 
the East African Court of Justice (EACJ); the East African Legislative 
Assembly (EALA); and the Secretariat. The institutions of the Community318 
shall be such bodies, departments and services as may be established by the 
Summit.319 Thus, the focus of this chapter shall be on the organs, established 
                                                 
313 Article 5.1 of the treaty. 
314 Article 5.2 of the Treaty requires that, in fulfilment of these objectives, the Partner States 
undertake to establish among themselves a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently a 
Monetary Union, and ultimately a Political Federation, in order to achieve accelerated, harmonious 
and balanced development and sustained expansion of economic activities, the benefits of which 
would be equitably shared.     
315 Article 6 of the Treaty. 
316 The Fundamental Principles are complimented by the Operational Principles as provided under 
Article 7 of the Treaty. The enshrined Operational Principles guide the practical achievement of the 
objectives. These are: people-centred and market-driven co-operation; provision of an adequate and 
appropriate enabling environment; establishment of an export oriented economy; subsidiarity; 
variable geometry; equitable distribution of benefits; complementarity; and asymmetry 
317 Article 9.1 of the Treaty. 
318 Article 9.2 of the Treaty. 
319 However,  under Article 9.2 of the Treaty , the East African Development Bank (EADB), the Lake 
Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO), and surviving institutions of the former EAC are deemed to 
be institutions of the Community, and shall be designated and function as such. 
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under Article 9(1) of the Treaty, which are responsible for the overall 
management and co-ordination of the integration process.320 
 
4.2.2  THE SUMMIT 
4.2.2.1STRUCTURE 
The Summit consists of the Heads of State or Government of the Partner 
States.321 If a member of the Summit is unable to attend, he may, after 
consultation with other Summit members, appoint a Minister of Government 
to attend the meeting.322 This kind of composition gives the Summit an 
intergovernmental character.323  
 
4.2.2.2 FUNCTIONS  
The role of the Summit is set out in Article 11 of the Treaty. The Summit is 
mandated to give general direction and impetus to the development, and 
achievement of the objectives, of the Community. Other functions include: to 
consider the annual progress reports and such other reports submitted by the 
Council; to review the state of peace, security and good governance within 
the Community and the progress achieved towards the establishment of a 
Political Federation; and other functions as conferred upon it by the Treaty. 
 
4.2.2.3 WORKING METHODS 
Under Article 11.4 the Summit may delegate the exercise of any of its 
functions, subject to any condition it may think fit to impose, to a member of 
the Summit, to the Council or to the Secretary-General.324 However, Article 
11.9 of the Treaty excludes delegation of certain functions and powers.325 
The Summit meets at least once every year and may hold extraordinary 
                                                 
320 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 143 where it is stated that integration requires constant institutional and 
policy co-ordination. Such co-ordination is the central nervous system of any regional economic 
community initiative in that it provides pathways along which decisions flow. 
321 Article 10.1 of the Treaty. 
322 Article 10.2 of the Treaty. 
323 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 21 
324 Under Article 11.6 of the Treaty, an Act of the Community may provide for the delegation of any 
powers, including legislative powers, conferred on the Summit by the Treaty or any Act of the 
Community, to the Council or to the Secretary-General. 
325 These are: the giving of general direction and impetus; the appointment of judges to the EACJ; the 
admission of new Members and granting of observer status to foreign countries; and assent to Bills.  
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meetings at the request of any of its members.326 The office of the 
Chairperson of the Summit is held on a rotational basis for one year. In terms 
of Article 12.3 of the Treaty, the decisions of the Summit are made by 
consensus.327  
 
4.2.2.4 ANALYSIS 
(i)  The frequency of Summit meetings 
The number of meetings of the Summit provided for by the Treaty, that is, 
one ordinary meeting every year, and any other extraordinary meetings, is 
shockingly insufficient. For a regional organisation that has set lofty ambitions 
of ultimately forming a political federation, given the fact that it is only at the 
stage of a Customs Union which is beset by a series of problems, the fact 
that it will be engaged in ( a lot of ) meetings to negotiate the remaining 
stages of integration, and bearing in mind that it is now locked in protracted 
negotiations for the establishment of a Common Market, one would tend to 
think that the Treaty should have provided a sufficient number of ordinary 
meetings, say four per year, which would have compelled the Summit to meet 
fairly regularly to iron out problems of the Community and hence help to 
enhance and deepen the integration process. Sticky issues which cannot be 
resolved by the Council have to be sent to the Summit, which is the ultimate 
source of authority, for reconsideration and resolution. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that, in view of their other obligations, it would be 
impossible for heads of government to meet more frequently, on a regular 
basis. But, on the other hand, it is far from clear that such a limited number of 
meetings a year, however intense, are sufficient to deal effectively with a 
growing workload. Governing an increasingly complex multinational entity 
needs more regular and more frequent efforts.328  
 
 
                                                 
326 Article 12.1 of the Article. 
327 Under Article 12.5 of the Treaty, the Summit is empowered to discuss business submitted to it by 
the Council and any other matter which may have a bearing on the Community. It determines its own 
procedure, including that for convening its meetings, for the conduct of the business thereat and 
other times, and for the rotation of the office of the Chairperson among the members of the Summit. 
328 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 43. 
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(ii) Mode of decision making at the Summit 
The decision making process of the Summit, which is wholly based on 
consensus, is also hardly helpful. Consensus as a decision making procedure 
is relatively inefficient as the Summit may frequently fail to reach decisions, 
creating ‘leftovers’, or postponing decisions to a future date.329 Given their 
respective stages of development,330 the Partner States may not be ready to 
support certain policies of the Community or even steps towards full 
integration at a given time.331 Therefore, the exclusive use of the consensus 
procedure in decision making may hamper the progress of the Community.332      
 
Takirambudde333 argues that the Achilles heels of the founding texts of the 
regional economic communities in Africa are the unanimity rule and the 
requirement for domestic ratification and incorporation of the regional 
instruments into the domestic laws of the Partner States. The implication is 
that each Partner State reserves the right to pursue an independent line of 
                                                 
329 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 44. 
330 See Converting LDC Export Opportunities into Business: A Strategic Response, pg iv where four 
out of five EAC Partner States are categorized as LDCs. These are Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda. Kenya is not an LDC.  
331See “e-EAC newsletter”, Issue No. 2008/12, op. cit.pg 6       where it is reported that some Partner 
States are objecting to certain provisions of the Draft EAC Common Market Protocol being 
negotiated by the High Level Task Force, especially the Right of Establishment, Residence and Free 
Movement of Persons within the EAC Common Market as well as Transport Policy and Free 
Movement of Services < http://www.eac.int/downloads/e-newsletter.html > accessed on 15 March 
2009.  
332See “e-EAC newsletter”, Issue No. 2008/12, op. cit. pg 3 where it is reported that the EAC 
delegation during a three day (25-27 August 2008) strategic consultative mission to Rwanda on the 
EAC integration process in Kigali, addressed a series of meetings attended by Cabinet Ministers, 
Permanent Secretaries and Senior Officers of the Rwanda government. During the launching 
session, the Counsel to the Community, Hon Wilbert Kaahwa, reviewed the judicial and legal 
challenges facing the Community. The Hon Kaahwa said the enforcement processes as well as the 
sanctions provided under the Treaty were weak. He quipped that the provisions were negotiated 
“more by diplomats than lawyers”, noting that the provisions of decision making by consensus posed 
a great challenge to the Community’s performance adding that, “How do you enforce sanctions 
against a Partner State where you have decision by consensus and the Partner States are expected 
to take sanctions against one of them by consensus?”. 
See also Advisory Opinion of the Court in the Matter of a Request by the Council of the Ministers of 
the EAC for an Advisory Opinion (Application No.1 of 2008), delivered by the First Instance Division 
of the EACJ on 24 April 2009 pg 8 where Counsel for the Community, Hon. W. Kaahwa, quoting from 
International Institutional Law by Henry, S.G, et al, enumerated, among others, the following as 
shortcomings of the consensus decision making, namely, intransigence associated with determining 
consensus; the possibility of indiscriminate vetoing of proposals that may be favoured by the majority 
of Partner States leading to preservation of status quo; the fact that consensus may not stand the 
test of usefulness when the membership of the Community increases to more than five countries; 
and susceptibility to disruption where the group may be held hostage to an inflexible minority or 
individual.< http://www.ealawsociety.org/Joomla/index.php?.html>  accessed on 28 April 2009.  
333 Takiramudde, P (1999) “The rival strategies of SADC & PTA/COMESA in Southern Africa” as 
cited in Fanta, E, op. cit. pg 19. 
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action if it does not agree with a particular measure.334 Braude further adds 
that in many regional economic communities elsewhere in the world, 
consensus decision making often leads to slow and cumbersome processes 
arising from wide divergencies between member states’ positions on 
particular matters under negotiation.335  The decision making process,  in the 
EAC Summit as well as in the Council,  should provide for three modes, 
namely,  consensus, simple majority votes, and absolute majority votes, 
depending on the subject matter. Matters within the competence of the 
Community should be categorised accordingly. For instance, issues, such as, 
giving general direction, as well as admission of new Members, could be 
decided by consensus whereas all other issues may be divided between the 
other two modes.336 
 
(iii) Chairpersonship of the Summit 
The incoming Chairperson of the Summit should be required to present his 
programme of action during his chairpersonship, so that at the end of his 
tenure it can be determined whether he fulfilled the mandate as expected. For 
instance, by having regard to the number of decisions agreed upon, or the 
number of decisions implemented, during his tenure. Otherwise the rotational 
chairpersonship will remain just that, rotational, without tangible results at the 
end of the tenure. Every country should have priority areas to focus on during 
                                                 
334 Ibid. 
335 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 23.  
336 See also Application No.1 of 2008, op. cit. where the EAC Council had formally sought the Court’s 
opinion on whether the operational principle of variable geometry, which is provided for in the Treaty, 
is in contradiction with the Treaty requirement that decisions of the EAC organs should be by 
consensus. In an opinion delivered by the Principal Judge of the First Instance Division, the Court 
opined that the operational principle of variable geometry is in harmony with the requirement of 
consensus decision making at the EAC, if applied appropriately; that the principle of variable 
geometry can and should be applied to guide the integration process, the requirement of consensus 
decision making notwithstanding; and that consensus does not necessitate unanimity of the Partner 
States. In other words, no Partner State has a veto power when it comes to decision making at the 
EAC. However, the Court stated that, consensus, as it stands in the Treaty, the Protocol on Decision 
Making and the Rules of Procedure of various organs of the EAC, is undefined and its application 
unclear. The provisions simply state ‘consensus’ plain and naked. It is not defined in relation to 
differing weight of particular decisions. It is not defined in relation to the various executive organs of 
the Community according to their hierarchy. Little wonder, the Court observed, the vacuum was filled 
by unanimity. Consequently the Court was of the opinion that the cure of this defect does not lie in 
equating it, from the blue, with unanimity. Rather it lies in amending the relevant instruments. 
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their chairpersonship.337 Leaders should be held accountable once they are 
at the helm of public institutions. This requirement may be inserted in a 
Protocol in order to be formalised. Of course, the programme of the 
Chairperson should be within the general development programme 
framework of the Community. 
 
4.2.3  THE COUNCIL 
4.2.3.1 STRUCTURE 
The Council consists of the Minister responsible for the EAC affairs of each 
Partner State; such other Minister of the Partner State as each Partner State 
may determine; and the Attorney-General of each Partner State.338  
 
4.2.3.2 FUNCTIONS 
The Council is the policy organ of the Community.339 It is mandated340 to 
promote, monitor and keep under constant review the implementation of the 
programmes of the Community. It is entrusted with various functions, chief 
among them being: making policy decisions; initiating and submitting Bills to 
the Assembly; giving directions to Partner States and to all other organs and 
institutions of the Community other than the Summit, Court and Assembly; 
and making regulations, issuing directives as well as taking decisions.341 
                                                 
337 See “e-EAC newsletter”, Issue No. 2008/12, op. cit. pg 2 where it is reported that the current 
Chairperson of the EAC Summit, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, during a meeting with senior 
officials of EAC in Kigali on 27 February 2008 unveiled his vision that would characterise his 
Chairpersonship. He said that, among the regional projects that would receive priority attention, and 
moved to advanced stages of implementation during his tenure, were the ongoing regional 
infrastructure development master plans in roads, railways, inland waterways, ports and harbours, as 
well as the Lake Victoria investment and development master plan. He said that other priority 
projects and programmes would: be the promotion of East Africa as a single tourist destination; the 
introduction of a common East African visa for tourists and business persons; intensification of the 
programme of elimination of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) under the ongoing programme of the EAC 
Customs Union; and the negotiation of the EAC Common Market. He said the immediate measures 
would be aimed at reducing the costs of doing business in East Africa and, on the whole, promote 
East Africa as a competitive single market and investment area with a thrust on tourism, trade and 
investments promotion.  
338 Article 13 of the Treaty 
339 Article 14.1 of the Treaty. 
340 Article 14.2 of the Treaty. 
341 Other functions include: making recommendations and giving opinions in accordance with the 
provisions of the Treaty; and considering the budget of the Community  considering measures that 
should be taken to promote the attainment of the objectives of the Community; making staff rules and 
regulations and financial rules and regulations; submitting annual progress reports to the Summit and 
preparing agendas for the meetings of the Summit; establishing Sectoral Councils from among its 
members; establishing Sectoral Committees; implementing the decision and directives of the 
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 4.2.3.3 WORKING METHODS 
By virtue of Article 15.1 of the Treaty, the Council meets twice a year, one 
meeting being is held immediately preceding a meeting of the Summit. 
Extraordinary meetings of the Council may be held at the request of a Partner 
State or the Chairperson of the Council.342  Subject to a protocol on decision 
making, the decisions of the Council shall be by consensus and are binding 
on Partner States.343  
 
4.2.3.4 Analysis 
(i) Mode of decision making at the Council 
The issue of decision making by consensus by the Council is critical and 
should be treated as suggested for the Summit hereinabove {4.2.2.4(ii)}. The 
above model makes Article 15(3) of the Treaty redundant. This article is not 
progressive in nature as it presupposes that the Council is precluded from 
discussing and deciding on matters, in this case any matter, once an 
objection from a Partner State has been recorded on such matter. A look at 
the functions of the Council clearly shows that this organ is the engine of the 
Community, so all matters under its jurisdictions should be allowed to be 
discussed at this level regardless of any objections from any Partner State or 
its perceived outcome. 
 
The decision making process at the level of the Council is ineffective and 
time-wasting, leading to diminished efficiency in the functioning of the 
Community. This reality is recognised even within the Community itself. In the 
                                                                                                                                                       
Summit; endeavouring to resolve matters that may be referred to it; and exercising such other 
powers as are conferred by the Treaty. The Council may also request advisory opinions from the 
EACJ, in accordance with the Treaty.  
342 Under Article 15.2 of the Treaty, the Council determines its own procedure for the conduct of its 
business and for the rotation of the office of the Chairperson of the Council. A member of the Council 
who is leader of his or her Partner State’s delegation to the Council meeting may, in terms of Article 
15(3) of the Treaty, record his or her objections to a proposal submitted for the decision of the 
Council and, if any such objection is recorded, the Council shall not proceed with the proposal and 
shall, unless the objection is withdrawn, refer the matter to the Summit for decision.  
343Under Article 16 of the Treaty, the regulations, directives and decisions of the Council are binding 
on the Partner States, on all organs and institutions of the Community other than the Summit, the 
Court, and the Assembly within their jurisdictions, and on those to whom they may be addressed 
under the Treaty. 
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EAC Development Strategy 2006-2010,344 it is stated that “the Council of 
Ministers meets twice per annum and works on the basis of 
recommendations and other inputs from each of the Sectoral Committees, 
through the Coordination Committee. Decisions are made based on the 
recommendations and inputs and these decisions become the basis for 
implementation by the Sectoral Committees. Given that the Sectoral 
Committees also meet on average twice per annum, in practice it is not 
uncommon for the implementation of decisions to take up to eighteen months 
from the time recommendations are made.”345  
  
It is obvious that this kind of decision making process which moves at a 
snail’s pace is counter-productive and at odds with the spirit of the Preamble 
to the Treaty. The Preamble advocates realisation of a fast and balanced 
regional development through creation of an enabling environment in all the 
Partner States in order to attract investments and allow the private sector and 
civil society to play a leading role in the socio-economic development 
activities through the development of sound macro-economic and sectoral 
policies and their efficient management while taking cognisance of the 
developments in the world economy. This is a very unhealthy situation which 
clearly justifies a change in the mode of decision making within the Council 
and other organs and institutions of the Community.  
 
(ii) Proposed formation of a permanent Secretariat of the Council of Ministers 
Given the above exposition, it is imperative that the decision making process 
of the Council needs to be radically transformed. The Council should be 
assisted by a permanent Secretariat which is “a relatively small and 
ostensibly politically neutral body, providing it with vital logistical, technical 
                                                 
344 The EAC Development Strategy 2006-2010 was adopted by the EAC Ministers Sectoral Council 
on Finance and Administration on 26th November 2006. It is Decision Reference No. EAC/CM13/DC 
97 < http://www.eac.int/council_decision/SectorDecision.php?SectorID=FINADMIN > accessed on 3 
March 2009.  
See also Busse, M, et al, op. cit. pg 2 where it is contended that the EAC Development Strategy 
translates the vision of co-operation among Partner States into a comprehensive action programme 
including areas, such as, trade and industry, transport and communications, agriculture, environment, 
tourism, social and cultural activities, and fiscal and monetary policies. 
345The EAC Development Strategy 2006-2010 pg 23< 
http://www.eac.int/EACDevelopmentStrategy2006-2010.pdf > accessed on 12 February 2009. 
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and administrative support”.346 This organ, constituted with various units or 
sectors reflecting the portfolios under the Community, will work on a daily 
basis carrying out the mandate entrusted to it, and thereby ensure that the 
flow of the work of the Council is not inhibited by institutional requirements of 
an ad hoc organ in the form of the Sectoral Committees. These meet on 
average twice a year although the Treaty provides that they may meet as 
often as necessary.347  It then follows that, with the establishment of a 
permanent Secretariat, the Sectoral Committees which are established under 
Article 9.1(d) of the Treaty will cease to exist. 
 
 The permanent nature of the Secretariat will cure another perennial problem 
associated with the composition of the Sectoral Committees which 
undermines their quality of work, that is, the ever changing membership of 
those Committees. The EAC Development Strategy, on this matter, notes 
that “membership to the Sectoral Committees keeps on changing as these 
are nominated from Partner States government departments from time to 
time often depending on who is available to travel or is not too busy 
presumably with other important commitments at the national level. This 
situation decreases the effectiveness of the committees especially when the 
members sent are not sufficiently senior to make decisions during the 
meetings or to express opinions based on insights from progress made in 
previous meetings”.348  
  
This permanent Secretariat may be headed by a Secretary-General who will 
be appointed by the Summit. The Secretariat should be staffed by 
independent, international civil servants, recruited by open competition from 
among the nationals of the member states.349  A number of units/sectors in 
the Secretariat may consist of a mixture of members of the Secretariat and 
seconded national officials reflecting the sensitivity and the intergovernmental 
nature of their work, such as, security and military matters.350  This kind of 
                                                 
346 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 52. 
347 Article 22 of the Treaty. 
348 The EAC Development Strategy, op. cit. pg 24 
349Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 53.  
350 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
73 
organ takes a leaf from the Secretariat-General of the Council of Ministers of 
the EU.351 Hartley352 contends that the General Secretariat of the Council is 
similar to, but much smaller than, the European Commission staff. 
 
However, unlike the Secretariat-General of the Council of Ministers of the EU, 
the permanent Secretariat of the EAC Council, since it is replacing the 
Sectoral Committees, will assume more major roles, in addition to organising 
and servicing the Council’s and Co-ordination Committees’ meetings. These 
roles include: responsibility for the preparation of  a comprehensive 
implementation programme and the setting out of priorities of different 
sectors; monitoring and keeping under constant review the implementation of 
the programmes of the Community with respect to different sectors; 
submitting from time to time, reports and recommendations to the Co-
ordination Committee either on its own initiative or upon the request of the 
Co-ordination Committee concerning the implementation of the provisions of 
the Treaty; and any other functions conferred on it by the Treaty.353 
Preparatory legislative work will be an important assignment of the 
Secretariat since, under the Treaty,354 the Council is the organ mandated to 
initiate and submit Bills to the Assembly. 
 
The conference organisation involves, among other things, convening 
meetings, preparing meeting rooms, and producing documents, which in turn 
requires the translation,355 photocopying, distribution and archiving of 
documents. Servicing involves drawing up agendas, preparing briefing notes, 
advising on questions of procedure and legality, helping to draft amendments, 
note taking, and producing minutes held within the Council hierarchy.356 The 
Secretariat officials, therefore, fulfil technical, advisory and logistical duties. 
They act as the memory of the Council, ensure consistency between 
                                                 
351See Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. 52. 
352 Hartley, T. C (1998) The Foundations of the European Community Law: An Introduction to the 
Constitutional and Administration Law of the European Community, pg 19. 
353 Article 21 of the Treaty. 
354 Article 13(3) (b) of the Treaty. 
355Partner States of EAC have different official languages: Burundi (French, Kirundi), Kenya 
(English), Uganda (English, Swahili), Rwanda (English, French, Kinyarwanda) and Tanzania 
(English, Swahili).  
356 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 60. 
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successive presidencies (chairpersonships), co-ordinate the activities of the 
various Councils, and ensure that the work of various preparatory bodies is 
coherent.357 There is no voting at this stage, the Secretariat is encouraged to 
reach decisions consensually. 
 
The co-ordination role of the EAC Council of Ministers’ Secretariat, under the 
guidance of the Co-ordination Committee, is crucial, given the number of 
sectors, under the Council, which are very diverse, ranging from being 
responsible for Nile perch protection358 to dealing with trade barriers.359 The 
Council has more than 25 sector formations. These include: Agriculture; 
Capital Markets; Customs; Defence; Education; Energy; Environment; 
Finance and Administration; Fiscal Affairs; Gender; and Health. Others are 
Immigration; Inter-University Matters; Interstate Security; Labour and 
Employment; Lake Victoria Development; Legal and Judicial; Monetary 
Affairs; Political Affairs; Research and Planning; Standards; Statistics; 
Tourism and Wildlife; Trade; and Transport.360 These sectors are grouped in 
clusters to form Sectoral Councils, such as, the Sectoral Council on 
Transport, Communication and Meteorology;361 the Sectoral Council on 
Trade, Finance, Investment and Industry;362 the Sectoral Council on Foreign 
Policy Co-ordination;363 the Sectoral Council on Interstate Security 
(comprising of internal affairs, security, intelligence, public safety and disaster 
management);364 and the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs.365 
                                                 
357 Ibid. 
358 See “Daily News Online” dated 2 March, 2009 which reported that the EAC Council of Ministers 
responsible for the Lake Victoria Fisheries Organisation (LVFO) has, on 27 February 2009, at an 
meeting held in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, approved zero tolerance measures against illegal fishing 
in effort to save declining Nile perch stocks < http://www.dailynews.co.tz/home/?cat=home > 
accessed on 3 March 2009. 
359 See “the Standard” dated 28 February 2009, which reported that the EAC Council of Ministers has 
set up a monitoring mechanism to deal with non-tariff barriers that have ruined investor confidence 
causing a drop in the region’s business climate index which fell to 44 points last year (2008) 
compared with 51 points in 2007 < http://www.eaststandard.net/Insidepage.php > accessed on 3 
March 2009. 
360 See “EAC Council Decisions Sector” < http://www.eac.int/councildecisions/sector.php > accessed 
on 2 March 2009. 
361 See The 17th  EAC Council of Ministers Meeting held at AICC in Arusha, Tanzania from 8th -13th 
September 2008 (Ref. EAC/CM17/BP/2008) pg 1 < http://www.eabc.info/files/17th%20Council%20of 
20Ministers%20Meeting.doc > accessed on 3 March 2009. 
362The 17th EAC Council of Ministers Meeting, op. cit. pg 2. 
363The 17th EAC Council of Ministers Meeting, op. cit. pg 16. 
364The 17th EAC Council of Ministers Meeting, op. cit.pg 18. 
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However, the formation and composition of the Sectoral Councils have been 
put under spotlight by the EACJ.366 
  
The fact that Partner States have established functional ministries to handle 
EAC matters, especially co-ordination of the implementation of  Council 
decisions, as per the May 2005 Summit decision,367 does not diminish the 
vitality of the proposed permanent Secretariat of the Council, as the 
designated ministries would still work at the national level. A great deal of 
groundwork has to be undertaken at this level before further decisions are 
taken by the Co-ordination Committee and the Council. It is indeed pointed 
out that most of the detailed negotiation, and much of the actual agreement, 
tend to occur at various levels below that which can take the final decision in 
the name of the Council.368  
 
(iii) Frequency of Council meetings 
Given the amount of workload at the Community, the Council of Ministers 
needs to meet on a monthly basis whereas the Sectoral Councils should 
meet as often as necessary. A careful look at the proceedings of the 
meetings of the EAC Council of Ministers reveals that the Council acts as a 
“co-ordinator” of the Sectoral Councils. This is not surprising, as the Council 
is mandated, as seen above, to establish, among its members, Sectoral 
Councils to deal with such matters that arise under the Treaty. 369 The 
decisions370 of such Sectoral Councils are deemed to be decisions of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
365See the 14th Meeting of the EAC Councils of Ministers held at AICC in Arusha, Tanzania from 24th 
-27th September 2007 (Ref.EAC/CM14/A1/2007) pg 1.  
366 See Deya, D “Rule of Law and Independence of Judiciary in the East African Region” (2007) 1 
The Tanzania Lawyer pg 57 where it is reported that, in the case of Calist Andrew Mwatela and 
others v The EAC EACJ Reference Number 1 of 2005, the Court, among other things, ruled that the 
Sectoral Councils (composed of Ministers of the Partner States’ cabinets) must only consist of legally 
competent ‘ministers’ in the various cabinets of the Partner States. It went on to declare that the 
Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs  of the EAC was improperly constituted as it consisted 
of the three Partner States Attorneys-General yet only the Ugandan Attorney-General was a 
‘minister’ under the Ugandan Constitution. It declared that the Tanzanian Attorney-General was 
definitely not a minister. The Court adopted the contention of the Counsel for the Kenyan Attorney-
General that, while the Kenyan Constitution does not explicitly make the latter a cabinet minister, its 
interpretation and general provisions statute states that she or he can act as a minister.   
367 EAC Development Strategy, op. cit pg 24. 
368 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 54. 
369 Article 14.3(i) of the Treaty. 
370Deya, D, op. cit. pg 57 where, in the above cited case of Calist Andrew Mwatela and others v The 
EAC, the Court, in passing, expressed doubts on the legality of decisions, directives or regulations 
 
 
 
 
76 
Council.371  Reports of the meetings of the Sectoral Councils are submitted 
by the Co-ordination Committee to the Council. The Council takes note of the 
decisions of the Sectoral Councils or refers matters from one Sectoral 
Council to another because of certain implications; for instance, decisions 
with financial implications are referred to the Sectoral Council on Finance and 
Administration for appropriate action, and matters of a legal nature are 
referred to the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs for legal input.372 
This role of the Council is almost akin to the one played by the General 
Affairs Council of the EU which is composed of the foreign affairs ministers of 
the member governments.373 
  
4.2.4  THE CO-ORDINATION COMMITTEE 
4.2.4.1STRUCTURE 
Under Article 17 of the Treaty, the Co-ordination Committee consists of the 
Permanent Secretaries responsible for East African Community affairs in 
each Partner State and such other Permanent Secretaries of the Partner 
State as each Partner State may determine. 
 
4.2.4.2 FUNCTIONS 
The Co-ordination Committee is entrusted to submit, from time to time, 
reports and recommendations to the Council, either on its own initiative or 
upon the request of the Council, on the implementation of the Treaty. The Co-
ordination Committee implements decisions of the Council.374   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
that can only be found in ‘Minutes’ or other narrative records of deliberations not yet officially 
‘gazetted’. It exercised its advisory mandate under the Treaty to advise that the previously lax attitude 
of the EAC in failing to ‘gazette’ the foregoing ought to cease forthwith. 
371 Ibid. 
372 See The 17th EAC Council of Ministers Meeting held at AICC in Arusha, Tanzania from 8 -13 
September 2008 (Ref. EAC/CM17/BP/2008) pg 2 where it is reported that the 17th Extraordinary 
Meeting of the Council of Ministers had decided to refer the Memorandum of Understanding on Co-
operation in Meteorological Services to the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs for legal 
input.    
373Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 50.  
374 Under Article 18 of the Treaty, the Co-ordination Committee receives and considers reports of the 
Sectoral Committees, and coordinates their activities. The Co-ordination Committee may request a 
Sectoral Committee to investigate any matter; and shall undertake other functions as conferred on it 
by the Treaty. 
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4.2.4.3 WORKING METHODS 
The Co-ordination Committee meets at least twice in each year preceding the 
meetings of the Council and may hold extraordinary meetings at the request 
of its Chairperson.375 Members of the Co-ordination Committee are the 
Permanent Secretaries responsible for East African Community affairs in 
each Partner State.376   
 
4.2.4.4 ANALYSIS 
(i) Structure 
If the proposal, set out above, to establish a permanent Secretariat of the 
Council is adopted, and, therefore, replaces the Sectoral Committee, it is 
imperative that the Co-ordination Committee, as an overseer of the activities 
of the Secretariat of the Council, should be reconstituted in a permanent form 
in order to be able to give guidance on the daily work of the Secretariat. In 
this case the members of the Co-ordination Committee should be 
permanently stationed at Arusha, Tanzania, the Headquarters of the 
Community. 
 
 The members of the Co-ordination Committee would be permanent 
representatives of the Partner States in the EAC. This role is modeled on the 
Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) in the EU, but without 
the two tier formation that characterises Coreper.377 This is a critical organ, as 
its work, mainly in the form of reports and recommendations, determines the 
functioning of the Council. Issues to be decided by the Council have to pass 
through the Co-ordination Committee first. Detailed and substantive 
negotiations are done at this stage to try to reach an agreement before 
                                                 
375 Article 19.1 of the Treaty. 
376 Article 19.2 of the Treaty, the Co-ordination Committee determines its own procedure, including, 
that for convening its meetings, for the conduct of the business thereat and at other times and for the 
rotation of the office of Chairperson among its members. 
377See Hartley, T.C, op. cit. pg 18 where it is stated that Coreper was set up to prepare the work of 
the Council. The Permanent Representatives are the ambassadors of the Member States to the 
Community and the Committee represents the Member States at a lower level than the Ministers. 
Coreper itself meets on two levels: Deputy Permanent Representatives (Coreper I) for more technical 
questions; and the Permanent Representatives themselves (Coreper II) for the more important 
political questions. At a lower level there are still many Coreper committees and working groups, 
staffed by national officials based in Brussels, Belgium or in their home countries.  
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matters are forwarded to the Council for decision. It meets with the 
Secretariat officials in order to carry out preparatory work for decision making 
in the Council.378 These meetings give rise to a relationship which facilitates 
the subsequent implementation of decisions of the Council.379 Peterson 
argues that the ability to serve as gatekeeper for the Council’s work is not 
simply about paving the way for Ministers to find agreement, but, 
increasingly, the ability to dispose of large quantities of business by forging 
consensus out of seemingly irreconcilable national positions.380  
 
As negotiations are full of drama and maneuvering, the Co-ordination 
Committee actually acts as a buffer zone shielding the Ministers, and by 
extension their countries, from diplomatic fights that may damage the 
relations of the Partner States. It is observed381 that when there is a political 
need to avoid confrontation or politicisation at the level of the Ministers, 
permanent representatives will have a freer hand in making deals, and selling 
success at home.   
 
It logically follows that the composition of the Co-ordination Committee also 
needs to change. Given the fact that the Permanent Secretaries are also the 
principal co-ordinators of the Ministries at national level dealing with all 
matters under their dockets, such as, finance, administration, policy, etc, it is 
difficult for them to be permanently stationed at the seat of the EAC, as well 
as attend to their duties effectively.  Experienced senior civil servants may be 
posted to serve in the Co-ordination Committee. Peterson contends that the 
permanent representatives are selected from the highest tier of career 
diplomats and civil servants, usually with a considerable background in 
integration affairs.382 Appointments are typically made after a 
recommendation by, or at least tacit approval of the head of state or 
government. Such high level political selection contributes enormously to the 
                                                 
378 See Bray, R (ed) (1999) Constitutional Law of the European Union, pg 386. 
379 Ibid. 
380 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 282. 
381 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 290. 
382 Peterson, J, op. cit.pg 285. 
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credibility and confidence of the permanent representatives to negotiate.383  
Appointments are noteworthy for length of tenure and absence of partisan 
politics. The average appointment is five years, slightly longer than the typical 
three- or four-year diplomatic rotation. Longer appointments provide 
continuity in the representation of interests.384 
 
(ii) Frequency of meetings 
The Co-ordination Committee will be meeting as often as necessary, weekly 
or possibly daily, to keep up with the work of the experts, that is, the Council’s 
Secretariat, if one puts into consideration the range of sectoral formations at 
EAC. One of the really distinctive features of diplomacy at this level is the 
degree of insulation from the normal currents of domestic pressures.385 The 
meetings are be treated as confidential, and many sensitive national positions 
are ironed out in restricted sessions where the permanent representatives 
can speak frankly and in confidence that what is said will not be reported to 
the capitals or the media. This can even include group discussion on how an 
agreement will be packaged back home.386  
 
Apart from negotiating deals and preparing reports and recommendations for 
the consumption of the Ministers, the permanent representatives sit beside 
their Ministers during Council sessions, briefing them beforehand and offering 
tactical suggestions. They attend Summits and can serve as behind-the-
scenes consultants. They monitor the proceedings of the working groups and 
offer specific points of strategy or emphasis. They are closely involved in 
monitoring co-operation and association agreements and accession 
negotiations.387 
        
As per the Treaty, the Co-ordination Committee determines its own 
procedure for the conduct of its business.388 It is hoped that there is no voting 
                                                 
383 Ibid. 
384De Zwan, J (1995) The Permanent Representatives Committee: Is Role in European Union 
Decision-Making as cited in Peterson, J, op. cit. pg 285. 
385 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 290. 
386 Ibid. 
387Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 288. 
388 Article 19.2 of the Treaty. 
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at this stage, and that decisions are made consensually. The reasoning 
behind no voting at the permanent representatives as well as the Council’s 
Secretariat stages, is that these are supposed to be continuous negotiation 
chambers389 where negotiators try to accommodate as many various 
interests as possible. The other reason is, that juridical decision making 
authority is a power exclusively reserved for Ministers.390 The mode, known 
as A-point procedure, used by Coreper to forward matters to the Council for 
decision-making is worth emulating in EAC.  A-points are ‘agreed points’ 
which are passed en bloc and without discussion by the Ministers at the 
beginning of each Council session. B-points are those issues sent to 
Ministers that do require further discussion. This corresponds to the agenda 
of each Council meeting that is divided into parts A and B.391 
 
4.2.5 THE SECTORAL COMMITTEES 
As indicated in section 4.2.3 above, the Sectoral Committees are to be 
replaced by the Council’s Secretariat and, therefore, they cease to exist. 
 
 
 
 
4.2.6 THE EAST AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE (EACJ) 
4.2.6.1STRUCTURE 
The EACJ (also referred to as ‘the Court’) is a judicial body which ensures 
adherence to law in the interpretation and application of, and compliance 
with, the Treaty.392 It consists of two divisions, namely, the First Instance 
Division and the Appellate Division.393 The Court is composed of a maximum 
of 15 Judges of whom not more than ten shall be appointed to the First 
Instance Division and not more than five to the Appellate Division.394 The 
                                                 
389Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 287.  
390 Ibid. 
391 Ibid. 
392 Article 23.1 of the Treaty. 
See also Keiuwa, O.M “Focus on the East African Court of Justice” (2003) 4 The East African Lawyer 
pg 14. 
393The First Instance Division shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine matters at first instance 
subject to a right of appeal to the Appellate Division. 
394 Article 24.2 of the Treaty. 
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Judges shall be appointed by the Summit from among persons 
recommended by the Partner State395. 
 
Under Article 25.1 of the Treaty, the tenure of a Judge is seven years. 
However, under the proviso to Article 23.2 of the Treaty, of the Judges first 
appointed to the Court only one third of them will serve their full seven year 
terms, while another one third will serve six year terms, and the remaining 
one third will serve five year terms. The Appellate Division shall be headed by 
a President assisted by a Vice President, both of whom are appointed by the 
Summit from among Appellate Division Judges.396  
 
A Judge may be removed from office by the Summit: for misconduct or 
inability to perform the functions of his or her office due to infirmity of mind or 
body; for being adjudged bankrupt; for being convicted of an offence involving 
dishonesty or fraud or moral turpitude; and in the case of a  Judge who holds 
judicial office or other public office in a Partner State, if removed from that 
office for misconduct due to inability to perform, or resigns from that office 
due to allegations of misconduct or inability to perform.397 The Registrar of 
the Court is appointed by the Council from among citizens of the Partner 
States qualified to hold such high judicial office in their respective Partner 
States.398 
 
4.2.6.2 JURISDICTION 
The Court shall initially have jurisdiction over the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty. However, this Court’s jurisdiction to interpret does 
not include the application of any such interpretation to jurisdiction conferred 
                                                 
395 These must be persons with proven integrity, impartiality and independence and who fulfil the 
conditions required for the holding of such high judicial office, or jurists of recognised competence in 
their own countries. However, no more than two Judges of the First Instance Division and one for 
Appellate Division can be appointed on the recommendations of the same Partner State.   
396 The President is responsible for the administration and supervision of the Appellate Division, 
including presiding over its sessions. The office of the President of the Court is rotated after 
completion of any one term. The Summit also designates two of the Judges of the First Instance 
Division as the Principal Judge and Deputy Principal Judge, respectively. However the President, 
Vice President, Principal Judge and Deputy Principal Judge shall not be nationals of the same 
Partner State 
397 Article 26.1 of the Treaty. 
398 Article 45.1 of the Treaty. 
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by the Treaty on organs of the Partner States.399 The Court’s jurisdiction also 
extends to labour and arbitration matters.400  
 
The Court has jurisdiction, under Article 28 of the Treaty, to adjudicate on 
references by Partner States where a Partner State considers that another 
Partner State or an organ or institution of the Community has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the Treaty or has infringed its provisions. A Partner State 
may also refer for determination by the Court, the legality of any Act, 
regulation, directive, decision or action on the grounds that it is ultra vires or 
unlawful or an infringement of the Treaty or any rule of law relating to its 
application or amounts to a misuse or abuse of power.401 Legal and natural 
persons, residing in a Partner State, may refer for determination by the Court, 
the legality of any Act, regulation, directive, decision or action of a Partner 
State or an institution of the Community on the ground that such an Act, 
regulation, directive, decision or action is unlawful or is an infringement of the 
Treaty.402  
 
4.2.6.3 WORKING METHODS 
The Court considers and determines every reference made to it and delivers 
in public session, a reasoned judgment. In special circumstances the Court 
may deliver the judgment in private. The Court delivers one judgment only in 
respect of every reference to it, which shall be the judgment of the Court 
                                                 
399 Article 27.1 of the Treaty. 
400 The other jurisdiction of the Court is to hear and determine disputes between the Community and 
its employees that arise out of the terms and conditions of employment. Disputes to which the 
Community is a party shall not on that ground alone be excluded from the jurisdiction of the national 
courts of the Partner States, except where jurisdiction is conferred on the Court by the Treaty. 
Decisions of the Court on the interpretation and application of the Treaty shall have precedence over 
decisions of national .courts on a similar matter. The Court also has jurisdiction, as per Article 32 of 
the Treaty, to hear and determine any matter arising from an arbitration clause in a contract or 
agreement which confers such jurisdiction and to which the Community or any of its institutions is a 
party; or arising from a dispute between the Partner States regarding the Treaty if the dispute is 
submitted to it under a special agreement between the Partner States concerned; or arising from an 
arbitration clause contained in a commercial contract or agreement in which the parties have 
conferred jurisdiction on the Court. 
401Under Article 29 of the Treaty, references may also be made by the Secretary-General where he 
considers that a Partner State has failed to fulfil its obligation under the Treaty or has infringed a 
provision of the Treaty. 
402 Article 30 of the Treaty. 
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reached in private by majority verdict. However, a Judge may deliver a 
dissenting judgment.403  
 
An application for review may be made to the Court only if it is based upon 
the discovery of some fact which by its nature might have a decisive influence 
on the judgment if it had been known to the Court at the time the judgment 
was given.404 The Court may give advisory opinions upon request by the 
Summit, the Council or a Partner State, regarding a question of law arising 
from the Treaty which affects the Community.405 
 
Judge Bossa espouses that the framework of EACJ clearly gives it an 
international character as it meets the features of an international court.406 
International courts are permanent in that states do not establish them to deal 
with a specific case or cases.407 An international legal instrument establishes 
them. They apply international law in disposing of cases before them, as 
opposed to national law. Their rules of procedure should exist before they 
handle any cases. They make binding decisions, even if they may have 
additional jurisdiction to render advisory opinions as well. States select their 
judges before any case in an impartial and transparent procedure. One of the 
parties to the disputes they handle must be a state or an international 
organisation.408   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
403 Article 35.1 of the Treaty. 
404 Article 35A of the Treaty, an appeal from the judgment or any order of the First Instance Division 
of the Court shall lie to the Appellate Division only on points of law, lack of jurisdiction or procedural 
irregularity. The Court may, in a case referred to it, in terms of Article 39 of the Treaty, make any 
interim orders or issue any directions which it considers necessary or desirable. Such interim orders 
or directions shall have the same effect ad interim as decisions of the Court. 
405 Article 36.1 of the Treaty. 
406 Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 11. 
407 Romano, C.P.R “The proliferation of international judicial bodies: the pieces of the puzzle” as cited 
in Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 11. 
408 Ibid.  
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4.2.6.4 ANALYSIS 
(i) Structure 
(a) Composition, independence and impartiality of the Court 
 As Ruhangisa409 contends, adjudication and determination of disputes 
arising under the Treaty is the major function of the EACJ. The Court, 
therefore, plays a crucial role in the process towards integration of the EAC. 
This role can be effectively realised through the Court’s effective and efficient 
execution of its mandate as an arbiter in dispute resolution, thereby 
contributing to confidence building in the region.  Invariably the Court, by 
playing its role effectively, is expected to enhance the observance and 
upholding of human rights through good governance and democratic 
institutions in the region. All these aspirations and objectives must be 
reflected in the way the Court conducts its activities, including the rules 
governing litigation.410 But this realisation is undermined by the fact that the 
institutional framework underlying the existence of EACJ takes away its 
independence, hence thwarting the envisaged effectiveness and efficiency. 
 
It has long been recognised that independence and impartiality are the 
fundamentals of any judicial institution.411 With primary responsibility to 
uphold the rule of law and to defend the constitution (in this case, the Treaty), 
the judiciary is a uniquely different organ whose effective functioning depends 
critically on its independence.412 The essential requirements of an 
independent judiciary include, invariably: a system of recruitment of judges 
and other judicial officers, that is, free from political domination; a secure 
tenure of office for judicial officers; and a system that guarantees the 
administration of justice to be free from political and executive pressure and 
                                                 
409 Dr. John Eudes Ruhangisa is the Registrar of the EACJ. 
410 Ruhangisa, J.E (2006) “Litigation in the East African Court of Justice” < 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=794 > accessed on 3 March 
2009. 
411 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 22.  
See also International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (2004) International Principles on the 
Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors: A Practitioners’ Guide pg 22 
where it is observed that the independence of the judge is indispensable to impartial justice under the 
law. It is indivisible. All institutions and authorities, whether national or international, must respect, 
protect and defend that independence. 
412 Addo, M.K (ed) (2000) Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges: A Comparative Study 
of European Legal Standards pg 3. 
 
 
 
 
85 
interference.413 That these conditions apply to national courts does not make 
it any different for courts whose jurisdiction is of a supranational character. In 
the case of the East African countries, national courts seem not to be entirely 
independent of executive control, with the appointment and dismissal of 
judges and other judicial personnel being in the control of the executive. This 
tradition, where the executive arm exercises control over the judicial arm, has 
been carried over to the EACJ where the judges414 are appointed by the 
Summit which is the highest organ of the Community.415 
 
It is not only appointment and dismissal of these judges that are at the whim 
of the executive. Their salaries and other terms and conditions of service are 
determined by the Summit on recommendation by the Council.416 
Independence of the judiciary requires that determination of terms and 
conditions of service be vested in a body other than the executive. It is a 
great risk to allow heads of states the power to determine terms and 
conditions of service.417 The political fortunes or misfortunes of a head of 
state in his country may well determine his view of the Court, and how it will 
operate.418  Consequently, the Court can be rendered irrelevant by the type of 
terms and conditions of service set. It should be kept in mind that the 
decisions of the Summit are by consensus. There is no voting. Therefore, 
there will eventually be a need to establish a Regional Judicial Service 
Commission to deal with all matters of the Court.419 
 
There are numerous workable and better time tested ways of appointing 
judges of superior courts. In Namibia, the President (executive) has to act, on 
                                                 
413 Mwaikusa, J.T “Rule of law and independence of the Judiciary in the SADC region: some pertinent 
challenges” (2007)1 The Tanzania Lawyer pg 64. 
414 The Summit appointed the following persons as the first Judges of EACJ: Mr. Moijo M. Ole 
Keiwua (President) (Kenya), Mr. Joseph Mulenga (Vice President) (Uganda), Mr. Augustino 
Ramadhani (Tanzania), Mr. Kasanga Mulwa (Kenya), Mr. Joseph Warioba (Tanzania) and Ms 
Solomy Bossa (Uganda).  
415 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit 22. 
416 Article 25.5 of the Treaty. 
417 See also Addo, M. K (ed), op. cit. pg 12 where it is observed that in most liberal democratic 
societies judges have security of tenure and their salaries are similarly safeguarded. 
418 Ogalo, D.W (2006) “East African Court of Justice: wanting in goodwill” < 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=760 > accessed on 3 March 
2009. 
419 Ibid. 
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making appointments of judges of superior courts, in accordance with the 
advice of the Judicial Service Commission consulted. There is a similar 
requirement for the appointment of judges in Botswana, Lesotho and South 
Africa, but not for the appointment of the Chief Justice. In appointing the 
Chief Justice the requirement on the President is limited to consultation only 
and there is no obligation to act according to advice.420  The appointing 
practice, excluding that of the Chief Justice, obtaining in these countries, is 
worth emulating. 
 
An independent judicial service commission421 of member states would 
exercise the power of nomination, with appointment by the Summit being 
merely a formality. Alternatively, appointment could be a direct process 
carried out by an independent judicial commission constituted in each of the 
partner states. Of course, this will call for a radical reorganisation of the 
constitutional dispensation of the member countries with regard to 
constituting judicial service commissions.422 Appointment of the Judges of 
EACJ may also be done by the parliaments of the respective partner states, 
or such parliaments may vet and subsequently confirm appointments of such 
Judges.423  
 
In the EU national practices with regard to the appointment of judges to the 
highest courts vary considerably.424 The members of the judiciary may all be 
elected by the legislature, or some members elected by the judiciary, the 
government, and the legislature, or by the head of state and by each 
legislative chamber. Some member states have established judicial 
appointment boards or other vetting procedures, which allow some degree of 
                                                 
420 Mwaikusa, J.T, op. cit. pg 65. 
421 See also “the EAC Press Release” dated 14th February 2009 after a High Level Strategy Retreat 
for Key Organs and Institutions of the EAC, convened by EAC Summit Chairperson, President Paul 
Kagame of Rwanda, held from 9-10 February 2009 in Kigali, comprising of the EAC Council 
Ministers, the Speaker and Members of the EALA, the Judge President, the Principal Judge, the 
Registrar and Senior Officers of EACJ, the Secretary-General and the Deputy  Secretaries-General 
of the EAC, Heads of EAC Institutions, Senior Government and EAC Officials, and Representatives 
of the business community and civil society, where one of the recommendations of the meeting was 
a call for establishment of the EAC Judicial Service Commission < http://www.eac.int > accesses on 
3 March 2009. 
422 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 25. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Stone Sweet, A (2000) “Governing with Judges” as cited in Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 121. 
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scrutiny of candidates’ suitability for appointment.425 The Judges of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) are appointed by ‘common accord of the 
Member States’, in practice the Council of Ministers.426  
 
 The ECJ comprises one Judge per member state. Judges are selected on 
the basis of their independence and legal stature, and must either have the 
qualifications to be appointed to the highest court in their home member 
state, or otherwise have an outstanding academic or professional record;427 
some, but not all, have held high judicial office before joining the ECJ. The 
Court, in this case the ECJ, therefore, has direct access to authoritative 
guidance on the law of the individual member states.428 This presence on the 
Court of members from all the national legal systems is undoubtedly 
conducive to harmonious development of Community case law, taking into 
account concepts regarded as fundamental in the various Member States, 
and thus enhancing acceptability of the solutions arrived at. It may also be 
considered that the presence of a Judge from each Member State enhances 
the legitimacy of the Court.429 
 
The absence of any Community vetting procedure, in the EU, for the ECJ is 
widely considered to be unsatisfactory. One of the principal tasks of the ECJ 
is to review the application of Community law by the Member States; Judges 
are thus called upon to review the acts of the governments that appointed 
them. They also decide disputes between the Council, the Community 
institution comprising national government representatives, and other 
institutions.430 Therefore, the personal stature, and the quality of the work, of 
the members should be beyond doubt. If the judges are not seen to be 
appointed through a procedure that sufficiently guarantees their neutrality vis-
                                                 
425 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 121. 
426 Simamba, B.H “Suspension and removal of Judges and Magistrates from the East African Court 
of Justice” (2005) 16 Journal of the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association pg 5 < 
http://www.cmja.org/downloads/CJJ/42087%20com%20Journal%2016-1.pdf > accessed on 12 
March 2009. 
427 Article 167 of the Treaty of the European Union. 
428 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 120. 
429 Proceedings of the Court of Justice and Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 22-
26 May, 1995, No.15/95 as cited in Arnull, A (2006) The European Union and its Court of Justice pg 
7. 
430Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 121. 
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a vis governments, the authority of the institution, and the legitimacy of the 
Community’s legal order, could ultimately suffer.431 
 
 All in all, the procedure adopted for appointment of Judges, in all jurisdictions 
including the EAC, must be open, all-inclusive and not subject to the 
discretion of individual persons. In this way it will be possible to adhere to the 
requirements set out in the Treaty that the appointees must be persons of 
proven integrity, impartiality and independence. Eventually it will be possible 
that individuals who are competent enough to carry out their duties will fill the 
positions.432   
 
When the Judges are appointed, they must be the ones that are in control of 
the Court. The Summit or other executive members of the Partner States 
must protect them from interference. As such, the Judges should be the ones 
to elect the President and Vice-President of the Court as well as the Principal 
Judge and Deputy Principal Judge of the First Instance Division. Alternatively, 
a workable system of rotation may be devised without involving the 
executive.433 The executive should refrain from designating the Court’s top 
leadership regardless of what criteria inform their decision.434 In the EU, the 
Judges, from among their number, by absolute majority and in secret ballot, 
elect a President. He or she serves in that capacity for a renewable term of 
three years. At the end of his term as President, he or she is allowed to sit as 
an ordinary Judge for remainder of the six year term.435 
 
The reluctance among member states of the EAC to create a body that would 
be independent of their control is posing problems. The significance of this 
state of affairs comes out when a judge is required to make a decision that 
                                                 
431Ibid.  
432 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 25. 
433 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 26. 
434See the Report of the 7th Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State (Ref. No .EAC/SHS EX.7/R/2008 
held in Kampala, Uganda, on 22 October, 2008 pg 7 where it is reported that in designating the Hon. 
Mr. Justice Harold J.Nsekela and the Hon. Mr. Justice Johnston Busingye as Judge President of the 
Court and Principal Judge of the First Instance Division respectively, the Summit took into 
consideration seniority in service in the Appellate Division and First Instance Division as well as the 
need to ensure effective continuity. 
435Simamba, B.H, op. cit. pg 5. 
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may run counter to the wishes of the appointing person, and such 
independence and impartiality are compromised.436 This apprehension was 
vindicated by none other than the Summit itself in November 2006,  in the 
second case to be filed at the EACJ,  in Honourable Prof. Peter Anyang’ 
Nyong’o and others v The Attorney General of Kenya and others.437  
 
In that case the applicants sued the Government of Kenya, challenging the 
manner in which the government handled nominations for the Kenyan 
representatives to the second EALA, which was due to be sworn in on 30 
November 2006. Among other things, they sought an interim injunction 
stopping the swearing in of the Kenyan nominees to the EALA.438  On 27 
November 2006, after listening to all the parties in the reference, the Court 
granted an interim injunction, barring the swearing in of the Kenyan nominees 
to the EALA pending full hearing of the application. The Court urged all the 
parties to expedite the hearing of the application.439  
 
These developments triggered an unprecedented reaction from the top 
executive organ of the EAC. The Summit immediately launched a series of 
disparaging attacks440 on the Court. Among other things, it was alleged that 
the Court was biased against the Government of Kenya because the two 
judges of the EACJ from Kenya, Moijo Mataiya ole Keiwua (its President) and 
Judge Kassanga Mulwa, had a grudge against it. The two were among the 
judges ‘purged’ by the Kibaki Government in October 2003, in an exercise the 
ostensible objective of which was to rid the Kenyan judiciary of corruption.441 
 
As a consequence the EAC Summit decreed an urgent process of 
amendment of the EAC Treaty to clip the EACJ’s wings by, among other 
things, establishing an Appellate Division, which would reverse decisions of 
the then existing Court. This was contained in the official communiqué issued 
                                                 
436Simamba, B.H, op.cit. pg 23. 
437 EACJ Reference Number 1 of 2006. 
438 Deya, D, op. cit. pg 58. 
439 Ibid. 
440 These were led by Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki and the Kenyan EAC Minister Honourabe John 
Koech. 
441 Deya, D, op. cit. pg 58. 
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by the Summit after its meeting of 30 November 2006.442 Within one week, 
the staff of the three Attorneys-General and the EAC Secretariat had agreed 
upon draft Treaty amendments solely targeting the Court. These were 
approved by the Attorneys-General, and sent to the EAC Council of Ministers, 
who cleared and forwarded them to the Summit for signature.443 Thus, in less 
than a fortnight after the interim Court decision, the Kenyan cabinet purported 
to ‘ratify’ the amendments, without taking them to the Kenyan Parliament, as 
the law requires.444 Ultimately the Court ruled against the Government of 
Kenya, declaring that no “election” as provided for under the Treaty had taken 
place in Kenya.445 Upon ratification of the amendments by the Partner States 
through the instruments of ratification, the last of which was deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the Community on 16th March 2007, the Summit 
approved the operationalisation of the re-constituted Court with effect from 1 
July 2007.446 
 
By ushering in the new amendments to the Treaty, the Summit was “using 
the legislative process to effectively overrule the Court decisions which the 
executive does not like”.447  Of all the amendments passed, the provisions 
with regard to the removal of judges from office were the harshest, 
devastating, and calculated, by the executive, to intimidate them in the course 
of their duties.448 The amendments effectively established two sets of 
                                                 
442 Ibid. 
443  See also the Communiqué of the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State held in 
Kampala , Uganda on 18 June, 2007 which records that the Summit at its 4th Extra-ordinary meeting 
in Nairobi, Kenya on 14th December, 2006 adopted proposals by the Council of Ministers to amend 
some provisions of Chapter Eight of the Treaty. 
444Deya, D, op. cit. pg 58. 
445Deya, D, op. cit. pg 60. 
446 See Communiqué of the 5th Extra-ordinary Summit of EAC Heads of State, op. cit. 
447 Mwaikusa, J.T, op. cit. pg 69. 
448 See also the proviso to Article 27.1 of the Treaty which bars the Court’s interpretation of 
jurisdiction conferred by the Treaty on organs of Partner State. It is feared that this may lead to 
impunity, as Partner States know that they will not be challenged by the EACJ for certain violations in 
breach of the Treaty. 
See also Sarooshi, D (2005) International Organisations and Their Exercise of Sovereign Powers pg 
31 where the author contends that there is an inherent conflict between law and politics at the heart 
of the practice of States conferring governmental powers on international organisations. The greater 
the degree or extent of conferrals by States of powers on an international organisation, the less is the 
degree of direct control that States are allowed to exert over the organisation’s exercise of the 
powers outside the confines of the organisation’s decision making processes; and, yet as a State 
confers powers to a greater degree on an organisation there will often be more pressures exerted by 
the State-often as a result of increased domestic political pressures-to try and control the 
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standards to determine removal of a judge from the service of the Court. 
These are determined either by misconduct or inability to perform the 
functions of office (EACJ) due to infirmity of mind or body,449 on one hand, or 
misconduct or inability to perform functions of office (judicial or other public 
office in a Partner State) for any reason, on the other.450 (emphasis supplied)  
 
 In this case the amendments introduced in two separate disciplinary 
regimes:  charges under Article 26.1(a) are dealt with by an ad hoc 
independent tribunal, consisting of three eminent Judges drawn from within 
the Commonwealth of Nations, appointed by the Summit,451 whereas the 
charges under Article 26.1(b) are managed by a tribunal or other relevant 
authority of the Partner State. This invocation of double standards in dealing 
with disciplinary matters of the Judges of the same Court was driven by bad 
faith as it is controversial and counter-productive in achieving the deserved 
security of tenure of judges; hence, eroding the independence of the Court. It 
is clear that, now that the amendments have been entrenched in the Treaty, 
Judges of EACJ should not hold other judicial or public offices in their home 
countries to avoid situations that put them on a confrontational course with 
the executive which might negatively impact on their duties at the Court. It is 
further argued that if appellate jurisdiction is conferred on the Court as 
envisaged by Article 27.2, Judges would find their decisions in national 
courts, where they also serve, being appealed in the regional Court, their 
other work station; a situation which does not create a favourable impression 
on the litigants, and actually complicates the Judges’ working environment.452  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
organisation’s decisions. This attempt to try and exercise greater control over the organisation’s 
decisions is not only actively pursued by the State’s executive branch, but also by the legislative and 
judicial branches of a State who may seek either to direct the executive in its representation of the 
State in the organisation or more simply threaten to exercise their own powers on the domestic plane 
to block the organisation’s decisions from having an effect within the State’s legal system.     
449 Article 26.1(a) of the Treaty. 
450 Article 26.1(b) of the Treaty. 
451 In the EU a judge is not removed by politicians. Article 6 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union clearly states that he may be removed from office “only if, in the unanimous 
opinion of the Judges and Advocates General of the Court, he no longer fulfils the requisite 
conditions or meets the obligations arising from his office.” 
452In actual fact Article 43.2 of the Treaty bars a Judge of the Court from holding any political office, 
or any other office in the service of the Partner State or the Community, or engaging in anything that 
interferes or creates a conflict of interest for his or her position. The law should be followed strictly to 
avoid interferences.  
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However, it has to be understood that misconduct of whatever nature is not to 
be condoned, and has to be absolutely abhorred, especially in respect of 
persons holding judicial office, regardless of when the conduct occurred. 
What is disputed here is the timing, when and manner in which, the said 
amendments to the Treaty were effected. It has to remembered that Justices 
Keiwua and Mulwa were mentioned in the ‘Corruption Report’ way back in 
October 2003 and were immediately suspended from the judicial positions 
they held in Kenya upon appointment of the tribunals453 to investigate them. It 
took the Summit more than three good years to realise that the Treaty 
needed to be amended immediately to cure the lacuna with regard to removal 
of Judges from office due to misconduct arising from their previous judicial 
positions in their home states.454 The fact that the amendments were effected 
within three weeks455 after the issuance of the preliminary ruling by the Court 
against one of the Partner States and amid disturbing and disparaging 
remarks against the Court from the executive456 leaves a lot to be desired, 
and, indeed imports inferences of outright interferences by the executive.457 
By nature of their tasks judges cannot easily respond to criticism, and for that 
                                                 
453Simamba, B.H, op. cit. pg 4.  
454 See Simamba, B.H. op. cit. pg 6 where the following possible situations of misconduct are noted : 
first, an EACJ Judge, who is also serving at home, may have misconducted himself there in a judicial 
capacity with respect to a matter in which  he was involved before appointment to EACJ; secondly, it 
is also possible that the alleged misconduct might occur at home, again in a judicial capacity, during 
a period when the Judge is serving in a similar capacity in the sub-regional Court; thirdly, there may 
be cases where a Judge no longer holds a judicial capacity at home but there is evidence of 
misconduct  with respect  to his conduct when he was on the bench there after he is appointed to the 
sub-regional Court; and fourthly, whether or not the person is or was  a Judge in a national court, the 
misconduct in issue may relate to his conduct when he was a lawyer in practice or otherwise involved 
in the legal field.     
455 The Executive disregarded the dictates of Article 150 of the Treaty which sets out a mandatory 
process and a minimum timeframe of 120 days for amendments. 
456 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 277 where it is reported that when the Court overruled the appointment 
of the Kenyan legislators, it was heavily criticised by the governments and the EAC Council, and the 
November 2006 Summit then coincidentally directed that the procedure for the removal of Judges 
from office provided in the Treaty be reviewed, with a view to including all possible reasons for 
removal, other than those provided in the Treaty. This was criticised by civil society as an attempt to 
weaken the Court. 
See also Addo, M.K (ed), op. cit. pg 11 where it is observed that, in relation to the criticism of judges, 
it is important to ensure that the call to account does not overwhelm judicial independence or the 
process of accountability itself will be unworkable and, therefore, unacceptable. 
457For contrary views see Beatson, J, et al (eds) (1998) European Public Law pg 128 where it is 
opined that the counter-majoritarian difficulty arises because at first sight it appears anti-democratic 
that a small, unrepresentative and unaccountable minority of the population which happens to hold 
judicial office should be able to overrule the expression of legislative will which represents (however 
imperfectly) a much larger group of the population.  
 
 
 
 
93 
reason, need to be protected,458 although they must consciously accept the 
risk that their judgments in crucial areas may be subject to criticism.459      
 
The Summit has been too much involved in matters that are traditionally in 
the domain of the administration of justice. Under the Treaty, if a Judge is 
directly or indirectly interested in a case before the Court and if he or she 
considers that the nature of the interest makes it prejudicial for him or her to 
participate in a case, he or she informs the President or Principal Judge, as 
the case may be, who in turn makes a report to the Chairperson of the 
Summit, and the Summit appoints a temporary Judge to act for that case only 
in place of the substantive Judge.460 Ordinarily, if a judge has an interest in a 
case before him, he will state his interest, disqualify himself, and ask the 
head of the court to allocate the case to another judge.461  
 
 This is a clear case of interference by the Summit in judicial functions.  
Mwaikusa contends that any interference, by the executive or any other 
institutions, with the functions of the judiciary is a violation of the rule of law 
simply because such interference goes contrary to the principle of separation 
of powers.462 The executive has been employing interference by legislative 
action, which is a complex affair, in a deliberate scheme whose ultimate goal 
is to render the courts helpless and redundant.463 The end result is that 
parties will have to wait until the Summit is convened. Presently the Summit 
                                                 
458 Addo, M.K (ed), op. cit. pg 12. 
459 See “The Thinker”, dated March 2009, “Interview” pg 21 ascribing the statement to the late former 
South African Chief Justice (CJ) Ismail Mahomed. The late CJ Mahomed is further quoted to have 
said that criticism should not cause judges no distress as a viable and credible constitutional culture 
evolves most effectively within the crucible of vigorous intellectual combat and even moral 
examination. What they are entitled to and demand is that the criticism should be fair and informed; 
that it must be in good faith, that it does not impugn upon the dignity or bona fides, and above all it 
should not impair their independence because judges themselves would not be the only victims of 
such impairment. 
See also “Newsweek”, dated 9 March, 2009, “When Judges Behave Badly” where Lithwick, D says “If 
we create too many systems that monitor the judiciary, we are really saying that we their judgment 
only when they agree with us. To paraphrase Justice Antonin Scalia of the US Supreme Court, 
judges are not gods. But we must trust them to do their jobs, or do away the institution itself.”  
460 Article 26.6 of the Treaty. 
461 Ogalo, D.W, op. cit. 
See also International Commission of Jurists, op. cit. pg 28 where it is contended that independence 
of the judiciary requires it to have exclusive jurisdiction over all issues of judicial nature and decide 
whether an issue before it is of judicial nature.  
462Mwaikusa, J.T, op. cit. pg 67.  
463 Mwaikusa, J.T, op .cit.pg 70. 
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meets once a year. This is a clear case of justice delayed, and, therefore, 
denied.464 That judges should be free from all forms of unnecessary 
interference in the performance of their judicial duties not only makes 
common sense but is also central to the survival of the rule of law.465 It is the 
independence of the judiciary that enables the judicial arm to act as a check 
on the other two arms in fulfillment of the judges’ duty to uphold the law.466 
 
(b) Competence and industry of Judges 
The competence, industry and impartiality of some of the Judges of the 
Partner States have been questioned time and again.467 By having powers to 
decide on whom to nominate and then appoint, the Summit members mainly 
exercise an extension of their powers under their national constitutions. The 
factors that influence their choices at national level will extend to influence 
their choices at Community level, hence producing little qualitative change in 
the composition of the Court.468   Respect for a judicial institution depends on: 
the perceived fairness of the substantive law to be applied; the degree of 
confidence in the independence, impartiality, and competence of the Judges, 
and the quality of the judgments rendered.469 In this regard the Community 
should continue to ensure the quality of individual judges as this has a direct 
bearing on their independence and affects the esteem of the Court.470 This 
includes the need to ensure that the judges appointed are persons who have 
exhibited a high degree of competence in judicial work or as jurists. High 
academic credentials would certainly be in order though not a sine qua 
non.471 A judge should be assisted by at least one legal secretary whose 
                                                 
464 Ogalo, D.W, op. cit. 
465 Addo, M.K (ed), op. cit. pg 12. 
466 Ibid. 
See also Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (2002) Report on Terrorism and Human 
Rights” (2002) as cite in International Commission of Jurists, op. cit. pg 27 where it is stated: “The 
requirement of independence (…) necessitates that courts be autonomous from the other 
branches…, free from influence, threats or interference from any source and for any reason, and 
benefit from other characteristics necessary for ensuring the correct and independent performance of 
judicial functions, including tenure and appropriate professional training”. 
467 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 22.  
468 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 23. 
469Cron, D.D (2000) “War and international adjudication: reflections on the 1899 Peace Conference” 
as cited in Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 23. 
470 Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 23. 
471 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 26. 
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main task is to carry out legal research and to help in the preparation of 
opinions or other legal writing.472 This enables the judge to write well 
researched judgements. 
 
Closely related to the competence and industry of the Judges is the issue of 
tenure of office. The Treaty unnecessarily restricts the tenure of office of 
judges to a maximum period of seven years.473 This period is too short. Ogalo 
argues that all the experience and knowledge acquired by a judge in 
determining disputes between states is lost after five to seven years. As soon 
as new judges have mastered this new legal field, they are removed. This 
weakens the Court, instead of strengthening it.474  
 
Judges at the EACJ should enjoy a renewable tenure in order to enrich the 
Court, and avoid a situation where the Court would perpetually have a new 
composition which is undoubtedly not a positive development since relevant 
experience at that level matters for justice to be properly administered.475 
This also in turn will render redundant the requirement of drawing of lots by 
the Summit to determine the Judges whose terms are to expire at the end of 
each of the initial periods.476 It will spare the Judges and the members of the 
Summit some embarrassment as one observer commented that the picture of 
Presidents picking pieces of paper from a basket to determine which judge to 
cease service is both hilarious and ridiculous.477 The renewal of judges’ 
tenure of office at regional or international courts is not a new phenomenon. 
Members of both the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and its Court of First 
                                                                                                                                                       
See also The Hon. Doyle, J “The National Judicial College of Australia” (2005) 16 Journal of the 
Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association pg 19 where the Hon. Doyle observes: “Judges 
and Magistrates are expected to have professional legal skills of a high order. They should also have 
a wide range of practical skills to enable them to carry out judicial work properly. Some of these 
practical skills are peculiar to the judicial role; some are skills that are also required in other 
professions”.   
472 See Hartley, T.C, op. cit. pg 57. 
473 Article 25.1 of the Treaty. 
474 Ogalo, D.W, op. cit. 
475 See also The Hon. Doyle, op. cit. pg 19 where it is argued that “judicial officers tend to occupy judicial 
office for fairly lengthy periods. This is in public interest. It takes time to develop fully the skills required of a 
judicial officer, and it is in the public interest that those who have fully developed those skills put them to the 
public benefit for as long as possible”.  
476 Article 24.3 of the Treaty. 
477 Ogalo, D.W, op. cit. 
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Instance (CFI) are appointed by a common accord of the member state 
governments for a renewable six year term.478   
 
(ii) Jurisdiction 
(a) Extended jurisdiction 
As stated above, the Court has initial jurisdiction over the interpretation and 
application of the Treaty.479 Under Article 27.2 of the Treaty, the Court shall 
have such other original, appellate, human rights and other jurisdiction as 
shall be determined by the Council at a suitable subsequent date through a 
protocol. It is submitted that it is high time the extended jurisdiction stated in 
the Treaty became a reality.480 The fact that, on the one hand, the 
Community has recognised the extended jurisdiction of the Court, but, on the 
other hand,  is apprehensive about putting in place the operational 
mechanism in form of a protocol, raises disturbing questions.481 This stance 
has indeed seriously and unnecessarily restricted the Court’s areas of 
competence. 
 
 Ojienda states that there does not seem to be a good reason why the Court’s 
jurisdiction should now be limited to the interpretation of the treaty provisions 
and not embrace other legal and human rights issues.482 The only conclusion 
that can be drawn is that there is a fear that such extended jurisdiction would 
create an institution with power to raise questions about the human, social, 
political and other rights records of the Partner States. At a time when there 
has been restricted tolerance of alternative, seemingly resistant, opinions, 
                                                 
478 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 121. 
479 Article 27.1 of the Treaty. 
480See also Mulenga, J.N “Linkages between the EACJ and national courts” (2003) 5 The East 
African Lawyer pg 28 where the author, former Honourable Justice of the EACJ, commenting on 
appellate jurisdiction, says: “During its existence, the EACA had the final appellate jurisdiction over all 
matters in each of the Partner States, except jurisdiction over national constitutional issues, which the 
respective national High Courts retained….It may well be expedient to harmonise the judicial 
structures, adopting a uniform one or two tier appellate ladder in the Partner States. In theory, 
however, each Partner State could retain its system while ceding final appellate jurisdiction to the 
EACJ. This is particularly plausible if the appellate jurisdiction to the EACJ is limited to selected 
categories of disputes. For example, it has been suggested that it might enhance investor confidence 
if appeals in commercial cases were to lie to the EACJ”    
481 See also Mchumo, A, S “The East African Community” (2003) 4 The East Africa Lawyer pg 9 
where the author observes that a temporary difficulty is that the jurisdiction of  the EACJ, which would 
be at the fore front of creating an East African jurisprudence, is initially rationed. 
482 Ojienda, T.O, op. cit. pg 25. 
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Partner States might have been wary of providing a forum at the regional 
level for propounding such views.483  
 
Being a judicial body, the Court’s responsibility is to administer justice and 
ensure the adherence to law in the interpretation and application of, and 
compliance with, the Treaty. It can administer justice by hearing and deciding 
cases and other matters brought before it. In other words, the Court is 
responsible for, among other things, determination of disputes that may arise 
out of the Treaty. The Court, therefore, has a crucial role to play in conflict 
resolution and confidence building in the region.484 However, this exposition 
is complicated by the situation on the ground. The absence of the Protocol on 
Extended Jurisdiction unnecessarily complicates a recourse to the Court for a 
person aggrieved by an infringement perpetuated by the Partner State, the 
Community, its organs or institutions, on such person’s rights as embedded in 
the fundamental principles of the Community, especially those under Article 
6(d) of the Treaty.485 
 
It has to be borne in mind that the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial 
Affairs initiated the process of putting in place the Protocol on Extended 
Jurisdiction during its meeting on 24 November 2004 by directing the 
Secretariat to prepare the Draft Protocol.486 The Draft Protocol accordingly 
provides for original, appellate, human rights, and other jurisdiction, including 
alternative dispute resolution.487 More than four years have passed since the 
                                                 
483 Ibid. 
See also Mulenga, J.N, op. cit.pg 28 the author opines that: “human rights are entrenched in the 
respective national constitutions of the Partner States which provide for their observance and 
protection. The national courts have jurisdiction to enforce those entrenched human rights….Vesting 
human rights jurisdiction in the EACJ will not necessarily affect the jurisdiction of the national courts 
over the same. Nor will that jurisdiction be in appellate form in the strict sense. However, because 
primarily it is the responsibility of the state to protect the human rights and to observe its international 
obligations, a person seeking to invoke that jurisdiction would have to go to the national courts first, 
to exhaust local remedies.”  
484 Ruhangisa, J.E, op. cit. 
485 The fundamental principles of good governance include: adherence to the principles of 
democracy, the rule of law, accountability, transparency, social justice, equal opportunities, gender 
equality, as well as the recognition, promotion and protection of human and people rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.   
486 See the report of the Meeting of the Sectoral Council on Legal and Judicial Affairs of 24th 
November 2004-Ref.EAC/SC/01/2004 as cited in Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 5. 
487Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 6.  
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process started but still the so called “consultations” on the Draft Protocol are 
going on and no one knows when the process will be concluded. It is, 
therefore, justified for the people of East Africa to demand that the process of 
preparing the Protocol be expedited. Ruhangisa, the Court Registrar, says 
that it is the wish of the Court itself, and probably many other stakeholders, 
including members of the bar, that the presently deferred appellate and 
human rights jurisdiction of the Court be operationalised as soon as 
possible.488  
 
(b) Combined jurisdiction 
The combined jurisdiction of the EACJ as a court of justice and a human 
rights and appellate court is too heavy, and in future this is bound to impact 
on its functioning. It is contended here that the human rights jurisdiction 
needs to be removed from the Court. A separate regional court should be 
established to take charge of the equally important human rights issues within 
the integration framework. The Community may need to borrow a leaf from 
the European Community.489 The European Community has two separate 
courts, namely the ECJ490 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 
The ECJ491 deals with disputes arising from the functioning of the Treaty of 
the European Union. On the other hand the ECHR,492 established under the 
European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECPHR) of 1950 as amended by various Protocols, deals 
specifically with human rights violations under ECPHR. This is a separate 
and distinct legal regime.493 The combined docket of EACJ is a cause for 
worry. Compared to ECJ and ECHR, the EACJ has a very wide jurisdiction 
                                                 
488 Ruhangisa, J.E, op.cit. 
489The Treaty establishing the European Community comprises of the following European 
Communities: European Atomic Energy Community Treaty (Eurotom) (1958); the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) (1951); and the European Economic Community (EEC) under the Treaty of 
Rome (1958). 
490The ECJ has three levels, namely, the Court of Justice (established under the European Coal and 
Steel Community, 1952), the Court of First Instance (established under the Single European Act, 
1986 but the Court came into effect in 1989), and Judicial Panels. The Council of Ministers is 
empowered to establish the Judicial Panels under Article 225a of the Treaty of the European 
Community as and when the Treaty of Nice, 2001 enters into force. 
491 ECJ may hear cases by individuals (companies and natural persons) and Community institutions, 
as well as by member states. 
492 ECHR is exclusively responsible to hear complaints by individuals or contracting parties. 
493 Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 16.  
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and the paltry number of fifteen Judges, i.e. three per Partner State, might not 
be sufficient to handle the work that the enactment of the Protocol is likely to 
generate.494 
 
(c) Preliminary rulings of national courts 
Article 34 of the Treaty provides that where a question is raised before any 
court on the interpretation and application of the Treaty, or the validity of 
regulations, directives, decisions or actions of the Community, that court 
shall, if it considers a ruling on the question necessary to enable it to give 
judgment, request the EACJ to give a preliminary ruling on the question. 
Scrutiny of this provision reveals that its drafting is not tight enough to impose 
a mandatory obligation on national courts to seek preliminary rulings from the 
Court on matters within the ambit of the Treaty. The national court may elect 
not to request such a ruling from the Court.495 For purposes of giving uniform 
application and clarity to the Treaty provisions across East Africa on the 
same matters, Article 34 should have made it mandatory for the national 
courts, especially the superior courts, to refer any matter on the interpretation 
and application of the Treaty to the Court.  
 
Giving the practice in the EC, Peterson496 states that as Community law is 
administered primarily by the national authorities, national courts are in a very 
real sense Community courts. To prevent divergent interpretations of 
Community rules, the treaty authors devised a procedure497 to allow the Court 
of Justice to provide an authoritative ruling on any aspect of Community 
submitted to it, and hence guarantee its uniform application.498 Where 
necessary to reach judgment, the national court can obtain a ruling on the 
                                                 
494 Bossa, S.B. op. cit. 17. 
495 See also Mulenga, J.N, op.cit. pg 26 where the author observes that the national court or tribunal 
is left with the discretion to determine if the ruling of the EACJ is necessary to enable such court or 
tribunal to give its own judgment.   
496Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 124.  
497 Underlying the preliminary ruling procedure of Article 234 of the Treaty of the European 
Community (TEC)(formerly Article 177) is a dispute before a national court that raises one or several 
issues of Community law, on the interpretation of the Treaty, or on the interpretation or validity of an 
of a Community institution or body. The ECJ only answers the Community law question, and does 
not decide the case. In practice, however, the national court will often have little remaining discretion 
as to the outcome of the proceedings before it. 
498 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 124.  
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Community law question from the ECJ. Lower courts may choose not to ask 
for a ruling, whereas national supreme courts are obliged to seek such a 
ruling where a Community law point arises, except where the answer is 
obvious or would not influence the outcome of the case.499 The significance 
of the preliminary reference procedure is that the ECJ’s ruling is binding, not 
only on the referring court, but on all the courts of all the member states faced 
with the same issue, the so called ‘multiplier effect’.500  
  
(iii) Applicable Law 
The Treaty has not dealt sufficiently with the issue of the applicable law for 
the Community. As explained earlier, the Treaty provides that the Court shall 
ensure adherence to the law in the interpretation and application of, and 
compliance with, the Treaty.501 It is obvious, Judge Bossa502 argues, that the 
Treaty does not state the law the Court should adhere to specifically. 
However, the Treaty gives further guidance in this regard, in the Fundamental 
Principles503 and in the Operational Principles504 of the Community. This may 
appear an oblique reference but it is a pointer to the standards, any organ of 
the Community, the EACJ inclusive, should set and apply in any matter. It 
incorporates universal principles, as well as principles of the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR).505 These are among the highest 
                                                 
499Ibid.  
500 Peterson, J, et al, op cit. pg 125. 
501 See note 284. 
502 Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 12. 
503Article 6 of the Treaty. 
See also the justiciability of the principle of rule of law by citizens of one of the Partner States as 
embedded in Article 6 of the Treaty in the case of Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary of the EAC 
and Another (Ref. No.1 of 2207) {2007}EACJ 3 (1 November 2007). In this case the claim arose from 
the disputed conduct of the Government of Uganda which rearrested and took back to jail the 
claimants immediately upon their release, on bail, by the High Court on charges of treason and 
misprision of treason. This conduct by the security personnel interfered with the process of 
preparation of bail documents. The claimants were later arraigned before a military General Court 
Martial for possession of firearms and treason. Despite the decision of the Constitutional Court of 
Uganda that the interference of the court process was unconstitutional, the claimants were not 
released hence petitioned the EACJ. The EACJ ruled that “We, therefore, hold that the intervention 
by the armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the execution of a lawful court order violated the 
principle of the rule of law and consequently contravened the Treaty. Abiding by the court decision is 
the cornerstone of the independence of the judiciary which is one of the principles of the observation 
of the rule of law.” < http://www.saflii.org/ea/cases/EACJ/2007/3.html > accessed on 24 April 2009.  
504 Article 7 of the Treaty. 
505 Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 13. 
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standards in human rights,506 and as such they put EACJ on a very high 
pedestal in terms of stature.507 The uniqueness of ACHPR, among the 
instruments that exist on human rights, is illustrated by, for example, the 
inclusion of civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and 
peoples rights, in one document treating them as indivisible.508 Additionally, 
the drafting of the provisions relating to the latter, and to the duties of the 
individual, are in considerable detail.509 The African Charter specifically refers 
to ‘Human and Peoples Rights’, highlighting the idea of preserving the 
traditional African collective rather than individual nature of the Western-
formulated human rights.510  
 
 However, the framers of the Treaty could have been more categorical. The 
Community should enact a clear and distinct provision on the law applicable. 
No doubt, the Fundamental Principles and Operational Principles serve a 
purpose but may not be the best place for guidance to the EACJ on the law to 
apply.511  With regard to this matter, it is, therefore, apparent that, apart from 
deficiencies in other discourses, the EACJ does not have a specific Treaty 
based regime on human rights to enforce, unlike its oldest sister, the 
ECHR.512  Judge Bossa513 further argues that this weakness may stem from 
the fact that EAC is yet to harmonise its human rights laws. While Partner 
States have signed and ratified a number of International Human Rights 
Instruments, they are yet to domesticate many of them.514 On their part, the 
national courts remain reluctant to invoke them. In addition, the Partner 
States have not harmonised their Bills of Rights.515  
                                                 
506 Romano, C.P.R “The proliferation of international judicial bodies: the pieces of the puzzle” as cited 
in Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 13. 
507 Bossa, S.B, op.cit. pg 12. 
508 Scoble, H (1984) “Human rights and non-governmental organizations in black Africa: their 
problems and prospects in the wake of the Banjul Charter” as cited in Murray, R , The African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights & International Law, pg 10. 
509 Nowak, M (1986) “The African Charter on Human and People’s Rights” as cited in Murray, R, ibid. 
510 Bunn-Livingstone, S. L (2002) Juricultural Pluralism vis-à-vis Treaty Law: State Practice and 
Attitudes pg 19. 
511Bossa, S.B, op.cit.pg 13.  
512 Ibid. 
513 Ibid. 
514 See the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
Convention for the Eliminations of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, among others. 
515 Bossa, S.B, op. cit. pg 13. 
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The reluctance of the framers to specifically provide for applicable law 
provisions seems not to be peculiar to the EACJ only. Peterson516 points out 
that the European Community (EC) Treaty517 defines the role of the ECJ as 
being to ‘ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the Treaty, the 
law is observed’. The EC Treaty does not provide further guidance as to what 
‘the law’ is, apart from the policy objectives, principles, instruments, and 
procedures it establishes for the Community institutions and the member 
states.518 It is clear, however, that ‘the law’ is something more than the mere 
provisions of the EC Treaty and Community legislation, and that the intention 
of the authors was that the ECJ itself would define ‘the law’. ECJ judgments, 
therefore, frequently provide direction for the political institutions in the 
establishment and the operation of the Community.519   
 
Furthermore the ECJ520 applies general principles of law that are recognised 
in the legal systems of the member states.521 Tridimas522 observes that they 
occupy a distinct position among the sources of Community law as they523 
are “children of national law but, as brought up by the ECJ, they become 
enfants terribles: they are extended, narrowed, restated, and transformed by 
a creative and eclectic judicial process”.524  One cannot agree more with this 
notion of the Court itself defining ‘the law’, and it is fully adopted here to the 
circumstances obtaining in the EACJ.525  
                                                 
516Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 128.  
517 Article 220 of the Treaty of European Community. 
518Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 129.  
519 Ibid. 
520 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 119. 
521 ECJ calls this system ‘a new legal order’ for the Community which is quite distinct from either 
national or international law, comparable in some respects to the constitutional law of a federal polity. 
522Tridimas, T, (2006) The General Principles of EU Law pg 5. 
523 See Tridimas, T, op. cit.  pg. 6 where the following general principles, among others, have been 
recognised by the ECJ: the right to judicial protection, the principle of equal treatment or non-
discrimination, the principle of proportionality, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of the 
protection of  legitimate expectations, the protection of fundamental rights, and the rights of defence. 
524 Tridimas, T, op. cit. pg 6. 
525See Deya, D, op. cit. pg 57 where, in the above cited case of  Calist Andrew Mwatela and others v 
The EAC, the Court applied the general principle of ‘prospective annulment’ to preserve the previous 
decisions of the EAC Council of Ministers and Sectoral Council for Legal and Judicial Affairs, to avoid 
anarchy with regard to past actions of EAC. It observed that prospective annulment which has been 
used in other jurisdiction is good law and practice, and proceeded to cite the case of Defrene v 
Sabena (1981) All E.L.R.122, decided by ECJ, as one of the authorities.   
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(iv)The official language of the Court 
The Treaty526 decrees English to be the official language of the Court. This 
requirement impedes ordinary citizens’ access to the Court.  Partner States, 
as observed above, have different official languages. English is not even an 
official language in Burundi, and it is not widely spoken by the general 
populace in some other Partner States. For instance, in Rwanda, “ninety 
three per cent of the country speaks only Kinyarwanda. Just over one half of 
a per cent (.59) speak English, about 51,000 out of the nearly 9 million 
population”.527 With this limited use of English as a medium of 
communication, it is absurd to note that only English is allowed as an official 
language of the Court. It is submitted that the principle of linguistic equality, 
particularly of the official languages as recognised by the Partner States, 
should be applied, not only by the Court, but also by the entire Community. 
One wonders that even Kiswahili, which is the lingua franca in the region,528 
has not been accorded the status of an official language of the Court, 
whereas it is an official language of the African Union, a continental body.  
Hartley529 observes that one of the characteristic of ECJ is that it is 
multilingual.530 Hartley further observes that when the Community turns 
multilingual, it must be able to operate in any official language.531 Community 
institutions are, therefore, required to accommodate themselves to the needs 
of the citizens and the other party.532 
                                                 
526 Article 46 of the Treaty. 
527 “New African”, Issue No. 482, dated March 2009 “Rwanda & the charity industrial complex (part 
2)” pg 35. 
528 Article 137 of the treaty states that the official language of the Community shall be English and 
Swahili is to be developed as the lingua franca of the Community. 
529 Hartley, T.C (2007) The Foundations of the European Community Law, pg 66. 
530 See Hartley, T. C (2007) op. cit. pg 66 where it is stated that the partner states in EU have 23 
official languages which are used by ECJ namely, Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, 
Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish , Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, 
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, and Swedish. All the official languages, 
except Irish, are working languages of the European Constitution. Community legislation is published 
in all the working languages, and it is generally accepted that all versions are equally authentic.  
531 Hartley, T. C (2007), op. cit. pg 68. 
532 Ibid. 
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4.2.7 THE EAST AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (EALA) 
4.2.7.1 STRUCTURE 
The membership of EALA (also referred to as ‘the Assembly’) comprises of 
nine members elected by each Partner State533 and ex-officio members.534  
The Assembly shall have committees constituted in the manner provided in 
the rules of procedure.535 A Clerk and other officers of the Assembly are 
appointed by the Council.536  
 
The National Assembly of each Partner State elects, not from among its 
members, nine members of the Assembly, who shall represent as much as 
feasible, the various political parties represented in the National Assembly, 
shades of opinion, gender, and other special groups, in accordance with such 
procedure as the National Assembly of each Partner State may determine.537 
A person has to meet certain membership qualifications.538  
 
An elected member of the Assembly shall hold office for five years and be 
eligible for re-election for a further term of five years.539 Terms and conditions 
of service of the members are determined by the Summit540. A member may 
vacate his or her office in a number of ways.541 The Speaker of the Assembly 
                                                 
533 Article 48.1 (a) of the Treaty. 
534 These consist of Ministers responsible for East African Community Affairs from each Partner 
State; the Secretary-General and the Counsel to the Community. The Assistant/Deputy/State 
Ministers may only participate in the meetings of the Assembly when substantive Ministers are 
unable to attend. 
535 Article 48.3 of the Treaty. 
536 Article 48.4 of the Treaty. 
537 Article 50.1 of the Treaty. 
538 Article 50.2 provides that such a person must: be a citizen of that Partner State; be qualified to be 
elected a member of the National Assembly of that Partner State; not be holding office as a Minister 
in that Partner State; not be an officer in the service of the Community; and has proven experience or 
interest in consolidating and furthering the aims and objectives of the Community. 
539 Article 51.1 of the Treaty. 
540 Article 51.2 of the Treaty. 
541 They are provided under Article 53.3 of the Treaty, namely: upon the delivery of his or her 
resignation in writing to the Speaker; upon his or her ceasing to be qualified for election as an elected 
member; upon his or her election or nomination as a member of the National Assembly of the Partner 
State; upon his or her appointment as a Minister in the Government of a Partner State; upon his or 
her having been absent from the Assembly for such period and in such circumstances as prescribed 
by the rules of the Assembly; or upon his or her conviction by a court of competent jurisdiction of an 
offence and sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months and if no appeal has been 
preferred against such a decision.  
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shall be elected on a rotational basis by the elected members from among 
themselves to serve for a period of five years.542 
4.2.7.2 FUNCTIONS  
The Assembly is the legislative organ of the Community.543 It liaises with the 
National Assemblies of Partner States on matters relating to the Community; 
debates and approves the budget; considers annual reports, audit reports 
and any other reports submitted by the Council; discusses matters of the 
Community and makes recommendations to the Council; may establish any 
committee; recommends to the Council the appointment of the Clerk and 
other officers of the Assembly544; establishes its own procedures; and 
perform any other function as conferred by the Treaty.545 
4.2.7.3 WORKING METHODS 
The meetings of the Assembly shall be held at such times and places as the 
Assembly may appoint.546 However, the Assembly shall meet at least once in 
every year at Arusha.547 The Speaker shall preside over the meetings of the 
Assembly.548 All questions proposed for decision in the Assembly shall be 
determined by a majority of the votes of members present and voting.549 Ex-
officio members are not entitled to vote. If the votes of the members are 
equally divided upon any motion before the Assembly, the motion is lost.550 
Under Article 59.1 of the Treaty, any member may propose any motion or 
introduce any Bill in the Assembly subject to the rules of procedure.551 The 
Assembly is precluded from proceeding with Bills in certain specified 
circumstances.552  
                                                 
542 Article 53.1 of the Treaty. 
543 Article 49.1 of the Treaty. 
544 Article 49.2 of the Treaty. 
545 Article 49.3 of the Treaty. 
546 Article 55.1 of the Treaty. 
547 Article 55.2 of the Treaty. 
548 Under Article 56 of the Treaty, in the absence of the Speaker, an elected member of the Assembly 
may be elected to preside over the sitting of the Assembly. 
549 Article 58.1 of the Treaty. 
550 Article 58.4 of the Treaty. 
551 The proviso to  Article 59.1 provides that a motion which does not relate to the functions of the 
Community or a Bill which does not relate to a matter with respect to which Acts of the Community 
may be enacted, shall not be proposed or introduced, as the case may be, in the Assembly. 
552 These, provided under Article 59.2, include a Bill that makes provision for the imposition of any 
charge upon any fund of the Community, or for the payment, issue or withdrawal from any fund of the 
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The enactment of legislation of the Community shall be effected by means of 
Bills passed by the Assembly and assented to by the Heads of State, and 
every Bill that has been duly passed and assented to is styled an Act of the 
Community.553 Under Article 63.1 of the Treaty, the Heads of State may 
assent to or withhold assent to a Bill of the Assembly.554 If a Head of State 
withholds assent to, a re-submitted Bill, the Bill shall lapse.555 Mechanisms for 
co-operation between the Assembly and National Assemblies of Partner 
States are provided by Article 65 of the Treaty.556 
 
4.2.7.4 ANALYSIS 
(i) Structure 
(a) Composition 
Upon the accession of Burundi and Rwanda, the number of elected members 
of the Assembly increased to forty five. However, this size of the Assembly 
still raises concerns. Oloka-Onyango557 states that it is a standard practice 
that legislative bodies the world over transact a considerable amount of their 
business while constituted as Committees, and the Treaty ‘concedes’ as 
much.558 Whether with forty five elected members the Assembly has the 
human power necessary to efficiently carry out its voluminous legislative 
functions, is to be seriously doubted.559 This worry stems from the fact that, 
                                                                                                                                                       
Community of any moneys not charged thereon, or the increase in the amount of any such payment, 
issue or withdrawal, or for the remission of any debt due to the Community. 
553Article 62.1 of the Treaty.  
554 A Bill that has not received assent within three months from the date on which it was passed by 
the Assembly shall be referred back to the Assembly, giving reasons, and with a request that the Bill 
or a particular provision thereof be reconsidered by the Assembly in terms of Article 63.2. If the 
Assembly again approves the Bill, the Bill shall be re-submitted to the Heads of State for assent. 
555 Article 63.4 of the Treaty. 
556 These include: transmission of copies of records of all relevant debates of the meetings, and 
copies of relevant Bills and Acts, by the Clerk of the Assembly to the Clerks of National Assemblies, 
and vice versa. 
557 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 37. 
558 See also Hughes, T, (ed) (2006) SADC: Parliamentary-Civil Society Engagement Handbook pg 31 
where it is contended that parliamentary committees constitute the most important work centres of 
any elected assembly, thus they are often termed the ‘engine room’ of parliament. Committees serve 
at least three crucial roles. The first role is that of constituting a body of members of Parliament 
(MPs) who are policy and legislative specialists to represent the parliament in a particular policy area. 
The second important role is consultative and to involve the public in the deliberative process. The 
third vital role played by committees is that of conducting oversight over the executive. 
559 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 37. 
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under the provisions of Article 49 of the Treaty, the Assembly is “mandated to 
exercise both legislative and oversight functions on all matters within the 
purview of the EAC. The mission of the Assembly is, therefore, to support, 
through legislation and oversight roles, the overall mission of EAC which aims 
at widening and deepening co-operation, among Partner States in political, 
economic, social, cultural, defense, etcetera for their mutual benefits.”560 
 
 The oversight roles include carrying out spot assessment visits to EAC 
projects and/or demand for periodic reports in lieu of visits.561 This is a 
continuous process whose aim is to provide legislative oversight in an 
attempt to ensure that the targets set out in the EAC Development Strategy 
are achieved by the stipulated dates.562  This work of the Committees563 
involves extensive travelling throughout the region where the programmes 
are executed.564 With as few as six Committees565 and a skeleton staff of 23 
only 13 of whom are employed at a professional level, whereas the remaining 
10 are in the general staff category,566 it will be an arduous task for the 
Assembly to fully and efficiently help to realise the stated mission of EAC. A 
45 member Assembly with such a skeleton supporting staff does not appear 
to be too reassuring.567 Hence the parliament and its committees need to be 
fully resourced if they are to properly carry out their multiple roles.568 For 
instance, they must have access to library and research services569 as 
                                                 
560 See the 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, AICC, Arusha, Tanzania, 24th-27th September 
2007 (Ref: EAC/CM 14/A1/2007) pg 84. 
561 See also Hughes, T (ed), op. cit. pg 5 where it is observed that parliaments have a democratic 
obligation to exercise oversight of the executive branch. This is a legitimate role of parliaments and 
one that should be central to any representative democracy. 
562 The 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 86. 
563The following are the six Committees of the Assembly, as discerned from various reports to the 
Council of Ministers Meetings (especially reports with Ref. Nos. EAC/CM 14/A1/2007 and EAC/CM 
17/BP/2008), namely, the General Purpose Committee, House Business Committee, Committee on 
Accounts, Committee on Regional Affairs and Conflict Resolution, Committee on Communication, 
Trade and Investments, as well as Committee on Agriculture, Tourism and Natural Resources.  
564 See also Hughes, T (ed), op. cit. pg 36 where the author opines that committees need to conduct 
regular departmental oversight and study tours to better understand the day-to-day activities, 
challenges and achievements of a particular department, and these need to be lobbied for and 
budgeted for by parliament. 
565See 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 86. 
566 The 17th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 59. 
567 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 138.  
568 Hughes, T, (ed), op. cit. pg 33. 
569 Ang’ila, F (ed) (2003) “Working structures of parliaments in East Africa” pg 9 < http://kenya-fes-
international.de/publications/workingstructures.pdf > accessed on 10 April 2009. 
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research capacity is essential for effective performance of any parliamentary 
committee.570 This is important as parliament, and committees in particular, 
cannot and will not be taken seriously by the executive branch unless they 
prove themselves to be well informed, well researched, proactive and 
constructive in their engagement with the executive.571 
 
The issue of the number of members of EALA raises another pertinent 
question of the current mode of representation where each Partner State is 
equally represented (nine elected members each) regardless of its size in 
terms of geographical configuration and populations.572 Proportional 
representation, in these circumstances, seems to be an ideal situation as 
opposed to allocation of equal number of seats per Partner State. Morara573 
aptly argues that the fixation on equal national representation leads to the 
neglect of important factors, such as, population density and size. The latter 
should ordinarily determine the level of representation, particularly when one 
takes into account that all the founding protocols proclaim that the 
parliamentary bodies are supposed to represent the people of the respective 
regions, and not an accumulation of individual national interests.574  
 
(b) Election procedures 
As mentioned above, the Treaty mandates the National Assembly of each 
Partner State to determine the procedure for electing members of the 
Assembly to represent their countries. However, Partner States have come 
up with different election rules, for example, “while in Tanzania and Uganda, 
the representation of gender interests was a critical criteria and its impact 
was well vindicated in the membership, in Kenya this was not the case, 
leading to demonstrations by civil society during the inauguration of EALA on 
                                                 
570 Ang’ila, F (ed) (2003), op. cit. pg 25. 
571 Hughes, T (ed), op. cit. pg 36. The author further argues, at pg 33, that committee members must 
develop a high level of appropriate skills both in un-packing and interpreting legislation and within the 
specific policy area covered. 
572 Rwanda (8 million), Burundi (8.6 million), Uganda (24.6 million), Kenya (34 million) and Tanzania 
(38 million) < http://www.eac.int/web-links/2-partner-states.html > accessed on 16 March 2009. 
573 Morara, H.O (2001) “The inauguration of East African Legislative Assembly-time to rejoice?” as 
cited in Terlinden, U “African regional parliaments-engines of integration and democratization? pg 5 < 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02581.pdf > accessed on 15 March 2009. 
574 Ibid. 
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21 November, 2001.”575  In Kenya and Tanzania, the lists of candidates were 
drawn up by the party caucuses, while aspirant members who wished to be 
nominated in Uganda had to gain support of at least 50 Members of 
Parliament (MPs) of the “no party” Parliament.576  
 
The representation in the Assembly has been exclusively confined within the 
context of political parties.577 Oloka-Oyango578 further argues that this 
approach barely strikes one as a faithful implementation of the letter and spirit 
of Article 50, and the Treaty in general. The “representativeness” that the 
Treaty seeks to achieve transcends political parties, extending to, and 
including, shades of opinion, gender and other special interest groups in the 
Partner States. If this were not the case, it would be exceptionally difficult to 
explain the Treaty’s special recognition of such sections of society as 
business organisations and professional bodies,579 women, civil society580 in 
general, and the declared operational principle of a people centred EAC.581  
 
The flagrant disregard of the rules was prominent, especially in Kenya. This 
was not entirely unexpected as Africa’s experience with constitutionalism has 
not been a happy one.582 The President ordered the Cabinet to ensure that 
the National Assembly approves a motion seeking to reverse a commitment 
to nominate three women583 to represent Kenya in EALA.584 On voting day, 
                                                 
575 Ang’ila, F (ed) (2004) “Processes for elections to the East African Legislative Assembly” pg 3< 
http://www.kenya.fes-international.de/publications/eala.pdf > accessed on 10 October 2008.  
576 Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 4. 
577 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 140.  
578 Ibid. 
579 Article 129 of the Treaty. 
580 Article 127.3 of the Treaty. 
581 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 140. 
582 See Akiba, O (ed) (2004) Contemporary Perspectives on Developing Societies: Constitutionalism 
and Society in Africa   pg 7.  
See also De Smith, S.A (1962) “Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth today” as cited in Akiba, O, 
op. cit. pg 3 where he states: “Constitutionalism in its formal sense means the principle that the 
exercise of political power shall be bounded by rules, rules which determine the validity of legislative 
and executive action by prescribing the procedures according to which it must be performed or by 
delimiting its permissible content. Constitutionalism becomes a living reality to the extent that these 
rules curb the arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact observed by the wielders of political power, 
and to the extent that within the forbidden zones upon which authority may not trespass there is 
significant room for the enjoyment of individual liberty” 
583See Ang’ila, F (ed), op. cit. pg 10 where he states that under the Treaty for Establishment of the 
East African Community (Election of the Members of Assembly) Rules, 2001 (LN 154/2001) enacted 
by the Kenyan Parliament, though the seats were to be shared according to the parties’ strength in 
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KANU, the ruling party, won the motion to alter the election rules by 89-79 
votes in favour of changing the number of women.585 The rules gave political 
parties the right to nominate EALA members, thereby violating Article 50 of 
the Treaty.586 Given the open secret that quite a significant section of the 
citizenry has no conscious affiliation whatsoever with any of the registered 
political parties,587 their monopoly over representation can not be justified as 
being microcosmic of all existing shades of opinion.588 The EALA should 
reflect as much as it is feasible the rich political, economic and social 
spectrum of society.589 
 
The process of electioneering for membership of EALA should be brought 
under order through uniform rules cutting across the five National Assemblies 
to limit unnecessary disruptions to the work of the Community. As seen 
above, in the case of Honourable Prof. Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o and others v 
the Attorney-General of Kenya and others,590  the injunction issued by the 
EACJ preventing the nine members from Kenya from being sworn in until the 
petition has been disposed off paralysed the entire process because, for 
other underlying practical realities, the members from other Partner States 
could not be sworn in either.591 When the EACJ held that the election method 
employed was inconsistent with Article 50 of the Treaty, hence necessitating 
fresh elections in Kenya, which were held in May 2007, the entire Assembly 
was kept in limbo for five months. As a result of this delay, no legislative 
work592 was carried out in the most part of the second half of the financial 
                                                                                                                                                       
Parliament, political parties were required to ensure that at least a third of their nominations to the 
EALA were women. Unfortunately this aspect of the rules proved inconvenient to the ruling Kenya 
African National Union’s (KANU) ethnic/regional based nominations, and the party, with its partner, 
the National Development Party (NDP) was able to force through an amendment to the rule, with the 
result that it nominated one instead of three women.    
584 Ang’ila, F (ed), op. cit. pg 10. 
585 Ibid. 
586Ang’ila, F (ed), op. cit. pg 11.  
587Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 140.  
588 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 141. 
589 Ibid. 
590 EACJ Reference Number 1 of 2006. 
591The 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 84. 
592 The second Assembly was sworn in on June 5, 2007. 
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year. EALA had to re-adjust its work plans inevitably pushing most of the 
planned activities for that period to the 2007/2008 financial year.593  
 
 Ang’ila594 contends that EALA itself should provide leadership in this process 
by drafting new regulations for uniform application in all the Partner States. 
This is feasible even if Uganda retains its current no-political party system, 
and is the only way that uniformity and faster integration can be achieved.595 
Indeed EALA has taken up the challenge, as during its 6th meeting,596 
pursuant to Article 59 of the Treaty and Rule 64 of the EALA Rules of 
Procedure, the Assembly approved the introduction of a Private Members Bill 
entitled: “The East African Community Elections Bill, 2008”. 597The objective 
of the Bill is to establish principles or guidelines for the conduct of elections to 
be adhered to by all Partner States within the Community.598 This is a 
welcome development as the EACJ, among other decisions it gave in the 
case of Hon. Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o cited above, was that the Kenya’s 
Election of East Africa Legislative Assembly Rules do not comply with Article 
50 of the Treaty.599  
 
Terlinden600 argues that the challenge lies in setting clear criteria and making 
them as obligatory as possible. The definition and homogenous application of 
electoral procedures within the partner states of a regional parliament are 
required to guarantee that due democratic process will be followed and 
equitable representation can actually be achieved.601 Any electoral procedure 
proposed should be able to put an end to the wrangling, bickering and chaos 
that has characterised the past two elections of members of the Assembly. 
The negativity accompanied with chaotic elections dents the image of the 
members in particular, and the Assembly generally, hence diminishing their 
                                                 
593 The 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 85. 
594 Ang’ila, F (ed), op. cit. pg 12. 
595 Ibid. 
596 The meeting was held from 11th -24th May 2008. 
597The 17th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 60.  
598 Ibid. 
599The 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 15. 
600 Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 5. 
601 Ibid. 
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moral authority, which is crucial in a legislative capacity because of the 
supervisory role it plays.  
 
It is, however, submitted that the best solution to the problem lies in the 
periodic direct elections of the EALA by the people of East Africa. Direct 
universal suffrage for the Assembly would give it ‘democratic legitimacy’ as it 
will have the support of the people on the ground.602 As it stands now, none 
of the organs or institutions of the Community is directly elected by the 
people.603 This, in the long run, may work to the detriment of the Community 
as people may feel alienated from the integration process, since they are not 
involved in deciding who should run the institutions governing the process.604  
Clapham605 argues that while the more formal process of regional integration 
remains a governmental endeavour directed by the political actors of member 
states, citizens’ participation in the process cannot be ignored in the long 
term. Braude606 insists that sustainable integration rests on broad public 
support, which helps to safeguard political shocks and ensures that 
integration addresses matters such as development and political 
governance.607 
                                                 
602 See also Hughes, T (ed), op. cit. pg 6 where it is observed that legitimacy and credibility are also a 
function of public familiarity with and knowledge of parliament. Ignorance of or lack of information 
about parliament can lead to widespread disinterest, scepticism and apathy. 
603 See “e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Special Issue No. 2008/15 dated 6 October 2008 “EAC 
Common Mandate Drive Gets Major Boost as Region’s Parliamentarians Join Forces” pg 4 where   
Hon Sarah Bonaya, EALA Member, is reported to have said that although the present situation 
whereby the EALA is indirectly elected through the National Assembly is not satisfactory, this should 
not be used to marginalise the Assembly’s representative, legislative and oversight roles as 
enshrined in the Treaty. A road map should be provided for the transition from the present indirectly 
elected EALA to an EALA that would be elected by universal suffrage < 
http://www.eac.int/downloads/e-newsletter.html > accessed on 3 March 2009.  
604 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 205 where it is recounted that one of the most common complaints 
regarding the driving forces behind EAC integration is that the process has not been sufficiently 
inclusive or people centred. Most agree that it is largely governments that have been driving 
integration, followed by business. This means that only politics and trade have been pushing the 
integration process thus far, rather than a wider agenda including, for example, socio-economic 
development, human rights, governance, culture, and identity. 
605 Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 160. It is further argued that to effectively mediate the negative 
effects of integration, political participatory mechanisms become important. The lessons learnt at a 
national level in terms of democratization and economic management are no less important at the 
regional level. 
606 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 19. 
607 Ibid. Braude further argues that if the citizens are to accommodate the adjustments, sacrifice and 
disruption entailed in the process, the public and the nation must be satisfied that integration is in 
their best interests. To bring about this acceptance demands an inclusive process, not only stronger 
and more sustainable at the political level due to the popular support it would bring about, but also 
greatly strengthened by the contributions from a range of stakeholders in business and civil society. 
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A perfect example, given by Karns,608 of the ‘democratic deficit’, whereby 
most decisions are made by governmental leaders and bureaucrats without 
direct input from voters, is derived from the EU, where the Maastricht Treaty 
on European Union609 was briefly set back when Danish voters rejected the 
treaty in a referendum.610 Following agreement that Denmark could opt out of 
certain provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, Danish voters passed it in a 
second referendum.611   
 
The EAC will not be the first to adopt a system of direct election of the 
members of a regional Assembly, albeit in a gradual way. In the EU, the 
organisation that the EAC has been greatly modelled on, a specific provision, 
under the Treaties of Rome, was made for direct election of the European 
Parliament (EP) and it was no longer to be a matter for each member state to 
decide.612 No fixed timetable was agreed for the change, but the commitment 
to abolish the system of nominated members was made legally binding. It 
took over twenty years for direct elections to be organised. Nevertheless, the 
change was to prove of long term significance in shaping the institution,613 as 
through representative democracy the EP provides the EU with a degree of 
democratic legitimacy614 when it participates in the legislative process whose 
purpose is accountability of decision makers.615 This route, though, seems to 
                                                 
608Karns, M.P, et al (2004) International Organisation: The Politics and Processes of Global 
Governance pg 163.  
609See Karns, M.P, et al, op. cit. pg 163 where it is stated that the Maastricht Treaty transformed the 
European Community (EC) into the EU. The original EC became one of the three pillars of the new 
EU. A second pillar was a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), while the third pillar 
included home affairs and justice. In reality, though, both the second and the third pillars remain 
largely matters for individual governments or at best intergovernmental agreement. The Maastricht 
Treaty also gave impetus to a European monetary union with agreement to institute a single 
European currency by 1999, and created European citizenship with a common passport and rights to 
live and vote wherever they liked. 
See also Meadle, E, op. cit. pg 47 where the authors indicate that, now, the EU monetary union 
comprises 16 countries (Slovenia, the newest member was welcomed in 2009). Its central bank, the 
European Central Bank (ECB), is one of the world’s most influential institutions, and its currency, the 
euro, is one of the world’s most prominent currencies.   
610Karns, M.P, et al, op. cit. pg 163.   
611 Ibid. 
612 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 97. 
613 Ibid. 
614 Szyszczak, E, et al (2005) Understanding EU law pg 35. 
615 Szyszczak, E, et al, op. cit. pg 36. 
 
 
 
 
114 
be not enough for the EU citizens.616 Indeed the people should take part in 
the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative 
assembly.617 
 
(c) Lifespan of the Assembly 
There are glaring lacunae in the Treaty with regard to the life of the 
Assembly, an important body of the Community. The Treaty does not provide 
for the lifespan of the Legislative Assembly itself.618 Its lifespan is determined 
through a proclamation by the EAC Heads of State.619 The Treaty, however, 
provides for the tenure of the individual members of the Legislative 
Assembly.620 This matter, which was brought to light through Mtikila’s case 621 
needs to be dealt with accordingly through amendments to the Treaty.622 
Although the Court did not address this matter as it was not an issue under 
dispute, the revelation that the lifespan of the Assembly itself is determined 
by the Summit does not sit well with the principle of separation of powers. It 
has been taken for granted that when the tenure of the individual members 
end, then the life of the Assembly also comes to an end. In Mtikila’s case the 
matter was complicated by the fact that two new members of the Assembly 
                                                 
616 Piris, J.C (2006) The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis pg 115 where the author contends 
that the Constitution for Europe, signed on 29 October, 2004 by 25 European Heads of State and 
Government, when it comes into force, will confer increased rights on some actors other the EU 
institutions: the National Parliaments, the Committee of the Regions and the EU citizens. These 
increased rights are an additional attempt to bring in the people, to try to give them other channels 
than the EP (directly elected) and the Council (composed of members of governments responsible to 
their people) through which to express their wishes and concerns.  
617Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 98.  
618 See Mtikila v Attorney-General of the United Republic of Tanzania and others Ref. No. 2 of 2007 
(Ruling) {2007} EACJ 4 (25 April 2007) pg 7 < http://www.saflii.org/ea/cases/EACJ/2007/4.pdf > 
accessed on 9 October 2008. 
619 See Vedasto, A.K “The East African Court of Justice: what it can determine and what it cannot”, 
Part II (2007) 1 The Tanzania Lawyer pg 81 where it is stated that through Proclamation by the 
Heads of State dated 16 November 2006 the first EALA was, pursuant to Rule 86 of the East African 
Legislative Rules of Procedure, dissolved with effect from 29 November 2006…The effect of the 
dissolution was to dissolve the hitherto membership of the EALA and create the 27 vacancies 
pending election of new members. By the fact dissolution of the business and membership in the 
EALA including that of Dr. Norman Sigalla and Mrs. Hulda Stanley Kibacha (from Tanzania), 
effectively ended on 29 November 2006.    
620 Article 51.1 of the Treaty an elected member of the Assembly shall hold office for five years and 
be eligible for re-election for a further term of five years. 
621 EACJ Ref. No.2 of 2007. 
622Compare with the Parliament of Tanzania, one of the Partner States. The Constitution of the 
United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, as amended, under Article 65 provides that the life of the 
Parliament shall be five years < http://www.nec.go.tz/publications/constitution.pdf > accessed on 22 
April 2009.  
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who assumed their position in the last year of the tenure of the serving 
members, upon resignation of two Tanzanian members, found that their 
tenure was deemed to end with the end of the sitting members’ tenure 
contrary to Article 51.1 of the Treaty. 
 
Vedasto623 argues that Article 51.3 of the Treaty which lists and limits the 
circumstances that can terminate membership before expiry of the five years 
excludes in that list termination by proclamation by Heads of State. He further 
argues that if Article 51 is a provision deserving respect, the proclamation 
and all such regulations, rules, circulars and whatever fathering or 
surrounding it would not work. For Article 51.1 guarantees five years 
regardless of anything except of the circumstances stated under Article 
51.3.624  
 
It also came to light that the Treaty does not provide for the process of filling 
any of the vacancies enumerated in Article 51.3.625 The assumption has been 
that this also falls under the jurisdiction of the National Assemblies.626 It is 
submitted that the Treaty should provide guidance on these important issues 
so as to create certainty. The call made earlier, hereinabove, that the Partner 
States need harmonised election procedures with regard to the membership 
of the EALA is reiterated to encompass the vacant position created by the 
operation of Article 51.3 of the Treaty. 
 
 
 
                                                 
623 Vedasto, A.K, op. cit. pg 82. 
624 Ibid. It is indeed incredible that the Proclamation made under Rules 5 and 86 of the East African 
Legislative Assembly Rules, 2001, which are themselves made under Articles 49.2 (g) and 60 of the 
Treaty, appear to overrule the dictates of a Treaty provision, that is, Article 51.1.  
625 It lists events upon whose occurrence a member is obliged to vacate his or her seat. These 
include resignation, ceasing to be qualified for election, upon nomination to the National Assembly of 
the Partner State, upon appointment as a Minister in the Government of a Partner State, absence 
from the Assembly for such period and such circumstances as prescribed by the rules of procedure 
and upon conviction by a competent court and sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding six 
months. 
626 See Mtikila’s case, op. cit. pg 11 where it is observed that Rule 16 of the East African Legislative 
Assembly Election Rules (the Tanzania Election Rules) states that the procedures, jurisdiction and 
the grounds of a Member of the EALA shall be the same as the provided by the law for election 
petitions in respect of the National Assembly. 
See also Article 52 of the Treaty. 
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(ii) Legislative and oversight powers 
(a) Oversight powers 
Generally most of the regional parliamentary assemblies, EALA included, 
pursue a number of activities outside the ‘classical’ responsibilities which are 
important for the practical democratic value of these bodies,627 namely, 
representing constituent interests, making or shaping public policy including 
law making, and overseeing policy implementation by executive branch 
agencies.628 African legislators face many constraints in fulfilling their roles 
and responsibilities, including, weak individual and institutional capacity, little 
independence from more powerful executives and ruling political parties, and 
limited political will.629 
 
The powers of the Assembly have been greatly and craftily muted. The muted 
nature of the Assembly’s power has been disguisingly acknowledged by the 
Community. One of the strategic interventions earmarked under the 
Development Strategy 2006-2010 is enhancement of the mandate of the 
EALA,630 though the success indicator over the matter indicates that the 
intended mandate is that of EALA taking precedence over National 
Parliaments.631 A careful reading of Article 49.2 of the Treaty on Functions of 
the Assembly shows that the Assembly is entrusted with general 
functions/responsibilities with not much real power. The Assembly mainly 
exercises advisory functions, that is, it can discuss, debate, consider and 
make recommendations, but it cannot censure, direct or demand general or 
specific actions to be taken by the Summit, Council, Secretariat or any of the 
institutions of the Community. Eze contends that none of the executive 
bodies is obliged to pay attention to these different types of advice.632  
 
                                                 
627 Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 6. 
628 Bryan, S, et al (eds) (2007) “Transparency and accountability in Africa’s extractive industries: the 
role of legislature” pg 10 < http://www.ndi.org/files/2191-extractive-080807.pdf > accessed on 16 
March 2009. 
629 Ibid. 
630 EAC Development Strategy, op. cit. pg 49. 
631EAC Development Strategy, op. cit. pg 89.  
632 Eze, O.C (2004) “The electoral processes of regional parliaments-similarities, differences and cost 
implications” as cited in Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 6. 
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The EALA can invite anybody to address them and the Heads of State of 
EAC have followed such an invitation several times.633 Terlinden,634 however, 
submits that this right has no practical value if invited officials refuse co-
operation.635 In the EU not only are invitations honoured but it is standard 
procedure that after the conclusion of the European Council session, its 
President, accompanied by the President of the Commission, reports to the 
European Parliament (EP) on the meeting.636 It is submitted that such a 
practice needs to be introduced in the EAC as it helps to forge links between 
the principal organs of the Community for a deeper integration. The EAC is 
urged to take practical steps to remove procedural bottlenecks that curtail the 
Assembly’s power. For instance, in a case of conflict EALA powers to 
investigate thoroughly and hold the executive accountable remain very 
limited. Questions put to the Council lapse automatically if not answered 
within a period of six weeks.637  
 
Ordinary parliaments exert a lot of their influence by providing checks and 
balances on the executive’s spending, and guiding the allocation of funds.638 
Under Article 49.2(a) of the Treaty, the Assembly has the power to debate 
and approve the budget. The Assembly has, indeed, on several occasions, 
exercised its power to disapprove the budget.639 Despite the ability to defer 
budgets, Ogalo argues that this provision which appears to empower the 
                                                 
633 Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 7. 
634 Ibid. 
635 EALA reportedly wished to hold a session on the conflict in Northern Uganda in 2003, in which 
President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda had agreed to participate. Yet when the Assembly supported 
the Ugandan Parliament’s call to declare the North a disaster area and asked for international 
engagement, Museveni cancelled his attendance at the meeting. (Adopted from Terlinden, U, op. cit 
.pg 7).  
636 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 28. 
637 Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 7. 
638 Ibid. 
639See the 17th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 59 where it is reported that the EALA, 
during its sixth meeting held from 11-24, May, 2008 in Nairobi, Kenya, deferred approval of the 
Community budget for the financial year 2008/2009 due to failure to adhere to the agreed Medium 
Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) principles in budgeting. The EALA, however, finally approved 
the re-worked budget during its seventh meeting held from 13-17 June 2008 in Arusha, Tanzania.  
See also Hughes, T (ed), op. cit. pg 42 where it is observed that one of the roles of the parliamentary 
budget committee is to assess the degree of adherence and variance between MTEF and each 
annual budget. Where there is substantial variance between the two, the reasons for such variance 
must be interrogated. Where there is no MTEF in place, it is strongly recommended that some 
medium term budgetary framework be established to assist with policy formulation and planning. 
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Assembly is misleading.640 The Assembly’s power does not include the 
entitlement to draw up or revise budgets, in terms of Article 59.2 of the 
Treaty, which effectively reduces the Assembly to a “rubber stamping 
institution”.641 It is really disturbing to rationalise the fact that the kind of 
oversight exercised by National Assemblies that is normally seen in the 
Partner States has not been replicated at the regional level in the respective 
areas of competence, which  are much fewer than those under national 
jurisdiction. 
 
(b) Law making powers 
As indicated above, the Assembly plays a role in law making, under Article 
59.1 of the Treaty. However, these powers are seriously constrained as 
EALA can only put forward and vote on motions and Bills if these have no 
cost implications for any fund of the Community.642 This gravely impairs the 
scope and relevance of potential laws.643 The EACJ, in the case of Calist 
Andrew Mwatela and others v The East African Community,644 observed that 
the prohibition on the general powers of legislation by the Assembly, under 
Article 59, applies to any member of the Assembly, both the members and 
also the Council, when introducing Bills in the Assembly.645  
 
As it has already been mentioned, Bills can be initiated by the Council646 or 
on the Assembly’s own initiative;647 however, they will only be enacted into 
community law if the Heads of State assent to them.648 Bills which are not 
                                                 
640 Ogalo, D. W, op. cit. 
641 Morara, H.O (2001) “The inauguration of East African Legislative Assembly-time to rejoice?” as 
cited in Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 7. 
642 Article 59.2 of the Treaty. 
643 Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 8. 
644 EACJ Reference Number 1 of 2005  
645 EACJ Reference Number 1 of 2005, pg 22. 
646Braude, W, op. cit. pg 145 where the author observes that the standard process for regional law 
making is that the Secretariat drafts laws that are forwarded to the Council of Ministers, which then 
forwards them to EALA. 
647 Article 59.1 of the Treaty. 
648 Article 63.1 of the Treaty. 
See also Ogalo, D.W “The East African Legislative Assembly Perspective” (2003) 4 The East African 
Lawyer pg 13 where the author contends that the initiative taken by members of the Assembly, via 
Article 59.1 of the Treaty, to draft and enact laws is hampered by the fact that the Assembly does not 
have a draftsman of its own. Members have to do the drafting themselves, yet they are not experts in 
that field. They also lack sufficient funding to do their work. 
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assented to, and referred back to the Assembly, lapse if they do not get 
assented to on re-submission.649 In other words, argues Terlinden, the 
Summit of Heads of State and Government has an effective veto right over 
the Assembly’s legislation.650 Worse still, the Community legislative 
instruments are not directly applicable in the Partner States unless they are 
ratified by the National Assemblies.651 Delays in ratification of these 
instruments, which sometimes run for several years,652 have greatly 
hampered the overall progress of the Community, as implementation cannot 
commence without lawful authority.653  
 
Oloka-Onyango654 argues that the prevailing legal system in the Partner 
States, which was and remains ‘dualist’ in nature, draws a ‘china wall’ 
between rules of international law, on one hand, and national law, on the 
other hand, with the consequence, in the event of conflict, the national law 
prevails.655 It is advisable to accord the Community’s legislative instruments, 
                                                 
649 Article 63.4 of the Treaty. 
650Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 8.  
651See Article 8.5 of the Treaty which provides that the Partner States undertake to make necessary 
legal instruments to confer precedence of Community organs, institutions and laws over similar 
national ones.  
652 See the 17th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 20 where it was reported that, except 
for the Republic of Uganda which has ratified the Protocol on the Establishment of the East African 
Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight Agency, the Partner States had not ratified the following 
protocols (by 30th June 2008)  as urged by the Council:- 
(a) Protocol on Environment and Natural Resources - concluded on 03/04/2006; 
(b) Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Science and Technology Commission – 
concluded on 18/04/2007; 
(c) Protocol on the Establishment of East African Civil Aviation Safety and Security Oversight 
Agency – concluded on 18/04/2007; 
(d) Protocol on the Establishment of East African Kiswahili Commission – concluded on 
18/04/2007; and 
(e) Protocol on the Establishment of the East African health Research Commission – concluded 
on 18/04/2007. 
653 See UNECA II, op. cit. pg 21, UNECA contends that protocols are needed to put treaties in effect, 
so it slows implementation of agreed programmes when members of the regional economic 
community fail to sign or ratify a treaty/protocol or to submit a ratified treaty/protocol in a timely 
fashion. Although strong actions would be expected at the national level, only 16% of ratifications 
take less than three months. In most countries the process takes a year. Delaying in signing and 
ratifying regional agreements contribute to a loss of momentum in integration. 
654 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 128.  
655 Ibid. 
See also Bhuiyan, S (2002) National Law in WTO: Effectiveness and Good Governance in the World 
Trading System pg 31 where the author observes that the gradual emergence of individuals as 
subjects of international law in such areas as human rights, investment, international administrative 
law, or international criminal law has thwarted one of the basic premises of the dualist doctrine. 
International law has also made considerable inroads into national legal systems in various ways, for 
instance by stipulations in treaties for states to take effective legislative, administrative or other 
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such as, Treaties, Protocols and Acts, automatic direct applicability in the 
Partner States to create an “interface between Community law and municipal 
law of the Partner States”.656 This will ensure the smooth operation of the 
Community, in the process cutting down the delays and bureaucratic inertia 
at country level.  
 
With the direct applicability of Community legislation in Partner States, the 
legislative sovereignty of the National Assemblies in Community matters   
ceases to apply. Herling657 states that the transfer by states from their 
domestic legal system to the Community legal system of the rights and 
obligations arising under the Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of 
their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent unilateral act incompatible 
with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.658 In the case of Costa v 
ENEL,659 it was held that the EC law has priority over national law. Hartley660 
insists that the doctrine of direct effect, that is, the principle that Community 
law must be applied by national courts as the law of the land, and the 
establishment of the supremacy of Community law are very essential.661 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
measures to implement treaty provisions. Examples of such treaties are: International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966, Articles 2(1)(c) and (d); International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, Article 2(2); American Covenant on Human Rights 1969, 
Article 2; African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights 1981, Article 1; Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984, Article 2(1); and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989, Articles 3(2), 4, 19(1),32(2) and 33. 
656Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 128. 
657 Herling, D, et al (2004) Briefcase on Constitutional and Administrative Law, pg 49. 
658 Ibid. 
659 Case No. 6/64 (I964) ECJ, as cited in Herling, D, et al, pg 49, where it is stated that ECJ further 
held that, the provision (of the Treaty) which is subject to reservation would be meaningless if a state  
could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a legislative measure which could prevail over 
Community law. 
660 Hartley, T. C. (2007), op. cit. pg 48. 
661 Ibid. 
See also Craig, P (2001) “Constitutions, Constitutionalism and the EU” as cited in Bhuiyan, S, op. cit. 
pg 31 where it is stated that the EU legal order, which in many respects partakes the characteristics 
of a domestic federal constitutional structure but yet remains an international treaty based system, 
provides another instance where the traditional lines between national and international law seem 
entirely inapt. 
 See also Clapham, C, et al (eds), op. cit. pg 158 where it is stated that the Andean countries took 
decisive steps toward supranationality in the legal sphere with the establishment of the Andean Court 
of Justice in 1979. This court’s decisions are directly applicable and of a binding nature on all 
member states. The jurisprudence established by this court has given the Andean process another 
distinctive integrative layer, which is absent from most other integrative schemes.   
 
 
 
 
121 
Interestingly, though, the Treaty does not provide procedures for treaty 
making between the Community and the outside world, which is essentially a 
portion of “sovereign power to create international obligations and new law in 
as far as the external treaty agreement with a state or international 
organisation”662 is concerned. It is not known whether the existing Treaty was 
meant to be the one and only treaty in the Community. It provides for 
procedures for its amendment,663 and for Protocols664 which may be 
concluded in each area of co-operation. This is a serious lacuna in the area 
of Community external relations. Being an economic oriented organisation, 
and aspiring to an eventual political federation, the Community might need to 
conclude treaties and agreements with states and international organisations. 
It is doubtful whether the legal capacity of the Community, as provided under 
Article 4 of the Treaty,665 gives it sovereign powers to conclude treaties.666 
The powers under this Article, on legal capacity of the Community, are 
normal powers with regard to its ordinary commercial transaction, privilege 
and immunities, undertaking legal proceedings, etc, as a body corporate in 
the Partner States. The Treaty only states that “the Community shall enjoy 
international legal personality”.667  
 
Bowett668 argues that whilst treaty making power is clearly evidence of 
international personality, the reverse may not be true, for ‘personality’ is an 
infinitely variable concept and it does not in the least follow that every 
international person has capacity to make treaties. As the International Law 
Commission (ILC) has put it: “…all entities having treaty making capacity 
necessarily have international personality. On the other hand it does not 
                                                 
662 Lasok, D, et al (1987) Law and Institutions of the European Communities (4ed), pg 111.  
663 Article 150 of the Treaty. 
664 Article 151.1 of the Treaty. 
665 Article 4(1) of the Treaty states that the Community shall have the capacity, within each of the 
Partner States, of a body corporate with perpetual succession, and shall the power to acquire, hold, 
manage and dispose of land and other property, and to sue and be sued in its own name. Article 4(2) 
provides that the Community shall have power to perform any of the  functions conferred upon it by 
the Treaty and do all things, including borrowing, that are necessary or desirable for the performance 
of those duties.  
666 See also Jackson, J.H (2006) Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of International 
Law pgs 57- 78 for an insightful discussion on modern approaches to the concept of sovereignty.  
667 Article 138.1 of the Treaty. 
668 Bowett, D.W (1982) The Law of International Institutions pg 341. 
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follow that all international persons have treaty making capacity.”669 
Sarooshi670 adds that the main way states confer powers on international 
organizations is by concluding treaties that provide for such conferrals.671 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the WHO Advisory Opinion case 
observed that “the powers conferred on international organizations are 
normally the subject of express statement in their constituent instruments.”672 
Scrutiny of the whole Treaty shows that there is no such express statement of 
conferral, by Partner States, of treaty making power with the outside world to 
the EAC.  
 
 Giving the example of the EU, Lasok673 observes that the treaty making 
powers of the Community, unlike that of a state, are not unlimited. The 
Community can enter into agreements with states and international 
organisations where this is provided for by the treaty. Such agreements shall 
be binding among Member States if concluded in accordance with the 
procedure laid down.674 Lasok675 further observes that the delegation of this 
power to the Community is not absolute for it is exercised subject to the 
participation of each Member State in the Council, and recourse to the ECJ. 
However, the ECJ acts as the watchdog of the Community’s legality but not 
of the interests of the Member States.676 The Partner States in the EAC are 
strongly advised to amend the Treaty and provide elaborate provisions on the 
exercise of treaty making power with the outside world by the Community to 
avoid questions of legality, i.e. whether they are binding on the Partner 
                                                 
669 A/4I69 as cited in Bowett, D.W, pg 341. 
670 Sarooshi, D, op. cit. pg 18. 
671 The two main treaty mechanisms by which one or more states can confer powers on international 
organizations are, namely, by use of a constituent treaty or on a more ad hoc basis by use of a treaty 
that is separate from the constituent treaty. 
672 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports, 1996, as cited 
in Sarooshi, D, pg 18. 
673 Lasok, D, et al, op. cit. pg 110. 
674 Ibid. 
675 Lasok, D, et al, op. cit. pg 111. 
676 Ibid. 
See also Clapham, C, et al, op. cit. pg 192 where it is reiterated that the EU influence is growing on 
the world stage, especially in international trade, where the European Commission has exclusive 
competence to negotiate on behalf of its members. The Commission also speaks for all its members 
when it negotiates with potential new members. 
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States, bearing in mind that the Community has already concluded a number 
of international agreements.677 
 
 Terlinden678 contends that, generally, in the absence of clearly defined 
working relationships, the Regional Assemblies (RAs’) dependence on the 
executive bodies hinders their effective parliamentary performance. And 
wherever RAs do possess rights vis- à -vis the regional decision making 
bodies, these do not provide for effective accountability.679 The mismatch in 
the relationship between RAs and their executives is particularly visible in the 
area of legislation. The Councils and the Summits possess legislative 
functions furthering their executive powers. Protocols680 and treaties 
endorsed by Summits and Councils become international law. Except for the 
case of the EAC, these legislative functions are even exclusive.681  
 
Braude682 argues that, at the moment, EAC protocols carry more authority, 
which effectively means that legislative powers lie effectively in the 
Secretariat and Summit. Such concurrent or exclusive legislative powers of 
the executive undermine the division of powers. Regional parliamentary 
bodies are structurally barred from fully exercising their supposed democratic 
roles and control functions.683 In the above referred case of Calist Andrew 
Mwatela and others v EAC, the Court re-asserted the principles of separation 
of powers and institutional balance between the various organs of EAC.684 In 
essence, it adopted the position of the ECJ that each of the principal organs 
of the regional entity must be allowed to fully exercise its Treaty mandate, 
and, therefore, act as checks and balances of each other.685  
 
                                                 
677 See “e-EAC newsletter”, Update Special Issue No. 2008/15, op. cit. pg 5 where the concluded 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) Framework Agreement between EU and EAC is reported. 
678Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 11. 
679 Ibid. 
680Protocols are approved by the Summit on recommendation of the Council in terms of Article 151.2 
of the Treaty.  
681Terlinden, U, op. cit. pg 11. 
682 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 146. 
683 Ibid. 
684 Deya, D, op. cit. pg 58. 
685 Ibid. 
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It is submitted, that whenever the Summit and/or the Council assume 
legislative functions, the Assembly should be involved through a modified 
version of the co-decision procedure,686 which is prominently used in the EU. 
Under the modified co-decision procedure, a proposal687 is sent to the 
Assembly688 by the Council.689 At this stage the Assembly may approve the 
proposal by a simple majority. However, if it does not approve the proposal, it 
will send it back to the Council, with amendments or reasons therefor. The 
Council may consider the suggested reasons or amendments and amend the 
proposal accordingly. The revised document will only be sent back to the 
Assembly, if it is approved by the Council through an absolute majority vote. 
By an absolute majority vote, the Assembly may or may not approve it. If the 
proposal does not pass this vote, it lapses. It is hoped that such a process will 
enhance the Assembly’s legislative powers and convert it from a place of 
discussion and debate to a major political actor involved in determining the 
overall direction of the Community.690 Hanlon691 argues that the co-decision 
procedure encourages the principal organs to engage in inter-institutional 
discussion and negotiation. Most importantly, the Council, if it wishes to pass 
a piece of legislation, is obliged to take seriously the role of the Parliament.692 
 
(iii) Working methods 
(a) Frequency of working meetings 
Given the wide scope of the Assembly’s business, the Treaty should provide 
for four statutory ordinary meetings every year, instead of a single meeting. 
                                                 
686 See Hanlon, J (2003) European Community law pg 24 where it is stated that the European 
Parliament was given further legislative power through Article 251 of the Treaty of European Union. 
The purpose of this mechanism is to give greater recognition to the joint involvement of the Council 
and Parliament. It should be noted though, that it does not give direct power to Parliament. The 
ultimate power of Parliament under this procedure is that it can veto legislation; so its power is a 
negative one. 
687 It may be a protocol or any legislative instrument other than a Bill. Bills will continue to follow the 
normal procedures under the Treaty and existing rules of procedure. 
688 Treaties are not subjected to this procedure because of the simple fact that it is now almost a 
universally accepted practice that most of the treaties are initiated, discussed, negotiated, agreed 
upon and adopted at forums other Parliaments. These forums in form of international conferences or 
high level meetings are mostly either ministerial or summit meetings.  
689 In this case, the Council is deemed to act for itself where the initiative is its own or on behalf of the 
Summit. 
690Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 96.  
691 Hanlon, J, op. cit. pg 25. 
692 Ibid. 
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(b) Citizen’s right to petition the Assembly and civil society participation 
The structure of the Assembly as it exists does not give room for a private 
citizen of the Community to petition it on matters under the jurisdiction of the 
Community which in one way or another have a direct bearing on his or her 
life. It is advisable for the Assembly to provide an avenue for citizens to 
petition it.693 It is also instructive that by engaging with civil society 
organizations, the work of the EALA would be enormously enriched. 
Hughes694 argues that parliaments and civil society must structure their 
working relationships in a more co-operative, transparent and mutually 
supportive manner than has hitherto been the case.695 Hartley696 contends 
that, in EU, the citizen,697 acting individually or in association with others, has 
the right to petition on any matter within the Community’s fields of activity 
which affects him directly.698 This can be a valuable means of putting 
pressure on the Community.699 
                                                 
693 See also Byers, M (ed) (2000) The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International 
Relations and International Law pg 117 where it is observed that post hoc ratification cannot ensure 
adequate public scrutiny of a government’s behaviour in its dealing with foreign governments. The 
government, as an agent of domestic actors, enjoying the relative secrecy of international 
negotiations, may find it relatively easy to pursue partisan, short-term goals at the expense of its 
larger constituency. The necessity has, therefore, been felt to allow other voices to be represented in 
the negotiation process, mainly non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who represent domestic 
voices. For this reason, a right to be represented or consulted during such negotiations, or at the very 
least a right to be heard before agreements are signed, should be acknowledged especially for those 
who may personally be adversely affected. 
694 Hughes, T (ed), op. cit. pg 9. 
695 See also Hughes, T (ed), op. cit. pg 17 where it is further argued that parliaments must 
acknowledge and embrace the legitimate and constructive role that civil society, including NGOs, 
trade unions, business organizations, academics and religious organizations, play in a healthy plural 
society. All these stakeholders possess unique qualities and qualifications, and these should be 
utilized for the improvement of parliaments’ deliberative, legislative and oversight roles. 
Consequentially, rather than exclude civil society and NGOs, parliaments should reach out to all 
elements of civil society and encourage their participation in their parliamentary process. 
See also Sachs, A “Participatory democracy” (2009) 32 New Agenda pg 34 where it is opined that 
public involvement may be of special importance for those whose strongly held views have to cede to 
the majority opinion in the legislature. Minority groups should feel that even if their concerns are not 
strongly represented, they continue to be part of the body politic with the full civic dignity that goes 
with citizenship in a democracy. 
696 Hartley, T.C (2007), op. cit. pg 31. 
697 Article 194 of the Treaty on European Union. 
698 The right extends to non-citizens residing in a partner state as well as to companies having their 
registered offices there. 
699 Hartley, T. C (2007), op. cit. pg 31. 
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4.2.8  THE SECRETARIAT 
4.2.8.1 STRUCTURE 
The Secretariat is the executive organ of the Community.700 The service of 
the Community with regard to the Secretariat consists of three major 
offices701 and such others as are deemed necessary by the Council. Under 
Article 67.2 of the Treaty, the Secretary-General (SG)702 is appointed by the 
Summit upon nomination by the relevant Head of State under the principle of 
rotation.703 The SG serves a fixed five year term. Deputy Secretaries-General 
(DSGs)704 are appointed by the Summit on a rotational basis and serve a 
three year term, renewable once. The Counsel to the Community, who is the 
principal legal adviser, is appointed on contract. All staff of the Community 
are appointed on contract. 
4.2.8.2 FUNCTIONS 
Under Article 71 of the Treaty, the Secretariat is responsible for: initiating, 
receiving and submitting recommendations to the Council; forwarding of Bills 
to the Assembly through the Co-ordination Committee; the initiation of studies 
and research related to, and the implementation of, programmes; and the 
strategic planning, management and monitoring of programmes.705  Where 
the SG thinks it is appropriate, he or she may act on behalf of the 
Community.706 
 
                                                 
700 Article 66.1 of the Treaty. 
701 These are Secretary General, Deputy Secretaries General and Counsel to the Community. 
702 The SG is the principal executive officer of the Community, and as such he or she becomes the 
Head of the Secretariat, Accounting Officer of the Community and Secretary of the Summit. 
703 Upon appointment of the SG the Partner State from which he or she is appointed forfeits the 
Deputy Secretary General under Article67.2 of the Treaty. 
704 The Council determines the number of Deputy Secretaries General. 
705 Other responsibilities include undertaking investigations, collection of information or verification of 
matters relating to the Community; co-ordination and harmonization of policies and strategies; 
general promotion and dissemination of information on the Community to stakeholders; the 
submission of reports on the activities of the Community to the Council; general administration and 
financial management of the Community; mobilization of funds from development partners and other 
sources for implementation of the projects; the submission of Community budget to the Council for 
consideration; proposing draft agenda for the meetings of the organs of the Community other than 
the Court and the Assembly; the implementation of the decisions of the Summit and the Council; 
organisation and keeping records of meetings of the organs of the Community other than the Court 
and the Assembly; custody of the property of the Community; establishment of the practical working 
relations with the Court and the Assembly; and any matters provided by the Treaty.    
706 Article 71.2 of the Treaty. 
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Under Article 72 of the Treaty, the staff of the Community shall not seek or 
receive instructions from any Partner State or any other authority external to 
the Community.707 The Partner States shall not by law of any of the Partner 
State confer any power or impose any duty upon an officer, organ or 
institution of the Community without the consent of the Council.708 
4.2.8.3 ANALYSIS 
(i) Structure 
(a) Secretary-General and Deputy Secretaries-General 
In general, when one looks at the responsibilities placed on the Secretariat as 
initiator, planner, manager, monitor, fundraiser, custodian, promoter, co-
ordinator and implementer of the projects and the development programmes 
of the Community, it becomes glaringly apparent that the current structure of 
the Secretariat needs to be reformed.  Kaahwa709 states that the Secretariat 
is served by a three tier staff cadre, that is, the executive staff,710 the 
professional staff,711 and the support staff.712 For a long time the Secretariat 
had a SG and two DSGs713.  Initially this system worked curiously well for two 
principal reasons: one, the Community was still in an infant stage and it had 
not assumed a lot of activities; two, with three Partner States, the top three 
positions at the Secretariat were easily filled.714 Then the post for DSG in 
charge of political federation was created to spearhead the fast tracking of 
the Community towards a political federation, which is the ultimate goal of the 
entire integration process in the region. With the accession of Burundi and 
Rwanda, the staffing system is not tenable anymore. The structure should 
                                                 
707 They are required to refrain from any actions which may adversely reflect on their position as 
international civil servants. The Partner States undertake to respect the international character of the 
responsibilities of the institutions and staff of the Community and shall not seek to influence them in 
the discharge of their duties. 
708 Article 72.2 of the Treaty. 
709 Kaahwa, W.T.K “The Secretariat of the East African Community” (2003)4 The East African Lawyer 
pg 30. 
710 The SG and DSGs. 
711 These include Counsel to the Community and other lawyers, economists, information and public 
relations officers, accountants, internal auditors, human resources officers, information technologists, 
statisticians, engineers, librarians, etcetera.  
712 These are secretaries, registry staff, accounts assistants, etcetera. 
713 DSGs for Projects and Programmes as well as Finance and Administration. 
714 Coincidentally, and may be through an unwritten informal understanding, at the entire Community 
level the allocation of top positions in three of the principal organs seemed to follow the principle of 
geographical distribution: EALA-Speaker (Tanzania), EACJ-President (Kenya) and Secretariat-SG 
(Uganda).  
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reflect the responsibilities of the Community.715  A restructured Secretariat will 
be able to efficiently and effectively carry out its mandate, and quell the 
perception that its existing structure is one of the stumbling blocks in 
implementing the agreed upon programmes.716 
  
The prevailing practice enshrined in the Treaty, that requires the office of SG 
to be a rotational post, reduces its vitality.  It is submitted that the SG should 
be appointed, by the Summit, from among any of the qualified East African 
citizens with a proven track record of performance. The term of office of the 
Secretary General should run concurrently with the term of office of the 
Deputy Secretaries General. In other words, the SG should enter office with 
his or her ‘team’ to ensure consistency and collective responsibility. Members 
of the team (SG and DSGs) should not be dismissed by their national 
governments during their term of office, but the whole team must resign en 
bloc if a vote of no confidence is passed by the Parliament.717 Individual team 
members can be compelled to retire, through a process administered by the 
Court, on grounds of serious misconduct or because he or she no longer 
fulfils the conditions required for the performance of his or her duties.718   In 
this way, when the Secretariat blunders, necessary actions are taken, as 
opposed to the present system, where the top ‘leadership’ of the Secretariat 
is seen, by the Summit/Council, as an extension of their Governments, and 
which is a recipe for incompetence, non-performance and 
maladministration.719 
 
                                                 
715 See Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 144. 
716 See also “e-EAC newsletter”, Issue No.2008/12, op. cit. pg. where Hon. Kaahwa said that the 
issue of sovereignty at the national level was at the core of the implementation bottlenecks the EAC 
was experiencing. He said that the issue of sovereignty should be revisited so that decisions are 
more binding and their implementation more expeditious. 
717 See Hartley, T.C, op. cit. pg 12. 
718 Ibid. 
719 See also Lawrence, R.Z (2007) “International organisations: the challenge of aligning mission, 
means and legitimacy” pg 4 where it is stated that international organisations have a tendency to 
develop traditions in which national origin rather competence plays a key role in appointment and 
advancement. Under these circumstances, national governments may find it difficult to complain 
about the performance of or about the dismissals of the nationals of the other countries thereby 
weakening accountability < 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/citrade/GTN/CURRENT%20rESEARCH/wto%20Int’l%20Orgs.pdf > 
accessed on 7May 2009. 
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With the current membership of the Community consisting of five Partner 
States, the rotational principle loses its ‘glamour’ as a Partner State has to 
wait for twenty years for its turn to field a SG. Given the non-rotational nature 
of the office of SG, reality dictates that Partner States will demand to be 
represented at the next high level position, that is, at the DSG level, 
regardless of the fact that the Secretariat is meant to be a formally apolitical 
supranational administration.720  It is prudent to achieve a broad balance in 
the ‘representation’ of partner states in the upper reaches721 of the 
Secretariat for purposes of acceptability at national level. Every Partner State 
should be allowed to nominate one person for appointment to the office of 
DSG. However, the nominated person must not be unacceptable to the other 
Partner States.722 The nominated officials, before being formally appointed by 
the Summit, must be vetted, through confirmation hearings to verify their 
suitability, by the Assembly. The SG or DSGs must not engage in any other 
occupation whether gainful or not during their term in office, though in 
practice certain academic practices may be allowed.723 
  
It is, therefore, contended that the structure of the Secretariat, given its 
multiple roles, should be portfolio based. As indicated above, there are more 
than 25 sectoral formations, and it would be desirable to cluster these 
formations in five portfolios.724 Each portfolio will be headed by a DSG in 
which case ‘expertise is matched to portfolio’.725 Given the fact that the 
current sectoral formations indicate the priority areas726 that the Community 
has chosen to  inform its integration process, it is only prudent and pragmatic 
for their supervision to be managed from right at the top of the Secretariat in 
order to give them the necessary impetus that they deserve in achieving the 
                                                 
720 See Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 73. 
721 See Peterson, J, et al op. cit. pg 144. 
722 See Hartley, T. C, op. cit. pg 12. 
723 See Hartley, T.C (2007) op. cit. pg 12. 
724 See “e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Special Issue No.2008/15 pg 3 where it is reported that Dr. 
Aman Kaborou, EALA Member, from Tanzania, warned against creating a top heavy EAC of 
politicians and bureaucrats and urged prudence in developing a structure and mechanism that 
strengthened the role of the ordinary people in the EAC integration process. < 
http://www.eac.int/downloads/e-newsletter.html > accessed on 20 March 2009. 
725 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 79. 
726See UNECA II, op. cit. pg 60 where UNECA states that institutions are important in regional 
integration with the caveat that it is important to adopt a strategic approach to regional integration by 
prioritising areas of action.  
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objectives of the Community. DSGs will be assisted by Directors-General 
(DGs), as is the case now, but with modified responsibilities, depending on 
the nature of the sectoral formations under the respective DSGs. Then 
support departments would be created that cut across the entire spectrum of 
the Secretariat’s work, such as, finance, administration, internal audit, 
communications, public relations, etc. 
 
The number of DGs will depend on how the sectors have been re-organised 
but initially two DGs per DSG seem ideal.  DGs may wish to head 
directorates that will consist of units. This is not necessary, as the Community 
is advised to move away from traditional, bureaucratic, and hierarchically 
based structures to more open and flexible administration.727 It involves 
focusing resources on core tasks, decentralising responsibilities whenever 
possible, devoting considerable attention to financial control, and establishing 
modern, incentive driven personnel systems.728 The stop-gap measures that 
are adopted by the Summit to plug the loopholes in the structure of the 
Secretariat are not helpful and are bound to exacerbate the problem.729 The 
existing institutional structure demands a complete overhaul. The 
administration of the existing customs union, and the envisaged common 
market in 2010, two advanced stages in the integration chain, require a 
comprehensive approach and a robust institutional framework to handle the 
challenges associated with their operationalisation.730  
                                                 
727Quinlivan, A, et al (2001) Kinnock’s Administrative Reform : A Cultural Perspective as cited in 
Peterson, J, et al , op. cit. pg 161.  
728 Ibid. 
729 See the Final Communiqué of the EAC Summit of Heads of State (Ref EAC/SHS EX.7/A/2008 as 
annexed to the Report of the 7th Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State (Ref. No .EAC/SHS 
EX.7/R/2008 held in Kampala, Uganda, on 22nd October, 2008 pg. 18 where during the consideration 
of the Progress Report of the Council on the Comprehensive Roadmap for the Integration of Burundi 
and Rwanda in EAC, The Summit endorsed the decision of the Council to split the position of DSG 
(Projects an Programmes) into two, namely, DSG (Planning and Infrastructure) and DSG (Productive 
and Social Sectors). It was further decided that, one of these positions, should be filled up 
immediately by the incumbent DSG through re-designation. The other position shall be filled up by 
one of the new Partner States through appointment upon expiry of the initial contracts of two DSGs in 
April 2009. 
730 See “e-EAC newsletter”, Update Issue No. 23 dated 10 February 2009 “8th round of EAC CM 
negotiations in Kisumu, Kenya” pg 3 where it is reported that during the 8th round of the EAC 
Common Market negotiations ended on 6 February 2009, the members of the High Level Task Force 
concurred that, as the Community progresses from a Customs Union to a Common Market, there will 
be a need to undertake institutional review for effective functioning of the Common Market. It is 
further reported that during the open ceremony of the negotiations Hon. Amason Jeffah King, Kenyan 
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(b) Staff 
The contract nature of the Community jobs may keep away talented, 
experienced and capable people, given the volatility of the labour market.731 
The Community is advised to devise a system which is able to re-assure 
capable staff to stay, based on merit and good performance, without 
compromising the work of the Community.732 Kaahwa observes that the 
backbone of every international organisation is its civil service, i.e. the 
permanent staff working for it.733 Retaining talents is one of the key 
challenges in human capital management in modern organisations.734 In 
other regional integration communities, such as, the EU, “the reliance on 
contract staff is being reduced”735 as it results in high staff turnover. 
 
Since the accession of Burundi and Rwanda, twenty two staff members have 
been recruited from those two Partner States to join the Community.736 
Although the Community’s wish is to maintain a broad geographical balance 
among its staff,737 merit and experience should be the critical considerations 
                                                                                                                                                       
Minister of EAC Affairs, said that “it is imperative that as the Community moves into deeper 
integration of the Common Market, the EAC institutions need to be reviewed if we are to achieve 
Common Market.”   
731See also “Attracting talent” (2009) 14 Business Brief pg 48 where it is noted that finding the talent 
appears to be the biggest challenge for most organisations.  
732 See also, “Attracting talent”, ibid, where it is observed that the biggest influence on human capital 
management is the performance review. It allows employees to see the link between their jobs and 
the organizational goals; something that is best supported by regular and specific feedback from 
managers. While an organization can have excellent leadership and defined objectives, when an 
effective review process is not in place, staff members are unable to gauge their performance, 
identify problem areas, advance their careers and ultimately realize their full potential.  
733Kaahwa, W. T.K, op. cit. pg 34. 
734 See also Sacht, J “Human resources in the age of talent” (2009) 14 Business Brief  pg 52 where it 
is contended that human capital management is a new business paradigm that considers people to 
represent a capital asset, rather than a set of costs. It is the foundational concept for talent 
management, in that leaders must adopt a new mindset and practices to replace the century-old 
imperative for cost control.  
735 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. 160. 
736 See “Arusha Times”, dated 21 February, 2009 “East Africa: Worst Financial Crisis Hits EAC” < 
allAfrica.com/allAfrica_com-East Africa Worst Financial Crisis Hits EAC (page 1 of 1).html> accessed 
on 3 March 2009; See also the Community, Issue no. 7, dated October 2008 “EAC Partnership Fund” 
pg 14. 
737 See also United Nations (UN) (1998) Image & Reality: Questions and Answers About the United 
Nations, pg 7 where it is stated that when recruiting the UN Secretariat staff, in addition to observing 
the criteria on the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity, due regard is also paid 
to recruiting the staff  on as wide a geographical basis as possible to reflect the whole membership of 
the UN, so that it will be responsive to the diverse political, social and cultural systems in the world 
and  that member states will have confidence in it. 
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in making appointments. Nationality should not matter when a new occupant 
is appointed to a specific post.738 The Secretariat is expected to be an 
institution of high efficiency and technical competence 739 which is pro-active 
and able to provide a self-propelling impetus to the Community.740 This is 
critical, as the Summit741 has embarked on the fast tracking of regional 
integration.742 
 
 With a staff of about 120,743 the staffing level of the Secretariat is worryingly 
low, 744 given the number of projects and programmes that the Secretariat is 
either directly managing or involved in through monitoring, evaluation, or 
providing advisory or co-ordination services.745 The mandate of the 
Secretariat has expanded over time without the corresponding expansion of 
its capacity in terms of professional cadre of staff, thus overstretching the 
capacities of such staff.746  This leads to poor implementation which, in turn, 
                                                 
738 See Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 159. 
739 Kaahwa, W. T. K, op. cit. pg 30. 
740 Kaahwa, W.T.K, op. cit. pg 32. 
See also “e-EAC newsletter”, Issue No. 2, pg 2 where the staff of the Community are called upon to 
adopt and operate a broader viewpoint and ambition, projecting a truly East African character as 
opposed to being extensions of individual Partner States’ bureaucracies and vested interests.  
741 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 114 where it is stated that the Summit meeting in August 2004 called 
for a speedier process of integration. This arose from a concern that customs union negotiations 
alone had taken four years to complete. A fast track committee, set up to investigate the practicality 
of fast tracking the entire integration process, released a report in November 2004 that suggested 
that fast tracking could lead to a political federation as early as 2013. 
742 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 121 where it is observed that the business community feels the 
technical process of integration needs more work to enable integration to go faster contrary to the 
Heads of State who want the issue of political federation resolved first because they feel that this will 
allow the technical process to go faster. 
743 See “Arusha Times”, op. cit. 
744 See UNECA II, op. cit. pg 20 where it is observed that resource constraints appear to be 
especially binding in staffing. Except the West African Economic and Monetary Union, most regional 
economic communities appear to have small and lean secretariats, with an average of 55% of total 
employees in general staff grades, even though the programmes run by the regional economic 
communities tend to be technical. Low salaries may explain the poor employment rates of the 
professional staff: 40% of the professional staff earn more than $20,000 a year, and another 40% 
earn $10,000–$20,000. Regional economic communities also face high staff turnover, which may 
have serious implications, especially for small communities. 
745 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 146 where it is reported that there are 22 sectoral committees and 
each has links to national departments. A problem arises when the 22 committees need to be aware 
of each other’s activities, which requires much co-ordination. Such co-ordination is still very weak. 
Further staffing is required for this purpose, because the committees must also be able to connect 
with layers above and below them and in this way connect with national and regional issues. Hence 
the Secretariat needs increased capacity in areas of co-ordination, planning and institutional 
linkages. 
746 See EAC Development Strategy, op. cit. 25. It is also further stated that in many areas the 
Secretariat is thin on the ground with departments understaffed. The optimal utilisation of existing 
staff to cope with existing mandate is also yet to be addressed. 
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results in delayed completion, hence negatively impacting on the financial 
health, as well as the proper functioning and development, of the 
Community.747 The problem is compounded by poor implementation at 
national level.748  Under the Treaty the Partner States are responsible for the 
actual execution of most of the programmes initiated by the Secretariat.749 
The formation of specific Ministries responsible for EAC affairs in each of the 
Partner States is not yielding the expected results, as they seem to be mired 
in the usual bureaucratic malaise characterizing the functioning of states.750 
Braude751 reiterates the need for the EAC Ministers to be based in Arusha so 
that they improve relations between the EAC and national structures, 
facilitate entry into national departments, and push the EAC views in national 
politics.752 Partner States are strongly urged to strengthen national institutions 
charged with implementing regional projects and programmes, whereas, as 
Braude753 argues, internal co-ordination with the Secretariat itself is 
                                                 
747 See EAC Development Strategy, op. cit. pg 24 where it is observed that the Secretariat has a 
mandate of monitoring the implementation of decisions made. However, its follow up of decisions is 
not exemplary. There are two challenges in this area, namely, the capacity of the Secretariat and its 
limited legal executive authority for enforcement in terms of implementation of Community 
programmes. 
 748See the 17th Meeting of the Council of Ministers, op. cit. pg 37 where it was noted that the Council 
Decision Ref: EAC/CM9/48 adopting the Inter University Council of East Africa (IUCEA) decision that 
East Africa students attending a University in a Partner State university other than his or her own be 
charged the same fees as the locals has not been adhered to. The Co-ordination Committee, 
therefore, recommended to the Council to urge Partner States to implement the Decisions of the 
Council of Ministers. Some of the similar pleas that were given by the Co-ordination Committee, in 
the same meeting, include formation of the Forum for Ministers responsible for labour; ratification of 
the Protocol on the establishment of the East African Science and Technology Commission; and the 
settlement contributions to budget of the Community as soon as possible. 
749 See Khumalo, N (2008) “Economic integration requires new strategies” where he observes that 
lack of  national mechanisms to co-ordinate, implement and monitor integration policies and 
programmes poses a big challenge to regional economic communities < allAfrica.com > accessed on 
19 October 2008. 
750 See UNECA II, op. cit. pg 21 where UNECA states that partner states are the primary 
stakeholders and have an important role ensuring that common agreed principles are implemented at 
national level but the national implementation has been weak, with few countries having established 
effective integration mechanisms.  
751 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 147. 
752 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 244 where he also observes that links between the Secretariat and the 
layers of bureaucracy that stand between it and the respective national, provincial and local 
governmental officials in the partner states will have to be negotiated and formalized. This means 
that an information supply chain to communicate information and decisions effectively from regional 
to national level and vice versa have to be effected. 
753 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 245. 
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necessary to ensure that information and decisions are absorbed by the 
relevant bodies.754   
 
Connected to all this is the issue of funding, not only of the Secretariat but of 
all the organs and institutions of the Community. Lack of sufficient funding is 
hampering the work of the Secretariat in particular, and the entire Community 
in general.755 The situation has been exacerbated by the failure of Partner 
States to honour their contribution obligations.756  For the integration process 
to bear any fruits, and hence realise the objectives for which the Community 
was formed, the Partner States should meet their financial obligations fully, 
as agreed, and strive to find other additional, better funding mechanisms.757 
WCSDG758 states that regional resource mobilisation is required for both 
investment and adjustment. This is particularly important when integration 
involves countries which are at very different levels of development.759 
Regional financial institutions are also vital in order to channel resources to 
regional investment. Donors and international organisations760 should also 
                                                 
754 Ibid, where the author insists that policy co-ordination relies on effective structures and linkages, 
both horizontal and vertical. The multi-faceted nature of regional integration, where a range of sectors 
or stages are being implemented across a number of partner states, means that attention should be 
paid to devising an effective policy and institutional co-ordination framework that operates within the 
regional secretariat and between the Secretariat and partner states. 
755 See “Arusha Times”, op. cit. where it is reported that EAC is facing its worst financial crisis due to 
non-payment of contributions by Partner States. Only 34% of the USD 23.4 million EAC annual 
budget for the financial year 2008/2009 had been remitted to the Secretariat. This has resulted in 
failure to meet operational costs, run some projects and even unable to pay staff salaries. 
756 See “e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Issue No. 24, op. cit.pg 5 “EALA Holds Sessions” where it is 
reported that EALA has formed a Select Committee to probe, among other things, the delayed 
remittances of contributions by EAC Partner States for financial year 2008/2009 where only USD II.8 
million out of USD 23.4 million has been remitted to EAC. 
757 See “e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Issue No. 23, op. cit. pg 3 where it was observed that the 
current mode of financing of EAC through equal sharing of the budget of EAC has proven 
unsustainable and, therefore, it calls for serious consideration of innovative ways of financing the 
Community. It was further observed that the EAC could learn best practice from EU that has 
successfully been able to run its institutions from some funds from the Partner States whereby a 
certain percentage of the revenues are channeled direct to the EU. 
758 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 74. 
759 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 74 where it is observed that the Structural and Cohesion Funds (SCF) in EU 
have helped promote upward convergence of poorer areas within the Union.  
760 See “The Community”, Issue No. 7, op. cit. “EAC Partnership Fund gets boost” pg 14 where it is 
reported that the Steering Committee of the EAC Partnership Fund (EPF), comprised of EAC, 
Canada, Denmark, EU, Department for International Development (DFID), Finland, France, Germany 
(GTZ), Japan (JICA), Norway, Sweden and World Bank, met on 22 May 2008 to approve USD 2.8  
million towards EAC Partnership Fund Projects and programmes for the first quarter of 2009 and 
USD 9 million for the medium to long term period-up to 2011. Some of the projects undertaken under 
the Partnership Fund are multilateral trade negotiations, EAC re-branding project, integration of 
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support countries efforts’ to develop common regional strategies for 
promoting social and economic development.761 
 
Peterson observes that the European Community was able, at the end of the 
1960s, to move away from the system of national contribution linked to each 
country’s Gross National Product (GNP) to a system of ‘own resource’, 
whereby the revenue available for financing European policies legally 
belonged to the Community and could not be withheld.762 Braude763 argues 
that the most effective source of recurrent funds may be a tax on trade.764 
Much as problems relating to sufficient resources need to be addressed, it is 
important that the Secretariat efficiently and appropriately manages the 
funding of the Community.765  
 
(ii) Interrelationship with other organs. 
The Secretariat is required, under the Treaty,766 to establish practical working 
relations with the Court and the Assembly. Also, as an organ of liaison among 
the EAC Partner States, the Secretariat should serve to co-ordinate EAC 
intra-organ activities, and those national activities that relate to the objectives 
of the Community.767 The achievement of the Community will depend on how 
cohesive and co-ordinated its organs and institutions are in discharge of their 
duties.768 However, this has not always been the case. The other organs, 
specifically the Court and the Assembly, seem to be forgotten in some of the 
Community activities. They are not adequately consulted. The information at 
                                                                                                                                                       
Rwanda and Burundi into the EAC and the ongoing negotiations towards the establishment of the 
EAC Common Market.  
761 Ibid. 
762 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 97. 
763 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 249. 
764 Ibid, the EAC has now opted for a 1.5% tax on partner’s customs revenues, which will, in theory, 
provide around USD 22 million annually. However, this mode raises a debate around political 
influence based on the size of financial contribution. This can prove divisive as was shown in the 
former EAC when Kenya felt that it was paying more and was, therefore, entitled to greater benefits.  
765 Kaahwa, W. T. K, op. cit. pg 32. 
766 Article 71.1(o) of the Treaty. 
767 Kaahwa, W. T. K, op. cit. pg 33. 
768 Ibid. 
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their disposal, such as, study reports, or even their involvement in these 
activities, are not as satisfactory as expected.769  
 
 The breakdown of communication has sometimes led to a frosty 
relationship.770 These organs, with their respective mandates, would wish to 
be accorded ample opportunity to become full partners in the integration 
process. For instance, the Parliamentarians have declared that the Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) Framework Agreement that was initialled 
between the EU and EAC in November 2007 was a raw deal, poorly 
negotiated, and did not involve Parliamentarians.771 They had resolved that 
EALA and the National Parliaments should engage the EPA negotiators, that 
is, Ministers and technocrats, to register their respective concerns772 before 
                                                 
769 See “New Vision” (Kampala), dated 6 October 2008 “East Africa: Secretariat Not Supportive-EA 
MPs” where it is reported that the EALA has blamed the slow progress in fast-tracking of the common 
market on lack of support from the Community’s  Secretariat  and inadequate co-ordination between 
the two bodies. The legislators further said that EAC has not adequately consulted the regional 
parliament nor the national parliaments in negotiations of the common market. These observations 
were made during the annual Inter-Parliamentary Meeting (Nanyuki IV) in Kigali, Rwanda. < 
allAfrica.com/allAfrica-com-EastAfricaSecretariatNotSupportive-EA MPs (Page 1 of 1).html 
>accessed on 10 October 2008.  
770Nangale, G, op. cit. pg 70 where the author recounts that a motion was floated in the Assembly 
and accepted to form a Probe Committee to examine the circumstances which led to resignation of  
the Clerk and recommend to the Assembly the procedure to be followed by the officers of the 
Assembly when resigning. Apparently the Clerk had resigned even before completion of his probation 
period. There had been delays in scheduling Assembly meetings, information had not been 
forthcoming from the Executive and progress on legislation had been limited. The resignation of the 
Clerk sparked off a lot of concern as to how the Assembly would continue to operate. Members felt 
that the environment at the Executive was not conducive for fostering a good working relationship. 
The failure of communication had rendered the legislative work difficult.  
771See “e-EAC newsletter”, Update Special Issue No. 2008/15, op. cit. pg 5.  
See also ODI/ECDPM “Interim EPAs in Africa: what’s in them? and what is next?”, op. cit. pg 1 where 
it is observed that there is no clear pattern that shows the poorer countries have longer to adjust than 
their richer ones, or that the EPAS are tailored to development needs. It is further observed that the 
picture that emerges is entirely consistent with the hypothesis that countries have a deal that reflects 
their negotiating skills: that countries that are able to negotiate hard with knowledge of their interests 
have obtained a better deal than those lacking these characteristics. Cote d’Ivoire and Mozambique 
will face challenges that are among the largest and will appear the soonest. Cote d’Ivoire, for 
instance, will have removed tariffs completely on 60% of its imports from the EU two years before 
Kenya even begins to start reducing its tariffs as per the EPA. 
772 These concerns include issues of Development Chapter in EPA, flexibility and exceptions in 
market access, periodic reviews, specific reviews, dispute settlement, poor approach to the 
Singapore issues and relevant institutions.  
See also Braude, W, op. cit. pg 316 where EALA is of the view that Singapore issues would pose a 
threat to the ability of the governments to freely determine national and sub-regional policies. 
See also Ochieng, C.M.O “The EU-ACP Economic Partnerships Agreements and the ‘development 
question’: constraints and opportunities posed by Article XXIV and the special and deferential 
treatment provisions of the WTO” (2007) 9 Journal of International Economic Law pg 1 where the 
author argues that Article XXIV and special and deferential treatment (SDT) provisions of the WTO 
present a number of constraints and opportunities to the design and the scope of the proposed 
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the final signatures to the comprehensive EPA Agreements.773 Ogalo774 
argues that, with respect to the EAC, there is total separation of powers in the 
real sense between the Executive and the Court as there is no formal 
mechanism through which there is a flow and exchange of information.775 
Although in the allocation of tasks, the judicial arm, unlike its legislative or 
executive counterparts, is not expected to participate directly in the day-to-
day political governance,776 there still needs to be a formal mechanism of 
engagement. 
 
This is a sad reality for the EAC. As a regional grouping that is striving to reap 
the economies of scale, its governance structures are expected to be 
inclusive. A synergistic approach to the management of the affairs of the 
Community is required where its organs and institutions, acting as a 
collective, provide leadership, direction and control of the regional integration 
process.777 WCSDG778 observes that the principles of participation and of 
democratic accountability are an essential foundation. Representative bodies, 
                                                                                                                                                       
economic partnerships agreements between the EU and the ACP countries. He further argues that 
were the EU’s negotiating position to prevail, ACP and other developing countries would likely suffer 
an ‘erosion of developmental principles’ embedded within the WTO. The differences between the two 
groups over the desirability and/or applicability of negotiating free trade agreements between 
developed and developing countries under the ‘strict’ jurisdiction of Article XXIV, and of negotiating 
agreements on services and the ‘Singapore Issues’, amount to the contestation over the principles of 
reciprocity and SDT within WTO, and of the scope of WTO.  
See also “EPAs: a threat to south-south trade?” in “Bridges Weekly Trade Dialogue”, dated February 
2008, where it is reported that the EPAs being negotiated between the EU and ACP countries 
contain some provisions with serious repercussions on developing countries, for instance, according 
to the EU any more favourable treatment that the region or any of its individual member states grants 
to ‘any major trading economy’ under a free trade agreement concluded after the signing of the EPA. 
Brazil presented to the WTO General Council, on 5 February 2008, that these so called ‘MFN 
clauses’ imposed by EU had the potential to undermine initiatives aimed at integrating developing 
countries with into the world trading system, including on-going negotiations on the Global System of 
Trade Preferences, and the efforts some developing countries are making to extend duty-free and 
quota-free market access to the LDCs. 
773 See “e-EAC newsletter”, Update Special Issue No. 2008/ 15, op. cit. pg 5; See also Braude, W, 
op. cit. pg 311 where it is reported that the EPA Agreement will subsist for a 25 year period and 
Article 37 declares that a Comprehensive EPA will be signed by 31 July 2009. 
774Ogalo, D. W, op. cit.  
775 Ogalo, D. W, op. cit.  where it is stated that recognising this problem the EALA passed a 
resolution calling for establishment of practical working relationship between the Court, the Assembly 
and the Executive. Unfortunately it never took off because of the bad working method of the 
Secretariat. The Court therefore has a problem relating to the Executive.   
776 See Addo, M.K (ed), op. cit. pg 3. It is further stated that theirs is the isolated task of adjudicating 
on disputes and often overseeing the compliance of the other two branches with the law.  
777 See “The Community”, Issue No. 7, op. cit. “Amb. Onen calls for dynamic, harmonious operations 
of EAC organs and institutions”, pg 6. 
778 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 73. 
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such as regional parliaments, have an important role. Regional integration 
should be advanced through social dialogue between representative 
organisations of workers and employers,779 and wider dialogue with other 
important social actors, such as business organisations780 and civil society781, 
on the basis of strong institutions for democratic and judicial accountability.782  
 
With a combined population of more than 93 million, the EAC region has a 
considerable human resource base to stimulate and sustain the development 
                                                 
779See also Baert, F, et al, op. cit. pg 55 where it is reported that the Southern African Trade Union 
Co-ordination Council (SATUCC), a sub-regional labour organisation is involved in SADC since its 
formation in 1983. The main scope of SATUCC is to establish a regional trade union movement that 
would influence SADC policies at regional and national levels. In 1995, the SADC Council of 
Ministers established the SADC Employment and Labour Sector, based on a tripartite structure, 
including representatives from the government, business and trade unions. The Extra-ordinary 
Summit in 2001 agreed on a new structure for SADC institutions, and therefore, the Employment and 
Labour Sector was included in the Social and Human Development Programme. The main 
achievement of SATUCC is the development of a Social Charter on Fundamental Rights of Workers 
in the Southern Africa which is ratified by nearly all SADC countries. 
780 See also the 17th Council of Ministers Meeting, op. cit. pg 21 where it is reported that the Summit 
has directed the Council to consider the request by the East African Business Council (EABC) to be 
institutionalised in the Community’s institutional framework. The Council is still working on the 
Summit’s directive, that is, on how to involve EABC in the mainstream EAC policy making 
programmes and activities. The private is a key player given its dominant role in the economy hence 
its merits attention from the executive.  
781 See also Braude, W, op. cit. pg 22 where he contends that one of the best defences against 
political unaccountability and consequent political instability is a vibrant, empowered and organized 
civil society. Civil society should likewise seek access to regional processes, and build regional civil 
structures, relationships and partnerships, both in terms of particular issues and around the overall 
regional project. 
See also United Nations (1998), op. cit. pg 6 where it is observed that the UN framework provides 
opportunities to involve other actors whose co-operation is increasingly vital for solution of global 
problems. Some 1,520 non-governmental organizations (NGOs) active in economic and social 
development have ‘consultative status’ with the UN Economic and Social Council, the main policy 
making body on social and economic matters, and their representatives may be invited to address its 
meetings. These NGOs speak for broad international and national constituencies and are 
increasingly influential on UN work playing a prominent role at UN conferences, advancing the views 
of their constituencies ranging from women rights to food security. 
782 Ibid. It further states that the creation of tripartite or wider councils and forums at regional level 
such as the Consultative Economic and Social Forum of MERCOSUR or the European Economic 
and Social Committee provides an important institutional framework for such a dialogue. 
See also the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) which is an organ of the African 
Union (AU), under the Constitutive Act of AU. Among other things, it is mandated to promote the 
participation of African civil societies in the implementation of the policies and programmes of the AU 
< http://www.africa-union.org/ECOSOC/home.htm. > accessed on 30 March 2009. 
See also Cilliers, J “The Pan African Parliament: a plenary of parliamentarians” (2004) 13 African 
Security Review where the role of ECOSOCC as a bridge between Africa’s leaders and the African 
people has been noted. 
See also Habib, A, et al (2006) “African integration and civil society: the case of the African Union” pg 
4 where it is argued that civic participation should be an integral component of Africa’s integration 
agenda, and encouragingly AU has distinguished itself to a people-centred and participative 
programme. It has institutionalised this through the establishment of ECOSOCC < 
http://www.transformation.ukzn.za/archive/tran059/5905.pdf > accessed on 6 May 2009. 
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of a viable single market and investment area, currently with a combined 
GDP of USD 28 billion.783 This potential cannot be fully tapped and realised if 
the organs of the Community, the engine of the integration process, are not 
able to put in place mechanisms for a meaningful and practical working 
relationship. The EAC also needs a strong institutional framework, which is at 
peace with itself, in order to attract investment. Creating a fertile investment 
climate in which domestic markets can flourish is the only way that long term 
dividends will be paid to both local and foreign investors.784  
 
The recently held Strategy Retreat, the first in almost ten years of existence 
of EAC, should be formalised and included on the annual calendar of the 
Community.785  In addition to this, the Secretariat should establish permanent 
                                                 
783 See Corporate Tanzania: The Business, Trade and Investment Guide 2007/2008 “Outlook on the 
effects of a completed EAC for the region’s economy” pg 31. 
784See Issa, O “How to attract foreign investment” in “African Business”, Issue No. 351, dated March 
2009, pg 42. 
See also Ibru, C “Boosting competitiveness across the continent” (2009) 7 Africainvestor pg 33 where 
it is contended that “to ensure Africa maintains its upward swing in terms of growth, governments on 
the continent have to help foster competitiveness by promoting policies affecting monetary, financial, 
fiscal and trade issues; increasing political and policy stability; reducing corruption and tax evasion; 
improving administration of justice and bureaucracy; supporting businesses by promoting 
entrepreneurship, skilled labour, investment in technology and sound management policies; and 
providing infrastructure by the provision of quality education, health, environment, water, energy and 
roads”. 
See also “Private investment for public infrastructure” in “BusinessinAfrica”, dated March 2009, pg 26 
where it is observed that one of the biggest challenges facing Africa is that of infrastructure. If African 
economies are to modernize, then they need all sorts of new economic infrastructure-from roads, 
railways, airports, seaports to power generation plants, as well as social infrastructure, such as, 
schools, hospitals, and the like. 
See also Issa, O “Investment: the importance of judicial reform” in “African Business”, Issue No. 352, 
dated April 2009, pg 38 where it is argued that a weak or ineffective judicial system can have a 
severe and direct impact on investment climate. A healthy business environment is as much about 
investor confidence as it is about opportunities and resources. Difficulties with enforcing contracts 
and obtaining commercial justice are often cited as reasons not to invest in Africa and can act as a 
real obstacle to domestic enterprise. It further stated that judicial reforms include facilitating 
improvement to access commercial justice system, strengthening judicial procedures, establishing 
dedicated commercial courts and modernizing judiciaries through provision of training and 
technology.  
See also “e-EAC newsletter, Issue No.24, op. cit. 2 where it is contended that the advantage of a rich 
legacy of socio-economic, political and cultural interactions in East Africa should be consolidated by 
strong, first rate formal institutions embracing a learning attitude, continuously  internalizing new 
knowledge, innovation and good practices to drive the integration process. 
785 See “e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Issue No. 24, op. cit.pg 1 “Summit Chair Convenes Historic 
Meeting to Usher ‘New Look’ EAC” where it is reported that a Strategy Retreat for Key Organs and 
Institutions of the East African Community was held in Kigali, Rwanda from 9-10 February 2009. The 
Retreat, the first of its kind brought together the top leadership, Ministers, Permanent Secretaries, 
Heads and Senior Officials of Government, EAC Organs and Institutions;  and representatives of the 
business community and civil society. The Retreat was convened by H.E. President Paul Kagame of 
Rwanda and Chairman of the Summit of Heads of State of the East African Community. The Retreat 
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‘bilateral’ meetings with the other organs in order to attend to specific issues 
that are peculiar to each organ. As it is increasingly becoming apparent that 
the EAC engine is not running smoothly, there is a need to remedy the 
situation,786 that is, avoid communication breakdown or full-scale inter-
institutional battles787 which eat away the required efficiency and 
effectiveness in service delivery. Governance that leads to fairer outcome 
should be based on democratic and participatory decision making 
processes.788 It has been argued that this problem of a dysfunctional 
relationship among the organs of the Community is partly explained by its 
strong intergovernmental nature.789  Nevertheless, there is a compelling need 
to ensure that the Secretariat does not abdicate its statutory duty of 
establishing and maintaining a practical working relationship among the 
organs of the Community.790 
 
 In a wider context, the Community’s visibility should be felt in the political, 
social and economic life of the people of East Africa, otherwise its relevancy 
would be questioned.791 Internal conflicts within Partner States have 
                                                                                                                                                       
was held against the background of deepening EAC integration and maintaining a harmonious 
working relationship among its organs and institutions to meet new challenges and expectations of 
regional integration within the fast evolving world economic and social order. The Strategy Retreat 
with a theme “Collaborative Work Culture in the EAC Organs and Institutions for a Stronger East 
Africa” focused on a review of the current operations of the EAC organs and institutions, sharing of 
views and insights on their effectiveness under their respective mandates under the Treaty, and 
drawing of lessons from other similar organizations in terms of collaborative work ethic < 
http://www.eac.int/downloads/e-newsletter.html > accessed on 3 March 2009.  
786 See e-EAC newsletter, Update Issue No. 24, op. cit. pg 3. 
787 Peterson, J, et al, op. cit. pg 61. 
788 WCSDG, op. cit. pg 76. 
 789 See Fanta, E, op. cit. pg. 19 where the author argues that each of the regional organisations that 
have been set up in Eastern Africa, including EAC, are organized following a very strong 
intergovernmental system where all the decisional power is concentrated in the hands of states and 
governments. The roles attributed to Secretariats or Commissions are always limited to 
implementation of the decisions made at a higher level and never include any decisional capacity.  
790 See also Mchumo, A.S, op. cit. 10 where it is observed that the introduction and sustenance of a 
mechanism for cordial and collaborative interfacing and interrelationships among the organs and 
institutions of the Community remains unassailable. Although the Treaty spells out the different 
functions of the organs with particular reference to the their establishment and roles, a standard 
interpretation of the Treaty would indicate that the intention of the Partner States is that the organs 
and institutions should play their roles with one ultimate objective- development of the Community for 
benefit of the peoples of Eat Africa. 
791 See Hartley, T.C, op. cit. pg 16 where the author argues that the Commission, in this case the 
Secretariat, can achieve a great deal so long as it retains the confidence of the Partner States. Its 
greatest asset is its impartiality. Partners are able to accept its role when they believe that it stands 
above national rivalries. 
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debilitating effects on the functioning of the Community. For instance, the 
Community was ineffectual, if not completely absent, in the ensuing conflict 
resolution and management efforts following the disputed 2007 Presidential 
Elections results in Kenya.792 Yet under the standard operating procedures of 
the Community, most of its organs, if not all, cannot meet or engage in 
anything without the presence and participation of the representatives of all 
the Partner States.793 Braude794 contends that elections cycles and 
referendums can prove very disruptive to normal government business and 
even more for regional affairs, which are often the first to be rescheduled or 
reprioritized because they do not immediately affect domestic constituencies. 
The lesson from the EAC experience is that national political events delay 
both legislative and policy cycles.795 
 
 It is hoped that these issues will be seriously considered, in order to achieve 
a better functioning Community with independent but well interlinking organs 
and institutions capable of realising its objectives through faster decision 
making processes and enhanced rapid delivery systems of the regional 
programmes and projects.796 These key players must ensure an inclusive 
                                                                                                                                                       
See also Braude, W, op. cit. pg 28, where the author contends that the Secretariat must build a 
presence on the ground in the Partner States, but to do so will have to win political and financial 
support from Partner States for such a departure from the current EAC roles of co-ordination and 
administration. This move would help co-ordination, information flow, immediate problem solving, 
liaison, integration of regional systems and processes into national structures, and, finally, raising the 
EAC profile among government officials and the public. 
792 See “New African”, op. cit. pg 16 “More speed, more speed, urges Annan” where it is reported that 
Mr. Kofi Annan, former UN SG, who was the Chairman of the African Union Panel of Eminent African 
Personalities, observed that in February 2008, Kenyan political adversaries, aided by the African 
Union and its international partners, negotiated a historic power sharing settlement to peacefully 
resolve the dispute over the results of 2007 presidential elections. Under the framework of the Kenya 
National Dialogue and Reconciliation, the political parties also concluded several agreements aimed 
at ending the violence, restoring fundamental rights and liberties, addressing the humanitarian crisis, 
promoting reconciliation, resolving the political crisis, and tackling long term issues affecting the 
nation. 
See also “Kenya’s example” in “New African”, op. cit. pg 10. 
793 See Calist Andrew Mwatela and others v EAC, op. cit. pg 13 where it is observed that Rule 11 of 
the Rules of Procedure for the Council of Ministers provides that the quorum of the session of the 
Council of Ministers shall be all Partner States representation. 
794 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 22. 
795 Ibid. 
796 See “e-EAC newsletter”, Update Issue No. 22, dated 27 January 2009 “EAC Launches Treaty 
Review Process” pg 1 where it is reported that the 6th   meeting of the Sectoral Council on Legal and 
Judicial Affairs was held in Mombasa, Kenya from 23-24 January 2009 to consider proposed 
amendments for the EAC Treaty < http://www.eac.int/downloads/e-newsletter.html > accessed on 3 
March 2009.  
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process, so that foundations are built for the steps necessary to achieve the 
goals of integration.797 With a robust and sound institutional framework, the 
key pillars798 of the East African integration would be ably anchored to tackle 
socio-economic and political challenges facing the region.799 
4.2.3  CONCLUSION  
The chapter has tried to show the importance of strong institutions in the 
process of regional integration in East Africa as “the quality of institutions 
‘trumps’ everything”.800 But it has been pointed out that,   for the institutions to 
work better in furtherance of the intended objectives of the Community, they 
need to be anchored in a well designed institutional framework. The chapter 
has shown how key organs of the Community are riddled with structural 
weaknesses which hamper the supposedly expected optimal functioning of 
the Community. Best practices have been borrowed from the EU, with 
modifications to properly fit in locally and have a meaningful impact, since 
“because of the special socio-political and economic circumstances prevailing 
in the different African sub-regions, the EU blueprint of institutional design 
can not be followed to the letter”.801 The chapter contains suggestions that 
point to an alternative architecture for the Community in places where 
structural loopholes have been spotted. These suggestions form part and 
parcel of the next and final chapter which deals with conclusions and 
recommendations. 
                                                 
797 Braude, W, op. cit. pg 207. 
798 See EAC Development Strategy, op. cit. pg 32. These are co-operation in political matters, 
defence and security; completion of the implementation of the Customs Union Protocol; 
establishment of the East African Common Market; laying the foundation for the Eat African Monetary 
Union; and laying the foundation for establishing a East African Federation.   
799 See also Shivji, I.G (ed), op. cit. pg 140 where it is contended that due to different levels of 
economy of the Partner States, there is a need to ensure that the integration process does not 
exacerbate any existing imbalances among them. 
800 Rodrik, D, et al (2002) “Institutions rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration 
in economic development” as cited in UNECA II, op. cit. pg 51. 
801UNECA II, op. cit. pg 61.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1  CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has shown the vitality of institutions in regional integration. It is 
apparent that regional institutions are important pillars in regional economic 
integration processes, especially in most of Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
particularly in East Africa where state institutions are not functioning at their 
expected optimal capacity.  
 
The paper observes that the underlying institutional framework determines 
the quality of decision making processes within an organisation, such as the 
EAC. The paper further makes an observation that one of the main problems 
afflicting the EAC is the endemic weaknesses in its institutional framework. 
 
The paper reveals the dominance of the executive (the Summit and the 
Council) in the integration process, leaving little room for other organs, 
especially the Assembly and the Court, to exercise, freely, fully and without 
interference, their already circumscribed mandates.  
 
The paper observes that the Community’s institutional framework needs to be 
systematically and extensively re-organised and strengthened, in order to 
effectively and efficiently meet the challenges of regional integration, and 
attain the objectives thereof. It further observes that enhancing and instilling 
effectiveness and efficiency in the Community entails funding, and that it 
should be preferred notwithstanding the costs involved to pursue it. 
 
5.2  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Now that it is evident that the Community’s institutional framework is 
characterised by endemic weaknesses that hamper its proper and optimal 
functioning, steps need to be taken to rectify the anomalies. The following 
recommendations are submitted: 
 
A sufficient number of ordinary meetings of the Summit, say four per year, 
must be convened to enable the Summit, as the ultimate source of authority, 
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to meet fairly regularly and iron out problems facing the Community, in order 
to enhance and deepen the integration process. It is further recommended 
that the Council should meet every month, whereas the Sectoral Councils 
may meet as often as it is practicable. 
 
The decision making process,  in the EAC Summit as well as in the Council,  
should provide for three modes, namely,  consensus, simple majority votes 
and absolute majority votes, depending on the subject matter. Matters within 
the competence of the Community should be categorised accordingly. 
However, only a few matters should be reserved for the category of decision 
making by consensus. For instance, issues, such as, giving general direction, 
as well as admission of new Members, may be decided by consensus, 
whereas all other issues may be divided between the other two modes.  The 
exclusive use of consensus needs to be abandoned. 
 
The incoming Chairperson of the Summit should be required to present 
his/her programme of action at the commencement of the Chairpersonship, 
so that at the end of the tenure it can be determined whether the mandate 
has been fulfilled as expected, for instance, the number of decisions agreed 
on, or the number of decisions implemented, during the tenure. This 
requirement may be inserted in a Protocol to have the force of law. 
 
The Council should be assisted by a permanent Secretariat, which is a 
relatively small and ostensibly politically neutral body, providing it with vital 
logistical, technical and administrative support on a daily basis. With the 
establishment of the permanent Secretariat, the Sectoral Committees which 
are established under Article 9.1(d) of the Treaty will cease to exist.  
 
The paper reiterates the need for the EAC Ministers to be based in Arusha so 
that they improve relations between the EAC and national structures, 
facilitate entry into national departments, and push EAC views in national 
politics. 
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It is imperative that the Co-ordination Committee, as overseer of the activities 
of the Secretariat of the Council, should be re-constituted in a permanent 
form in order to be able to give guidance on the daily work of the Secretariat. 
In this case the members of the Co-ordination Committee should be 
permanently stationed in Arusha, Tanzania, the Headquarters of the 
Community. This Committee should use a mode, known as “the A-point 
procedure”, to forward matters to the Council for decision making.  A-points 
are ‘agreed points’, at Committee level, which are passed en bloc and without 
discussion by the Ministers at the beginning of each Council session. B-
points are those issues sent to Ministers that do require further discussion. 
This arrangement should inform the agenda of each Council meeting, that is, 
it should be divided into parts A and B. 
 
It is recommended that entrenching the independence of the EACJ is a 
critical step that must be taken by the Partner States. Guaranteeing and 
ensuring that the judiciary is insulated from interference by the executive is 
absolutely essential. In this case, independent judicial commissions of 
Partner States may exercise the power of nomination of Judges for the EACJ, 
with appointment by the Summit being merely a formality process. 
Appointment may also be done by the Parliaments of the respective Partner 
States, or such Parliaments may vet, and subsequently confirm, the 
appointment of such Judges.  Alternatively, there is a need to establish a 
Regional Judicial Service Commission to deal with all matters of the Court. It 
is further recommended that the Judges should be the ones to elect the 
President and Vice-President of the Court, as well as the Principal Judge and 
Deputy Principal Judge in case of the First Instance Division.  
 
The Community should continue to ensure the quality of individual judges as 
this has a direct bearing on their independence and affects the esteem in 
which the Court is held. This includes the need to ensure that the Judges 
appointed are persons who have exhibited a high degree of competence in 
judicial work or as jurists. High academic credentials would certainly be in 
order, though not a sine qua non. Also a Judge should be assisted by at least 
one legal secretary whose main task is to carry out legal research, and to 
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help in the preparation of opinions or other legal writing. This enables the 
judge to write well researched judgements. 
 
Judges at the EACJ should enjoy a renewable tenure of office in order to 
enrich the Court and avoid a situation where the Court would perpetually 
have a new composition. This is undoubtedly not a positive and healthy 
development since relevant experience at that level matters for justice to be 
properly administered. 
 
It is recommended that the presently deferred original, appellate and human 
rights jurisdiction of the Court should be operationalised as soon as possible. 
It is further recommended that the human rights jurisdiction needs to be 
removed from the Court. A separate regional court should be established to 
take charge of the equally important human rights issues within the 
integration framework. It is further recommended that the Partner States 
should harmonise their human rights laws. 
 
For purposes of giving uniform application and clarity to the Treaty provisions 
across East Africa on the same matters, Article 34 should make it mandatory 
for the national courts, especially the superior courts, to refer any matter on 
the interpretation and application of the Treaty to the Court.802  
 
The Community should enact a clear and distinct provision on the   applicable 
law, or alternatively the Court itself should define ‘the applicable law’. Court 
judgments, as well as application of general principles of law that are 
recognised in the legal systems of the Partner States, must provide direction 
for political institutions in the establishment and operation of the Community. 
 
                                                 
802The EACJ ruling should not only bind the referring court, but all courts of the Partner States with 
the same issue. 
 See also Oduol, J.O “Origins of the COMESA Court of Justice” (2003) 4 The East African Lawyer pg 
29 where the author observes that the Court of Justice is the backbone of a system of judicial 
safeguards which ensures uniformity and that the law is not interpreted and applied differently in 
each Partner State. As a shared system, it remains a common system which is always identical for all 
circumstances.  
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The size of the Assembly needs to be enlarged to sixty members so that it 
fully and effectively discharges its legislative and supervisory duties, given 
the fact that it uses a committee system, a system commonly used by many 
legislatures, which entails a division of labour among its members. It is further 
recommended that the parliamentary committees must be fully equipped, in 
terms of human and material resources, necessary for their various 
specialised tasks.803 
 
It is recommended that the EAC should take practical steps to remove 
procedural bottlenecks that curtail the Assembly’s power. EALA should be 
accorded powers to investigate thoroughly, and hold the executives 
accountable through censure, forced resignation or recommend prosecution, 
where a crime seems to have been committed. It is further recommended that 
the Assembly’s power should include an entitlement to draw up or revise 
budgets. It is further recommended that whenever the Summit/Council 
assumes legislative functions, the Assembly should be involved through a 
modified version of the co-decision making procedure. 
 
The process of electioneering for membership of the EALA should be 
controlled and ordered through uniform rules cutting across the five National 
Assemblies, to limit unnecessary disruptions of the work of the Community. 
The established principles or guidelines for the conduct of elections should be 
adhered to by all Partner States within the Community. 
 
It is recommended that, as a long term strategy, direct universal suffrage for 
the Assembly, should be considered and implemented in order to give the 
citizens of East Africa a say in the running of the Community’s affairs. This 
would give the Assembly ‘democratic legitimacy’ as it will have the support of 
the people on the ground. Similarly, the lifespan of the Assembly, an 
important body of the Community, needs to be provided for in the Treaty, 
instead of being left to the Summit to determine through proclamations. 
 
                                                 
803 See Ang’ila, F (ed) (2003), op. cit. pg 25. 
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A system of proportional representation, as opposed to the current one, that 
is,   allocation of an equal number of seats, in the Assembly per Partner State 
is recommended. Due regard should be given to size of economy, population, 
geographical coverage, etc. 
  
It is recommended that the Community’s legislative instruments, such as, 
Treaties, Protocols and Acts, should be accorded automatic direct 
applicability in the Partner States. This will ensure the smooth operation of 
the Community, and, in the process, cut down the delays and bureaucratic 
inertia at country level. 
 
It is recommended that the Partner States should amend the Treaty and 
provide elaborate provisions on the exercise of treaty making power with the 
outside world by the Community to avoid questions of legality, in terms of 
whether these are binding on the Partner States, bearing in mind that the 
Community has already concluded a number of international agreements. 
 
A recommendation is made that the structure of the Secretariat should reflect 
the responsibilities of the Community. The structure of the Secretariat, given 
its multiple roles, should be portfolio based. It is further recommended that 
the staffing level of the Secretariat must be sufficiently enhanced to provide a 
proper functioning machinery that keeps up with the growing workload.  
 
It is submitted that the Secretary-General should be appointed, by the 
Summit, from among any of the qualified East African citizens with a proven 
track record of diligent performance. The term of office of the SG should run 
concurrently with that of the Deputy Secretaries-General (DSG). The team 
(SG and DSGs) should not be dismissed by their national governments 
during their term of office, but the whole team must resign en bloc if a vote of 
no confidence is passed by the Parliament. 
 
It is further recommended that each Partner State be allowed to nominate 
one person for appointment to the office of DSG. However, the nominated 
person must not be unacceptable to the other Partner States. The nominated 
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officials, before being formally appointed by the Summit, must be vetted by 
the Assembly through confirmation hearings to verify their suitability. Each 
portfolio will be headed by a DSG, in which case ‘expertise is matched to 
portfolio’. 
 
It is recommended that the Community organs and institutions should be 
appropriately and adequately staffed based on merit and experience criteria. 
It is further recommended that the mandate of the Secretariat in terms of 
legal executive authority needs to be enhanced.804  
 
It is recommended that Partner States should strengthen their national 
institutions charged with implementing regional projects and programmes 
whereas internal co-ordination with the Secretariat itself is necessary to 
ensure that information and decisions are absorbed by various relevant 
bodies. 
 
It is reiterated that there is a compelling need to ensure that the Secretariat 
does not abdicate its statutory duty of establishing and maintaining practical 
working relationships among the organs of the Community.  
 
It is recommended that the private and civil society organisations should be 
mainstreamed in the structures of the Community. They broaden the popular 
participation in the Community and, therefore, enrich its work. It is not enough 
for their existence to be only mentioned in the Treaty.805 
 
                                                 
804 See Braude, W, op. cit. pg 27 where the author reiterates the need for the EAC Secretariat to 
complete its staff expansion because it must have correct levels and quality of personnel in place 
before the launch of the common market in 2010 to prevent a repeat of the confusion and lack of 
capacity that initially accompanied the launch of the customs union. 
See also Sako, S (2006) “Challenges facing Africa’s regional economic communities in capacity 
building” (ACBF Occasional Paper No. 5/2006) on building and strengthening trade-related 
institutional capacity in particular, and effective regional integration capacity building in general < 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002737/REC_Occasional_Paper_Paper5_ACBF_2006.pdf > 
accessed on 5 May 2009.  
805 See also Shivji, I. G (ed), op. cit. pg 141 where it is reiterated that East African should take over 
the Community from their leaders in order to ensure that a small quarrel among the leadership does 
not reduce the efforts of millions to naught. 
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It is recommended that the structure of the Assembly should provide an 
avenue for private citizens of the Community to petition it on matters under its 
jurisdiction which in one way or another have a direct effect on their lives.  
 
 It is recommended that the Community should strengthen its revenue 
generating mechanisms and efforts as effective operationalisation of the 
recommended measures have financial implications. 
 
It is recommended that the Community should make its visibility felt in the 
political, social and economic life of the people of East Africa to justify its 
relevancy. Infrastructure development projects, such as roads and railways, 
have a direct impact on citizens. Their successful implementation will draw 
citizens closer to the EAC. Similarly the promotion of best practices of good 
governance806 and democracy, advocacy for a culture of political dialogue 
and tolerance,807 and participation of the EAC, as a fair and neutral observer 
and/or monitor, in the Partner States’ Presidential and Parliamentary 
Elections will send a strong message to the people that it cares and values 
the local political processes as an impartial agent.808 The elections at the 
Partner States’ level invariably determine the composition of the Summit and 
the Council. 
 
The last, but arguably the most important, recommendation, relates to the 
continued sustaining of the political will in the integration process. The 
                                                 
806 See Kajee, A, et (eds) (2007) Designing Democracy: Comparing Party Politics in Emerging 
Regions pg 19 where it is argued that, in the 21st century, political discourse is dominated by the 
‘good governance’ agenda which advocates political accountability, parliamentary ethics, 
transparency in business transactions, the protection of human rights, the guarantee of property 
rights and the supremacy of the rule of law. These principles have become strongly embedded in 
approaches to democratic reforms and economic growth.  
807 See also Inglehart, R, et al “How development leads to democracy: what we know about 
modernisation” (2009) 88 Foreign Affairs pg 47 where the authors contend that democracy is unlikely 
to survive in a society torn by distrust and intolerance. 
See also Sachs, A, op. cit. pg 34 where the author opines that a vibrant democracy has a qualitative 
and not just a quantitative dimension. Dialogue and deliberation go hand in hand. This part of 
tolerance and civility characterize the respect for diversity.  
808 See also “Burundi seeks EAC assistance in upcoming general elections” in “Guardian” dated 29 April 2009 
where it is reported that the Government of Burundi has underscored the need for East African countries to 
assist the country to hold free and fair general elections scheduled to take place in 2010. The request was made 
on Monday 27 April 2009 in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania by President Pierre Nkrurunzinza when he met his 
counterpart Jakaya M. Kikwete at State House < 
http://www.ippmedia.com/ipp/guardian/2009/04/29/135744.html > accessed on 30 April 2009.  
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process goes beyond putting in place a robust institutional framework. Given 
the tragic experience of collapse of the integration in 1977, which has been 
amplified by “the explicit and candid acknowledgment in the preambular part 
of the Treaty”,809 the Partner States must abundantly ‘invest’ their political will 
in the process so that the Community flourishes as envisaged and expected. 
To this end, Partner States are called upon to fully subject their sovereignty in 
agreed matters to the jurisdiction of the Community.   
 
If properly implemented, it is believed that these measures would put in place 
a sound and robust institutional framework which will enable the Community 
to effectively and efficiently carry out its mandate in order to realise its 
integration objectives. The reform process would put the Community on a 
firmer foundation and increase chances of achieving its goals. 
                                                 
809 Oloka-Onyango, J (ed), op. cit. pg 135. 
 
 
 
 
152 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
REFERENCE WORKS 
Addo, M.K (ed) (2000) Freedom of Expression and the Criticism of Judges: A 
Comparative Study of European Legal Standards, Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Ltd and Dartmouth Publishing Co. Ltd. 
 
Akiba, O (ed) (2004) Contemporary Perspectives on Developing Societies: 
Constitutionalism and Society in Africa, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. 
 
Akokpari, J, et al (eds) (2008) The African Union and its Institutions, 
Capetown: Fanele 
 
Arnull, A (2006) The European Union and its Courts of Justice (2ed), New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Beatson, J, et al (eds) (1998) European Public Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing. 
 
Bennett, A. L (1988)  International Organisations: Principles and Issues (4ed), 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Bhuiyan, S (2001) National Law in WTO: Effectiveness and Good 
Governance in the World Trading System, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Blaisdell, D, C (1966) International Organisations, New York: The Ronald 
Press Company. 
 
Bowett, D.W (1982) The Law of International Organisations (4ed), London: 
Stevens & Sons. 
 
Bray, R (ed) (1999) Constitutional Law of the European Union, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
Braude, W (2008) Regional Integration in Africa: Lessons from the East 
African Community, Johannesburg: The South African Institute of 
International Affairs. 
 
Bunn-Livingstone, S.L (2002) Juricultural Pluralism vis-à-vis Treaty Law: 
State Practice and Attitudes, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
 
Byers, M (ed) (2000) The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in 
International Relations and International Law, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Clapham, C, et al (eds) (2001) Regional Integration in Southern Africa: 
Comparative International Perspectives, Johannesburg: The South African 
Institute of International Affairs. 
 
De Burca, G, et al (eds) (2001) The EU and the WTO: Legal and 
Constitutional Issues, Portland: Hart Publishing.  
 
Grobbelaar, N, et al (eds) (2008) Unlocking Africa’s Potential: The Role of 
Corporate South Africa in Strengthening Africa’s Private Sector, 
Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Hanlon, J (2003) European Community Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
 
Hartley, T.C (1998) The Foundations of the European Community Law: An 
Introduction to the Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European 
Community (4ed), New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Hartley, T.C (2007) The Foundations of the European Community Law: An 
Introduction to the Constitutional and Administrative Law of the European 
Community (6ed), New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Herling, D, et al (2004) Briefcase on Constitutional and Administrative Law 
(4ed), Oregon: Cavendish Publishing. 
 
 
 
 
154 
 
Hoekman, B.M, et al (2001) The Political Economy of the World Trading 
System: The WTO and Beyond, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hughes, T (ed) (2006) SADC: Parliamentary-Civil Society Engagement 
Handbook, Johannesburg: The South African Institute of International Affairs. 
 
International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) (2004) International Principles on 
the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors: A 
Practitioners’ Guide, Geneva: International Commission for Jurists. 
 
Jackson, J.H (2006) Sovereignty, the WTO, and Changing Fundamentals of 
International Law, New York, Cambridge University Press. 
 
Kajee, A, et al (eds) (2007) Designing Democracy: Comparing Party Politics 
in Emerging Regions, Johannesburg: The South African Institute of 
International Affairs. 
 
Karns, M.P, et al (2004) International Organisations: The Politics and 
Processes of Global Governance, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
 
Lanjouw, G.J (1995) International Trade Institutions, New York: Longman 
Publishing. 
 
Nyerere, J. K (1966) Freedom and Unity, Dar-es-Salaam: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Lasok, D, et al (1987) Law and Institutions of the European Communities 
(4ed), London: Butterworths. 
 
Mathis, J.H (2002) Regional Trade Agreements in the GATT/WTO: Article 
XXIV and the Internal Trade Requirement, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press. 
 
Moyo, D (2009) Dead Aid, London: Penguin Books. 
 
 
 
 
155 
 
Mvungi, S.E.A (ed) (2002) The Draft Treaty for the Establishment of the East 
African Community: A Critical Review, Dar-es-Salaam: Dar-es-Salaam 
University Press Ltd. 
 
Murray, R (2000) The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights & 
International Law, Portland: Hart Publishing. 
 
Nangale, G (2006) The Politics of Partnership: A Reflection of Living Life in a 
Legislative Assembly and other Organisations, Dar-es-Salaam: Links Training 
Centre. 
 
Okoth, A (2006) A History of Africa: African Nationalism and Decolonization 
Process 1915-1995 Vol.2, Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers. 
 
Oloka-Onyango, J (ed) (2003) Constitutional Development in East Africa for 
the Year 2001, Dar-es-Salaam: E&D Publishers Limited. 
 
Palmeter, D (2003) The WTO as a Legal System, London: Cameron May Ltd. 
 
Peterson, J; Shackleton, M (2002) The Institution of the European Union, 
New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 
 
Piris, J.C (2006) The Constitution for Europe: A Legal Analysis, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sarooshi, D (2005) International Organisations and Their Exercise of 
Sovereign Powers, New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Schott, J.J (ed) (1996) The World Trading System: Challenges Ahead, 
Washington: Institute for International Economics. 
 
Shaw, M (1998) International Law [4ed-low priced], Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
Shivji, I.G (2004) Constitutional and Legal Systems of Tanzania: A Civics 
Sourcebook, Dar-es-Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers Ltd. 
 
Szyszczak, E, et al (2005) Understanding EU Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell 
 
Tridimas, T (2006) The General Principles of EU Law, New York: Oxford 
University Press Inc. 
 
United Nations (1998) Image & Reality: Questions and Answers About the 
United Nations, New York: UN Department of Public Information. 
 
Van Krieken, P.J, et al (eds) (2005) The Hague: The Legal Capital of the 
World, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 
 
Venter, D, et al (2007) Regional Integration-Economic Partnership 
Agreements for Eastern and Southern Africa, Pretoria: Institute for Business 
Innovation. 
 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
            Akinsanya, A “International protection of direct foreign investments in the                     
            World” (1987) 36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
 
            Asante, S.K.B “International law and foreign investment: a reappraisal”  
            (1988) 37 International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
 
“Attracting talent” (2009) 14 Business Brief. 
 
Bartels, L “The legal status of the initialled EPAs” (2008) 7 Trade 
Negotiations Insight. 
 
Busse, M, et al “Trade effects of the East African Community” (2005) 6 The 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
157 
Cheng, J.Y.S, et al “China’s Africa’s policy in the post-cold war era” (2009) 39 
Journal of Contemporary Asia. 
 
Cilliers, J “The Pan African Parliament: a plenary of parliamentarians” (2004) 
13 African Security Review. 
 
Davies, R “Bridging the divide: the SADC EPA” (2008) 7 No.4 Trade 
Negotiations Insights. 
 
Deya, D “The rule of law and independence of the judiciary in the East 
African region” (2007) 1 The Tanzania Lawyer. 
 
Ibru, C “Boosting competitiveness across the continent” (2009) 7 
Africainvestor. 
 
Inglehart, R, et al “How development leads to democracy: what we know 
about modernisation” (2009) 88 Foreign Affairs. 
 
“Interview with Peter Mandelson: EPAs: there is no Plan B” (2007) 6 Trade 
Negotiations Insight.  
 
Kaahwa, W.T.K “The secretariat of the East African Community” (2003) 4 The 
East African Lawyer. 
 
Keiwua, O.M “Focus on the East African Court of Justice (2003) 4 The East 
African Lawyer. 
 
Mchumo, A.S “The East African Community” (2003) 4 The East African 
Lawyer. 
 
Meadle, E “Monetary integration: prospects for a changing world economy” 
(2009) XXX Harvard International Review. 
 
 
 
 
 
158 
Mosoti, V “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development” (2004) 5 San 
Diego International Law Journal. 
 
Mosoti, V “Non-discrimination and its dimensions in a possible WTO 
Framework Agreement on Investment: reflections on the scope and policy 
space for the development of poor economies” (2003) 4 The Journal of World 
Investment. 
 
Mulenga, J.N “Linkages between the EACJ and the national courts” (2003) 5 
The East African Lawyers. 
 
Munyuki, E “ESA-EC discuss EPAs negotiations” (2006) 9 SEATINI Bulletin. 
 
Musoke, M, et al “Pressure mounts on Tanzania to chose” (2006) 2 
Procurement News 
 
Mwaikusa, J.T “Rule of law and independence of the judiciary in the SADC 
region: some pertinent challenges” (2007)1, The Tanzania Lawyer. 
 
Ochieng, C.M.O “The EU-ACP Economic Partnerships Agreements and the 
‘development question’: constraints and opportunities posed by Article XXIV 
and the special and differential treatment provisions of the WTO” (2007) 9 
Journal of International Economic Law. 
 
Oduol, J.O “Origins of the COMESA Court of Justice” (2003) 4 The East 
African Lawyer. 
 
Ogalo, D.W “The East African Legislative Assembly perspective” (2003) 4 
The East African Lawyer 
 
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)/European Centre for Development 
Policy Management (ECDPM) “Interim EPAs in Africa: what’s in them? And 
what is next? (2008) 7 Trade Negotiations Insight. 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
Ojienda, T.O “Understanding the East African Court of Justice” (2003) 4 The 
East African Lawyer. 
 
Pahariya, N.C “Trans-regional trade agreements in South Asia” (2008) 4 
Trade Insight. 
 
Sachs, A “Participatory democracy” (2009) 32 New Agenda. 
 
Sacht, J “Human resources in the age of talent” (2009) 14 Business Brief. 
 
Salacuse, J.W “Do BITs really work?: an evaluation of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties and their grand bargain” (2005) 46 Harvard International Law 
Journal. 
 
Simamba, B. H “Suspension and removal of Judges and Magistrates from the 
East African Court of Justice” (2005) 16 Journal of the Commonwealth 
Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association. 
 
Southern Africa Global Competitiveness Hub (SAGCH) “Tough questions 
face COMESA as it prepares for customs union” (2008) 12 Inside Southern 
African Trade. 
 
The Hon. Doyle, J “The National Judicial College of Australia” (2005) 16 
Journal of the Commonwealth Magistrates’ and Judges’ Association. 
 
 
Vedasto, A.K “The East African Court of Justice: what it can determine and 
what it cannot” (2007) 1 The Tanzania Lawyer. 
 
WEBSITE ARTICLES 
Ang’ila, F (ed) (2003) “Working structures of parliament in East Africa” 
<http://www.kenya.fes-international.de/publications/workingstructures.pdf > 
accessed on 10 April 2009.  
 
 
 
 
 
160 
Ang’ila, F (ed) (2004) “Processes for elections to the East African Legislative 
Assembly” < http://www.kenya.fes-international.de/publications/eala.pdf > 
accessed on 10 October 2008.  
 
Apuuli, K.P (2006) “Fast tracking East African Federation: asking the difficult 
questions” < http://www.deniva.org.ug/files/articles-askingdifficultquestions.doc > 
accessed on 28 April 2009. 
 
 
Blomstrom, M, et al (1998) “Regional economic integration and foreign direct 
investment: the North America experience” < 
http://www.ideas.repec.org/p/hhs/hastef/0269.html > accessed on 9 October 
2008. 
 
Bryan, S, et al (eds) (2007) “Transparency and accountability in Africa’s 
extractive industries: the role of legislature” pg 10 < 
http://www.ndi.org/files/2191-extractive-080807.pdf > accessed on 16 March 
2009. 
 
Goude, N.N (2008) “Trade and investment between Japan and Africa in the 
context of follow up to the Fourth Tokyo International Conference on African 
Development (TICAD IV)” < http://www.afdb.org/pbs/portal/docs/PAGE/ADB-
ADMIN-PG/DOCUMENTS/AEC/1.2.3-GOUDE-0.PDF > accessed on 10 
November 2008. 
 
Guzman, A.T (1997) “Explaining the popularity of BITs: why LDCs sign 
treaties that hurt them” < http://www.jeanmonnet.org/papers/97/97-12.html > 
accessed on 10 November 2008. 
 
Habib, A, et al (2006) “African integration and civil society: the case of African 
Union” < http://www.transformation.ukzn.za/archive/tran059/5905.pdf > 
accessed on 6 May 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
161 
Kouassi, R.N (2007) “The itinerary of the African integration process: an 
overview of the historical landmarks” < http://www.africa-
union.org/root/ua/Newsletter/EA/Vol.1,No.2/Kouassi.pdf> accessed on 28 
October 2008 
 
Kritzinger Van Niekerk, L (2005) “Regional integration: concepts, advantages, 
disadvantages and lessons of experience” < 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002411/index.php> accessed on 10 
September 2008. 
 
Khumalo, N (2008) “Economic integration requires new strategies” < 
allAfrica.com > accessed on 19 October 2008 
 
Lawrence, R.Z (2007) “International Organisations: the challenge of aligning 
mission, means and legitimacy” < 
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/citrade/GTN/Current%20Research/WTO%20Int’l
%20Orrgs.pdf > accessed on 7 May 2009. 
 
Maur, J.C (2008) “Regionalism and trade facilitation: a primer” < http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent.Server/WDS/IB/2008/01/03/
000158349_2 > accessed on 30 October 2008. 
  
Ogalo, D.W (2006) “East African Court of Justice: wanting in goodwill” < 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=760 
> accessed on 3 March 2009. 
 
Qualmann, R, et al “Overlapping membership in COMESA, EAC, SACU, 
SADC: trade policy options for the region and for EPA negotiations”< 
http://tanzania.fes-international.de/info-service/docs/overlapping-
membership-in-comesa-eac-sacu-and-sadc.pdf >   accessed on 10 
September 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
162 
Ruhangisa, J. E (2006) “Litigation in the East African Court of Justice” < 
http://www.africanexecutive.com/modules/magazine/articles.php?article=794 
> accessed on 3 March 2009. 
 
“Supachai’s Consultative Board: non-discrimination in trouble” 
<http://www.globefish.org/?id=2338     accessed on 6 May 2009. 
 
Terlinden, U (2004) “African regional parliaments-engines of integration and 
democratization?”  < http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/02581.pdf >  accessed 
on 15 March 2009. 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS AND WORKING PAPERS      
Aminian, N, et al (2008) “Integration of markets vs. integration by 
agreements”<http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContent 
Server/WDS/IB/2008/03/04/000158349_2 > accessed on 30 October 2008. 
 
Baert, F, et al (2008) “Deepening the social dimension of regional integration: 
an overview of recent trends and future challenges in light of the 
recommendations of the report of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalisation” (UNU-CRIS Working Paper No. W-2008/3) < 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/w-2008-3.pdf > accessed on 
10 October 2008. 
 
DeRosa, D.A (2007) “Regional integration arrangements: static economic 
theory, quantitative findings, and policy guidelines” 
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/workpapers/wps2000series/
wps > 007/wps2007.pdf accessed on 24 October 2008.        
 
Fanta, E (2008) “Dynamics of regional (non-) integration in eastern Africa” 
http://www.cris.unu.edu/workingpapers/Emmanuel.pdf> accessed on 10 
September 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
163 
Fiorentino, R.V, et al (2006) “The changing landscapes of regional trading 
agreements: 2006 update” (Discussion Paper no. 12) < 
http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/bookp-e/discussion-paper12a-e.pdf>   
accessed on 12 September 2008. 
 
Gibb, R (2006) “Rationalisation or redundancy? making Eastern & Southern 
Africa’s trade units relevant” (Brenthurst Discussion Paper No.3/2006) < 
www.givengain.com/unique/tralac/pdf/20060423-Brenthurst-Discussion.pdf > 
accessed on 19 September 2008. 
 
Kaplinsky, R, et al (2007) “The impact of China on Sub-Saharan Africa” IDS 
Working Paper 291< 
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002953/China_Africa_IDS_Nov2007.p
df> accessed on 10 October 2008. 
 
Mayda, A. M, et al (2006) “Do South-South trade agreements increase trade? 
commodity-level evidence from COMESA” UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers 0-
2006/19 < http://www.cris.unu.edu/UNU-CRIS-Working-Papers/Mayda.pdf > 
accessed on 28 October 2008.  
 
McKay, J, et al (eds) (2005) “Regional economic integration in a global 
framework”<http://www.bportugal.pt/euro/emudocs/bce/regionaleconomicinte
grationglobalframework2005_e.pdf > accessed on 9 October 2008 
 
Memis, E, et al (2006) “Assessing RTAs in the context of flying gees 
framework” pg 6 UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers No. 0-2006/18)< 
http;//www.cris.unu.edu/UNU-CRIS-Working-Papers.19.0.html > accessed on 
28 October 2008 
 
 
Portugal-Perez, A, et al (2008) “Trade costs in Africa: barriers and 
opportunities for reform” < http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/09/16
/0000158349_20089161 > accessed on 28 October 2008.  
 
 
 
 
164 
 
 
Schiff, M, et al (1997) “Regional integration as diplomacy”    
<http://www.worldbank/html/dec/Publications/workpapers/WPS 
1800series/wps 1801/wsp 1801.pdf> accessed on 24 October 2008. 
 
Sindzingre, A (2007) “Trade structure as a constraint to multilateral and 
regional arrangements in Sub-Saharan Africa: the WTO and the African 
Union “(UNU-CRIS Working papers W-2007/11) <http://www.cris-
unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20071207142150.w-2007-11.pdf> 
accessed on 10 October 2008. 
 
Stahl, H (2005) “Tariff liberalisation impacts of EAC customs union in 
perspective” (Tralac Working Paper no.4/2005) <www.givengain.com/cgi-
bin/giga.cgi?cmd=cause-dir-news-items&cause-id=1694&news-
id=5188285cat-id=1051 > accessed on 19 September 2008. 
 
Streatfeild, J.E.J (2003) “An examination of regional trade agreements: a 
case study of the EC and the East African Community” (Tralac Working 
Paper no. 11/2003)< www.tralac.co.za/scripts/content/php?id=2240> 
accessed on 17 September 2008. 
 
Van Hoestenberghe, K, et al (2006) “Economic Partnership Agreements 
between the EU and groups of ACP countries: will they promote 
development” UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers O-2006/27 < 
www.cris.unu.edu/fileadmin/workingpapers/20061117101114.O-2006-27.pdf 
> accessed on 2 November 2008.   
      
World Trade Organization (2007): “RTAs and WTO: A troubled relationship” < 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/bookshop_e/discussion_papers12b_e.pdf > 
accessed on 28 February 2009. 
 
SEATINI (2007): “Protecting health in the proposed Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) between East and Southern Africa (ESA) countries and the 
 
 
 
 
165 
European Union” < http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0002684/index.php 
> accessed on 25 October 2008. 
 
South Centre (2007): “Aid for trade and financial assistance to implement the 
EPAs”, Analytical Note SC/AN/TDP/EPA/6 < http://www.sarpn-
org.za/documents/d0002666/EPA_Factsheet6_SouthCentre-May2007.pdf > 
accessed on 10 October 2008. 
 
REPORTS 
Bank of Namibia (2005) The Benefits of Regional Integration for Smaller 
Economies<http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0001766/Bank_Namibia_2005
.pdf> accessed on10 October 2008. 
 
Communiqué of the 5th Extraordinary Summit of the EAC Heads of State held 
in Kampala, Uganda on 18th June, 2007 
 
Corporate Tanzania: The Business, Trade and Investment Guide 2007/2008. 
 
EAC: The EAC Development Strategy 2006-2010 
 
EAC (2007): 14th Meeting of the Council of Ministers of the East African 
Community (Ref.EAC/CM14/AI/2007) held on 24 -27 September, 2007. 
 
EAC (2008): 17th EAC Council of Ministers Meeting (Ref. 
EAC/CM17/BP/2008) held at AICC in Arusha, Tanzania from 8th -13th 
September 2008. 
 
EAC (2004): Report of the 6th Summit of the East African Community Heads 
of State (Ref: EAC/SHS/06/2004) held in Arusha, Tanzania on 26 November 
2004. 
 
 EAC (2008): Report of the 7th Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State (Ref. 
No .EAC/SHS EX.7/R/2008) held in Kampala, Uganda, on 22nd October 
2008. 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
EU (2007): Report on Economic Partnerships Agreements of the Committee 
on International Trade of the European Parliament (Final A6-0084/2007), 
dated 27 March 2007 < http://www.sarpn-
org.za/documents/d0002579/EPA_EU_report_March2007.pdf > accessed on 
10 October 2008. 
 
International Trade Centre (ITC) (2001): Converting LDCs Export 
Opportunities into Business: A Strategic Response. 
 
Sutherland, P, et al (2004) The Future of the WTO: Addressing institutional 
Challenges in the New Millennium < http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-
e/10anniv-e/future-wto-e.pdf > accessed on 6 May 2009.  
 
 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2004):  Assessing 
Regional Integration in Africa I, UNECA Policy Research Report  < 
www.uneca.org> accessed on 17 September 2008 
 
United Nations Commission for Africa (UNECA) (2006):  Assessing Regional 
Integration in Africa II: Rationalising Regional Economic Communities < 
http://www.uneca.org/eca-programme/nrid/docs/pppOutcomeJuly2008.pdf > 
accessed on 12 September 2008. 
 
Welcome to EAC < http://www.eac.int/index.php/about-eac.html > accessed 
on 10 September 2008. 
 
World Bank (2000): Trade Blocs < 
http://oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/1923431.pdf> accessed on 10 September 
2008. 
 
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalisation (WCSDG) 
(2004): A Fair Globalisation: Creating Opportunities for All. 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
World Trade Organisation (2003): World Trade Report 2003. 
 
World Trade Organisation: RTAs notified to the WTO and in force < 
http://docsonline.wto.org-WT/COM TD/25/Add.1 > accessed on 10 
September 2008. 
 
SPEECHES 
Bossa, S.B (2006) “A critique of the East African Court of Justice as a human 
rights court” < http://www.icj.org/IMG/Speech_BOSSA_pdf > accessed on 3 
March 2009. 
 
Carstens, A (2005) “Making regional integration work”, a speech delivered by 
Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at 20th Annual 
General Meeting and Conference of the Pakistan Society of Development 
Economists, Islamabad, Pakistan, 20th January 2005 < 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/011205.html > accessed on 9 
October 2008. 
 
LEGISLATION 
Agreement for the Division of the Assets and Liabilities for the Former East 
African Community, 1984. 
 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1994 
 
General Agreement on Trade in Services, 1994. 
 
Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union, 2004. 
 
The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, as amended. 
 
The East African Trade Negotiating Bill, 2007. 
 
The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community,1999 (As 
amended on 14th December, 2006 and 20th August, 2007). 
 
 
 
 
168 
 
The Treaty for the East African Co-operation, 1967. 
 
CASES 
Advisory Opinion of the Court in the Matter of a Request by the Council of 
Ministers of the EAC FOR an Advisory Opinion (Appl. No.1 of 2008) [2008] 
EACJ (24 April 2009)  < http://www.ealawsociety.org/Joomla.php?html> 
accessed on 28 April 2009. 
 
The Attorney of the Republic of Kenya v Prof. Anyang’ Nyong’o and 10 
Others (Appl.No.5 of 2007) [2007] EACJ (6 February 2007) < 
http://www.safli.org/ea/cases/EACJ/toc-E.html > accessed on 6 October 
2008. 
 
Calist Mwatela and Others v East African Community (Appl.No.1 of 2005) 
[2006] EACJ (October 2006) < http://www.safli.org/ea/cases/EACJ/toc-E.html 
> accessed on 6 October 2008.  
 
Costa v ENEL Case No.6/64 (1964) ECJ. 
 
Defrene v Sabena (1981) All E.L.R.1222. 
 
International Law Commission Advisory Opinion A/46169. 
 
Katabazi and 21 Others v Secretary-General of the EAC and Another (Ref. 
No.1 of 2007) {2007} EACJ 3 (1 November 2007) < 
http://www.saflii.org/ea/case/EACJ/2007/3.html > accessed on 24 April 2009. 
 
Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ 
Reports, 1996 (popularly known as ‘the WHO Advisory Opinion Case’). 
 
Mtikila v Attorney General of the United Republic of Tanzania and others Ref. 
No. 2 of 2007 (Ruling) {2007} EACJ 4 (25 April 2007) 
 
 
 
 
169 
<http;//www.safli.org/ea/cases/EACJ/toc-E.html> accessed on 10 February 
2009.  
 
Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, Appellate 
Body Report WT/DS34/AB/R, 22 October 1999.  
 
MAGAZINE/NEWSPAPER/NEWSLETTERARTICLES/PRESS RELEASES 
 
“Arusha Times”, dated 21 February, 2009. 
 
“BusinessinAfrica”, dated March 2009. 
 
“Bridges Weekly Trade Digest”, Vol. 12, No.1, dated February2008. 
 
“Daily News Online”, dated 2 March, 2009. 
 
Dowden, R, et al “Dialogue” in “Standpoint”, Issue No.10, dated March 2009. 
 
“e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Issue No. 2008/12 dated 5 September 
2008. 
 
“e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Special Issue No. 2008/15 dated 6 October 
2008.  
 
“e-EAC newsletter”, Update Issue No. 22, dated 27 January 2009. 
 
“e-EAC newsletter”, Update Issue No. 23, dated 10 February 2009. 
 
“e-EAC newsletter”, EAC Update Issue No. 24 dated 24 February 2009. 
 
EAC: “Press Release”, dated 14th February 2009 on a High Level Strategy 
Retreat for Key Organs and Institutions of the EAC. 
 
“Guardian” dated 27 April 2009. 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
Issa, O “How to attract foreign investment” in “African Business”, Issue 
No.351, dated March 2009. 
 
Issa, O “Investment: the importance of judicial reforms” in “African Business”, 
Issue No. 352, dated April 2009.  
 
Kabukuru, W “Kenya’s example” in “New African”, Issue No. 482, dated 
March 2009. 
 
Kron, J “Rwanda & the charity industrial complex” in “New African”, Issue No. 
482, dated March 2009. 
 
Lithwick, D “When Judges behave badly” in “Newsweek”, dated 9 March, 
2009. 
 
“New Vision” (Kampala), dated 6 October 2008.  
 
Njururi, B “More speed, more speed, urges Annan” in “New African”, Issue 
No. 482, dated March 2009. 
 
Obadina, T “Free trade, not ‘positive’ discrimination” in “Africa Today”, Vol.15 
No.3, dated March 2009. 
 
Pahad, E “Interview” in “The Thinker”, dated March, 2009. 
 
Siddiqi, M “Global crunch presents stiff challenges to FDI despite new 
incentives” in “The Middle East”, Issue No. 398, dated March 2009. 
 
Tandon, Y “Ending aid dependence” in “African Business”, Issue No. 351, 
dated March 2009. 
  
“The Community”, Issue No. 7, dated October 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
171 
 “The Standard”, dated 28 February 2009. 
 
WEBSITES 
www.african-union.org 
www.allAfrica.com.East 
www.eac.int 
www.cris.unu.edu 
www.eabc-online.com 
www.allAfrica.com.East 
www.eadb.org 
www.ealawsociety.org 
www.dailynews.co.tz  
www.imf.org 
www.ippmedia.com 
www.nation.com 
www.sarpin.org.za 
www.satradehub.org 
www.eaststandard.net 
www.thecitizen.co.tz 
www.theeastafrican.co.ke 
www.tradeobservatory.org 
www.tralac.co.za 
www.uneca.org 
www.wto.org 
 
 
 
 
